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Abstract 
 
 This thesis is concerned with the rise and fall of cybernetics, understood as an inquiry regarding 
the nature of a machine. The collapse of this scientific movement, usually explained by external factors 
such as lack of funding, will be addressed from a philosophical standpoint. 
  Delving deeper into the theoretical core of cybernetics, one could find that the contributions of 
William Ross Ashby and John von Neumann shed light onto the particular ways in which cybernetics 
understood the nature and behavior of a machine. Ross Ashby offered an account of the nature of a 
machine and then extended the scope of “the mechanical”. This extension would encompass areas that 
will later be shown to be problematic for mechanization, such as learning and adaptation. The way in 
which a machine-ontology was applied would trigger effects seemingly contrary to cybernetics’ own 
distinctive features. Von Neumann, on the other hand, tinkered with a mechanical model of the brain, 
realizing grave limitations that prompted him to look for an alternative for cybernetics to work on. The 
proposal that came out of this resulted in a serious blow against the theoretical core of cybernetics. 
 Why did cybernetics collapse? The contributions coming from both thinkers, in their own ways, 
spelled out the main tenets of the cybernetic proposal. But these very contributions led to cybernetics’ 
own demise. The whole story can be framed under the rubric of a serious inquiry into the metaphysical 
underpinnings of a machine. The rise and fall of cybernetics could thus help us better understand what a 
machine is from a philosophical standpoint. 
 Although a historical component is present, my emphasis relies on a philosophical consideration 
of the cybernetic phenomenon. This metaphysical dissection will attempt to clarify how a machine-based 
ontology remained at the core of cybernetics. An emerging link will hopefully lead towards establishing a 
tri-partite correlation between cybernetics’ own evolution, its theoretical core, and its collapse. It will 
hopefully show how cybernetic inquiries into the nature of a machine might have proved fatal to the very 
enterprise at large, due to unsolvable theoretical tensions.  
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Introduction. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the rise and fall of cybernetics, understood as an inquiry regarding 
the nature of a machine. 
 Mechanical devices have certainly been the focus of attention in the past. This thesis is 
not concerned with those --interesting in their own right, but tangentially related to the notion of 
a machine. In fact, there seems to be so far no treatise which directly addressed the nature of a 
machine per se. Cybernetics is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of science, and it is 
my thesis that it was fundamentally concerned with the notion of a machine. Furthermore, 
cybernetics might stand as the first time in history where the nature of a machine tout court was 
taken up to constitute the hinge upon which the whole enterprise revolved. This scientific 
movement, which has arguably not yet received adequate attention from a philosophical 
standpoint, will be addressed at fair length and depth, using it as a guiding instance for the 
questioning of the nature of a machine.  
 Delving deeper into the theoretical core of cybernetics, one could find that the 
contributions of William Ross Ashby and John von Neumann shed light onto the particular ways 
in which cybernetics understood the essence of a machine. However, both these contributions 
have been relatively relegated to a secondary role in historical treatments, leaving their 
philosophical import somewhat in the dark. Ross Ashby pondered about the useful outcomes of 
extending the scope of “the mechanical” after offering an account of the nature of a machine. 
This extension would later encompass realms that will show to be problematic for 
mechanization, and the way in which a machine-ontology was applied would trigger effects 
seemingly contrary to cybernetics’ own distinctive features. Von Neumann, on the other hand, 
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tinkered with a mechanical model of the brain, realizing grave limitations that prompted him to 
look for an alternative for cybernetics to soldier on. The proposal that came out of it might have 
signified a serious blow against cybernetics’ theoretical core. 
 The contributions coming from both thinkers, in their own ways, spelled out the main 
tenets of the cybernetic proposal, consistent with their original intentions for further advancing it. 
But these contributions –likely against the will of the contributors themselves—might have led to 
cybernetics’ own demise. The whole story can be framed under the rubric of a serious inquiry 
into the metaphysical underpinnings of a machine. The rise and fall of cybernetics could thus 
help us better understand what a machine is from a philosophical standpoint. 
 This thesis is made up by two major parts: a historical and a philosophical one.  
The historical part is itself unfolded in two stages: a) the history of cybernetics proper: its 
beginnings in the early 1940s, flourishing, and decline a decade later; and b) the pre-history that 
lead to the cybernetic enterprise. What I tried to do in the latter was addressing the historical and 
theoretical context that put together the stage for cybernetics to emerge. Indeed a particular 
development in mathematics during the first half of the 20
th
 century, which ended up in Alan 
Turing’s contribution to the notion of computation, seems to have triggered a questioning close 
to the nature of a machine. Accordingly, an exposition of this evolving context will precede the 
articulation of the cybernetic main theoretical tenets in the following part. 
 Although an updated historical account of cybernetics can be worthy in and of itself, my 
emphasis relies on a philosophical consideration of the cybernetic phenomenon. This latter 
account is comprised by four parts: a) an articulation of the metaphysical tenets underlying 
cybernetics (chapters III and IV); b) the contribution of William Ross Ashby (chapter V); c) the 
contribution of John von Neumann (chapter VI) and d) a philosophical account on the effect of 
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these contributions (chapter VII). This metaphysical dissection will attempt to clarify how a 
machine-based ontology lay at the core of the cybernetic edifice. An emerging link will 
hopefully lead towards establishing a tri-partite correlation between cybernetics’ own evolution, 
its theoretical core, and its collapse. 
 The first two chapters give a historical overview of cybernetics; they depict its origins, 
rise, climax and subsequent downfall. They aim to reveal how deeply intertwined the project was 
since its inception with an epistemology that directly stems from experimentation with machine 
behavior. The third chapter deals with the preceding events that lead to the emergence of 
cybernetics, mainly in recent history of mathematics. This chapter will aim to show how a 
previous transformation of the notion of a machine paved the way for cybernetics to appear. The 
fourth chapter aims at philosophically dissecting the main tenets of cybernetics, in order to 
unveil the metaphysical program behind the enterprise at large. This chapter will attempt to show 
that the entirety of the cybernetic ethos was underpinned by a framework constituted by bold 
conjectures regarding the nature of a machine. Chapters five and six address the contributions of 
Ross Ashby and John von Neumann – respectively. These contributions should help uncover 
relatively hidden tensions in the cybernetic project --both stemming from the nature of a 
machine. Chapter seven ties up both Ashby’s and von Neumann’s contributions with the main 
pillars of cybernetics. Hopefully it will show how cybernetic inquiries into the nature of a 
machine might have proved fatal to the very enterprise at large, due to unsolvable theoretical 
tensions. The concluding remarks will briefly recapitulate the thread of the argument 
underpinning this thesis.  
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I. Cybernetics: The beginnings, the founding articles and the first meetings. 
 
1. The problem of anti-aircraft weaponry. 
 
On September 1
st
 1939, the Nazis invaded Poland. Two days later, both France and Great Britain 
declared war on Germany. Soon thereafter, constant aerial raids were launched from both sides. 
Current anti-aircraft guns were proven reasonably effective against the massive air bombers that 
began to cast immense shadows over Europe. They flew at a relatively slow pace and in a fairly 
straight path. But the ground guns’ effectiveness against the escorting fighter planes was 
wanting. These aircraft were smaller, faster and capable of snappily avoiding predictable paths 
with ease and surprise
1
 –the celebrated and sometimes legendary skills of a pilot were largely 
based upon these extreme maneuverability capacities. Since a shot shell would take up to 20 
seconds to reach the desirable altitude for explosion,
2
 at a point 2 miles after the original position 
of the flying target,
3
 a very concrete problem for the military emerged.  
 At that point, inheriting the legacy of the knowledge gained from the first aerial strikes at 
the end of World War I, the human decision factor was being gradually merged with the relative 
reliability of a machine designed to fulfill a task. An early proto-computer (a “predictor”) would 
receive visual information from soldiers on the ground, regarding the possible size of the target, 
its possible speed, the height of its path, the wind situation at the moment, etc. The analog 
machine would then plot the direction towards which the soldier had to aim the gun. If all 
worked well, the soldier had to worry mainly about constantly and accurately pointing at the 
moving target and re-charging ammunition --while the predictor would take care of the angle of 
                                                 
1
 Mindell 1995, p. 78 
2
 Conway & Siegelman 2005, p. 110 
3
 Mindell 2002, p. 86 
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shooting. Ideally, this synergy of man and machine would create a cloud of exploding shells 
around the target’s flying path. Shrapnel should sufficiently damage the aircraft’s fuselage for it 
to go down, become an easier target due to damage, or abort its mission and retreat. 
 It is now widely agreed that the first air raids over the United Kingdom, the “Battle of 
Britain”, was the first military failure for the German advance over Europe. Further, British 
retaliation against Germany proved to be devastating for the Nazis. The English air forces 
inflicted a serious blow to the Nazi leadership’s image, coordinating bombings to happen 
precisely while important political speeches were taking place –topping it with one on Hitler’s 
birthday.  The German morale was however unbroken, and the retaliation against Britain, in 
terms of air strikes, was massive --it is referred to as the “Blitz” (“Lightning” in German). 
Despite the fact that the German mission was more successful this time, it still failed to 
accomplish its main goal: to cripple the military response capacity of the United Kingdom. In 
fact, raids over Germany, now with help from the Allies, increased, and overall the destruction 
ended up being worse on the German side.  
 Although the United States chose to stay out of the war in the beginning, it gradually 
modified its stance, starting by helping its soon-to-be-Allies with supplies –a position captured in 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famed “Arsenal of Democracy” catchphrase. American elites 
were, expectably, following the events closely. Despite an alleged majority opposing joining the 
war, sentiments of preparation and readiness for the dramatic possibility were strong. In fact, 
there already were secret talks taking place between Great Britain and the United States 
regarding possible courses of action in the eventuality that the latter would enter the conflict. 
Scientists and academicians were not excluded from the patriotic sentiment of becoming useful 
for their nation given the distinct possibility of war. Quite the contrary. 
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 Norbert Wiener (1894–1964) was in his forties an already famed mathematics professor 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Of Russian Jewish ancestry, he married a 
bride brought from Germany, had two daughters, and ended up attending a Christian Unitarian 
church with his family. A child prodigy, Wiener already knew the alphabet at 2 years old, 
finished his mathematics bachelor’s degree at Tufts University at 14, and after studying 
philosophy both at Cornell and Harvard universities, he ended up obtaining a Ph.D. in 
mathematics from Harvard University at 18. After further studying in Europe under Bertrand 
Russell and David Hilbert, he finally landed a position at MIT, where he remained for the rest of 
his career. Between his return from Europe and the MIT professorship, World War I was still 
being fought. Wiener attempted to enlist in the military, but he was rejected, twice –his eyesight 
was remarkably poor. The third time he applied, this time as a lowly infantry soldier, he was 
accepted. WWI ended however just days later and to his chagrin he was quickly sent back home. 
 World War II broke out while Wiener was teaching at MIT. This time, equipped with 
prestigious degrees and academic fame, he approached the military via a proxy more related to 
his skills, addressing the scientific bureaucratic body set up to face the war. Vannevar Bush 
(1890-1974), a doctor in electrical engineering also from MIT and President Roosevelt’s 
consultant in all matters scientific, insisted on creating a special unit in charge of linking military 
and civilian knowledge. WWI allegedly showed that these two remarkably distinct and 
traditionally opposed human groups are not naturally inclined to work in tandem. Collaboration 
and synchronization between both had to be fostered –even enforced. Thus, the National Defense 
Research Committee (NDRC) was created, with Bush as its Chairman. Soon later, the NDRC, 
which had authority for organizing applied scientific research, but not for funding and 
developing projects, was superseded by the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
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(OSRD). This newer office had the power to give the go-ahead to projects, enjoying access to 
practically unlimited resources for funding. The NDRC, which ended up being the research 
branch within the bigger OSRD, was divided in five divisions: 
 Division A - Armor and Ordnance 
 Division B - Bombs, Fuels, Gases, & Chemical Problems 
 Division C - Communication and Transportation 
 Division D - Detection, Controls, and Instruments 
 Division E - Patents and Inventions. 
Division D, the one that concerns this chapter, was itself divided in four sections: 
 Section 1 - Detection 
 Section 2 - Controls 
 Section 3 - Instruments 
 Section 4 - Heat Radiation
4
 
Thus, the division and section to which Wiener had to apply was D-2, chaired by the doctor in 
engineering and mathematician Warren Weaver. In his letter, Wiener made sure that the upper 
echelon of the newly appointed scientific administration would acknowledge his eagerness to be 
at the service of his country through the military, clearly stating his wish: “I hope… you can find 
some corner of activity in which I may be of use during the emergency”.5 Not long after, to 
Wiener’s delight, he received word from NDRC letting him know that the military was interested 
in one of his proposals.
6
  
                                                 
4
 Mindell 2002, ch. 7 
5
 Galison 1994, p. 228 
6
 Indeed Wiener proposed several projects. Among them, he was advocating for the positioning of immense aerial 
balloons to be massively ignited in a prolonged manner once the enemy would fly close-by. This rejected proposal 
might have been refused due to its “passive defense” character. There already were projects that came to fruition 
which placed static “barrage balloons” tethered to the ground. This would provoke two desired outcomes. The 
enemy planes would have to fly higher, thus becoming more available as target --which is more difficult when they 
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 The United Kingdom had secretly developed a “cavity magnetron” –a type of radar far 
more advanced than anything similar developed anywhere else. This was probably Britain’s best 
kept “secret” at the time (the Germans eventually found out). The British were willing to share 
this ground-breaking weapon accessory with the Americans in exchange for help in quickly 
developing anti-aircraft weapon systems –with which such an invention should interface. 
Vannevar Bush was aware that American anti-aircraft technology was not precisely cutting edge, 
having barely improved after WWI. Closely following the way the war was unfolding in Europe, 
he understood that such was precisely the kind of weapon improvement that America urgently 
needed in case the war reached the Pacific coast. He agreed to the exchange. America would be 
helping the UK against the advancement of the “Axis” (Germany, Italy and Japan) while 
dramatically improving its own anti-aircraft defense. 
 Early on, Wiener took issue with a perceived inadequacy of contemporary anti-aircraft 
weapon systems, thus wishing to approach the problem from a different angle –from a 
perspective closer to his own fields of expertise. In the past, Wiener had spent years working on 
the mathematical tractability of diverse chaotic phenomena, trying to find recognizable patterns 
via formulaic equations. For instance, he devised a numerical “filter” for the allegedly random 
movement of dust particles (Brownian motion) --which was later known as the ‘Wiener filter’. 
Given the relative ineffectiveness of the current anti-aircraft predictors, he saw a probable 
application of similar principles for the construction of an improved machine –one that could 
predict the position of the flying target by extrapolating its likely future location, statistically 
deducing it from its previous locations. Taking into consideration all the relevant variables 
                                                                                                                                                             
fly at a low altitude. Also, if they would refuse to fly higher, they would risk becoming entangled with the wires and 
crash. As it turned out, pilots soon easily overcame this difficulty, and these defenses stopped being used (Galison 
1994, pp. 228-229). 
9 
 
available and finding an “average”, the machine would predict where the enemy object would be 
in the near future, thus producing its best possible shot at neutralizing it. 
 
2. The AA-Predictor. 
  
The utmost importance of interfacing pure theory and embedded practice was always in 
Wiener’s mind --and in a personally dramatic manner. His plans for earning a Ph.D. in biology 
were trumped by his utter manual clumsiness while making his way through the mandatory 
laboratory coursework.
7
 Once a professor, his poor sight led him to famously walk down the 
campus hallways with one hand always touching the wall, allegedly following the belief that 
tracking a maze’s wall would eventually take him to the exit. Wiener’s inability to shoot and hit 
even a big immobile object, “a barn among a flock of barns”,8 spelled for him, much to his 
dismay, non-admittance to military service. The reason why he famously walked with his head 
tilted back was that he instructed his optometrist to divide his thick glasses in two: the upper half 
would allow him to read, whereas the lower half to see afar. Thus he used to walk towards and 
approach people in a manner of looking down on them –which gained for him some antipathy. 
He was just severely myopic.
9
   
 It is then unsurprising that as soon as he received funding for his project, finding a person 
with the appropriate hands-on skills was the first task. Nobody without at least passing 
knowledge in applied electronics (e.g. radio building) would even be considered as a potential 
assistant. “There is nothing in a drawing in abstract algebra or topology… which would prepare 
                                                 
7
 Hayles 1999, p. 99 
8
 Conway & Siegelman 2005, p. 124 
9
 For the famous anecdotes about his legendary blindness and eccentricities, see Jackson 1972. 
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one in a way to cooperate with engineering design”.10 From now on, the scientist involved in 
wartime projects would have to get out from the comfort zone of “clean” and pure science and 
“get dirty”, so to speak, with real-world constraints.   
 If I could not find these talents joined together in a single man, I would be forced to assemble a 
 team of people each with particular talents in one field and a general knowledge of the others. In 
 this team I would probably be the only mathematician thus the project as a whole would concern 
 other engineering groups as much as the American Mathematical Society and it would be 
 necessary for me to cross ordinary professional lines.
11 
In January 1941, Wiener hired Julian Bigelow, a talented and down to earth electrical engineer 
from MIT. Most relevantly, he was an active airplane pilot as well. He joined Wiener’s team for 
exclusively working in the circuit design of the predictor, but his skills would later prove to be 
essential for a much bigger project.
12
 As alluded to above, Wiener wished to utilise knowledge 
gained from his previous mathematical investigations into chaotic motion in order to improve the 
capabilities of the current predictors –so that the machine could better foretell the future position 
of a flying enemy target. But that part was just half the story. Such an approach, even if 
potentially of great value, had to be connected with the unavoidable “real world” constraints in 
order to bring something truly useful --for the military at any rate-- to fruition. Fortunately, 
Wiener’s knowledge proved to be capable of modeling and articulating Bigelow’s grounded 
know-how expertise as a pilot in interesting ways.  
 Bigelow emphasized to Wiener that when a pilot is shot at, the scope of possible sudden 
movements he would try in order to avoid enemy fire was not boundless. The dynamics of 
                                                 
10
 Galison 1994, p. 235 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Bigelow would go on later to fulfil an important role as an irreplaceable collaborator for similarly inspired 
projects that came after this first one, which spanned a new way of thinking about science, engineering, and even 
philosophy, which Wiener later baptised as “cybernetics” (more below).  
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contact between the vessel and air, the resistance of the latter against the former’s fuselage, the 
torsion forces that the airplane’s body can maximally handle… all those aspects form the 
physical landscape that limit the amount of actual ‘moves’ and ‘tricks’ available to the pilot. 
Indeed a wrong sudden movement could end up breaking the plane. Wiener grasped the nature of 
this limited range of actions crisply. He then stated that there was a way to insert this limitation 
into the operation of the machine. Statistics was to provide the way: since the limited range of 
movement was known, one could find an average for the likelihood of a certain move to occur. 
In fact, the same reasoning could also be applied to the infamous sluggishness of the heavy anti-
air guns operating from the ground. The predictor to be built was going to dramatically improve 
its prognostications using the power of statistics. In Wiener’s mind, that was the feature that was 
going to provide this machine its unique capabilities.  
 As mentioned above, towards the end of WWI interest in anti-aircraft weaponry 
substantially grew. Accordingly, the notion of a “servomechanism” was given a good deal of 
attention, and thus it was right from the start at the crux of Wiener’s designs. Indeed the patent 
for which he applied was firmly within the realm of predictors –themselves paradigmatic 
examples routinely articulated in treatises about servomechanisms. Although most work had 
been done “empirically” --without a “school of thought” or anything pertaining to a mature 
technology-- there were two main writings circulating around the American war laboratories. 
One was by Hendrik Bode –a doctor in engineering working from Bell Laboratories-- and 
another one, less exhaustive but more encompassing, by LeRoy MacColl --a mathematician from 
Columbia University. Wiener chose MacColl’s treatise13 and soon introduced it to Bigelow. 
The common root between “servomechanism” and “servant” is not coincidental. 
Commonly regarded as an Anglicism, the noun “servant” was adopted in its unchanged form 
                                                 
13
 MacColl 1945 
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from the French language. The French servant denotes an entity fulfilling a role, but it has the 
connotation of being hired --and thus, remunerated. However the older Latin servus (from where 
the French word itself derives) has a more direct referent to the notion of a “slave”. A 
servomotoeur (French) is an engine subservient to a greater, more encompassing mechanical 
task. Its enslavement is firmly put in place by means of a phenomenon within control theory 
whose rediscovery was in itself, for Wiener, a sort of revelation: Negative Feedback. This was a 
type of corrective input that would fix possible deviations from the system’s designed task. As 
we will see later, negative feedback as a major useful element entered Wiener’s mind after facing 
the very real-world problems he was choosing to confront. Of the two classical writings on 
servos alluded to above, the one chosen by Wiener (McColl’s) firmly treated servo-mechanisms 
as paradigmatically “enslaved” by means of negative feedback. Thermostats and self-guided 
torpedoes would be prime examples of devices reliant on these servomechanisms. In fact, 
Wiener would not regard his own system in a fundamentally different manner than these two 
devices. He theoretically expanded the main tenets underlying one self-regulated system (that of 
a thermostat), to envision another similar one (that of an anti-aircraft weapon system). Seen from 
afar, both systems, thermostat and anti-aircraft weapon system, would be one and the same. 
 The attentive reader will notice that while in the thermostat all the comprising parts of the 
closed system are inanimate and mechanical in nature (gears, levers, etc.), Wiener’s system will 
have human beings at two points (the pilot and the gunner) interlaced with plane and gun. It did 
not take long for Wiener to see, after he began working out the systems’ circuits, that those two 
entities would be the source of irregularities for the predictor. “Irregularities”, however, were not 
a scary notion for Wiener. He had been dealing with phenomena of this sort while studying the 
allegedly random (Brownian) motion of dust –hence the confidence in his own usefulness for the 
13 
 
cause of the war. Hence Wiener proceeded to treat them mathematically. This mathematization 
would pre-require some sort of measured report of these irregularities, captured within a 
controlled environment.   
 As advanced above, Bigelow’s input would prove itself essential for the construction and 
operation of the new predictor –and more. As his airplane piloting know-how was in fact 
complementing his remarkable engineering skills, he designed and built a secondary machine at 
Wiener’s laboratory that would begin producing the data needed for the principal machine, the 
predictor. Bigelow’s machine, once constructed, begun to receive test subjects in a laboratory-
controlled environment, obtaining valuable data from their behavior.  
 The “gunners” recruited to use Bigelow’s machine had to align, via the manipulation of a 
delayed-effect joystick, two large light dots projected against a wall –a white one representing 
the enemy plane and a red one being the gunner’s beam. The recreated situation aimed to 
simulate the experience of a gunner aiming his heavy and slow gun turret towards the flying 
target and successfully hitting it with exploding shells. As mentioned before, airplane fighting 
made of the avoidance skills a matter of celebrative tradition –after all, the survival of the pilot 
was the positive outcome. This skilled irregular flying pattern had to be somehow represented in 
the movement of the white beam. Accordingly, Bigelow had the ingenious idea of projecting the 
white dot on the four walls of the classroom in a circular manner. When the dot would pass from 
one side of the corner to the other, it “jumped”, mimicking the sudden and deceptive avoidance 
behavior of a trained pilot. The “gunmen” reported how difficult this sudden move made the task 
of aligning their beam to the target, having to move the rigged joystick well ahead before the 
white spot would arrive at the predicted target location. Wiener was happy with the machine’s 
14 
 
simulation, and the data being produced by the gunners’ behavior was later input into Wiener’s 
predictor.
14
 
 Around the same time, and unbeknownst to Wiener, Warren Weaver was (due to war 
urgency) funding another anti-aircraft weapons system project via NDRC’s Fire Control section -
-of which he was chairman. Of special priority was the quick construction of a predictor that 
could be interfaced with Britain’s shared radar machine. At the time, up to fourteen people were 
required to provide the visual input and manual direction of the heavy and slow gun turrets. In 
Wiener’s mind, this process was “fascinating, absurdly cumbersome and ripe for 
improvement”.15 Given the relentless German bombing over England, automation of the whole 
system indeed carried a sense of urgency. 
 Neither Wiener nor Bigelow, despite their fairly high security clearances, knew at the 
time of the Radiation Laboratory
16
 functioning in a close-by building at MIT itself. The British 
secret invention was being studied there. Both were invited, however, to the Bell Laboratories, 
where a simpler predictor, soon to be coupled with the British radar, was being constructed under 
the supervision of that other theorist of servomechanisms, Hendrik Bode. The engineers at Bell 
were dismissive of Wiener’s project, feeling that theirs was less complicated and still able to 
                                                 
14
 Peter Galison has a different view on the nature of Bigelow’s machine, which allegedly recreates the kinaesthetic 
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accomplish the same task. Wiener and Bigelow were unmoved, pointing out the almost 
simplistic and unsophisticated nature of the machine built by these engineers. They did not take 
the statistical considerations pointed out by Wiener for its construction, and it was exclusively 
based on calculating the future angle of the plane using its previous location. When the predictor 
was coupled to an anti-aircraft gun and tested in the field, it did fairly well --but far from 
perfectly. However, it did not have to be particularly accurate, since the shells were altitude-
sensitive, and they would likely explode close to the plane fuselage anyway, damaging it with 
shrapnel. Given the urgency of the situation, Wiener and Bigelow gave a cold approval of the 
project, realizing that the Bell predictor had to be deployed anyway given the Axis’ ongoing 
devastation. 
 Not long after Wiener was finally notified of the secretive Rad Lab operating very close 
to his own, and was asked to train the group of young scientists gathered in there. Since Wiener’s 
ultimate reason for working on this whole project was patriotic in nature, he put understandable 
professional rivalries aside and agreed to help. However, schooling young and eager Ivy League 
minds would not be an easy task. From the point of view of scientific practice vis à vis different 
disciplines, there was a feature that lay at the center of Wiener’s operational concerns. If we 
follow a traditional distinction between the notions of multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity,
17
 one could arguably make the point that the scientists recruited by the 
bureaucratic overseeing institution (NDRC) would likely come equipped with a multidisciplinary 
perspective –open to what other disciplines would have to offer, but ultimately unwilling to 
substantially cross their own field boundaries. Wiener expected for his project (and indeed for 
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any working project) in contrast, a radical interdisciplinarity –based upon what other fields could 
provide, holistically creating a separate entity. Partly due to adherence to already familiar ways 
and reluctance to change (a usual signature of large administrative bodies), this pre-requirement 
proved to be particularly difficult to fulfill –so difficult in fact that the project was at some points 
almost brought to a permanent halt. Wiener complained… 
 New members of the staff of your Laboratory are recruited from the theoretical physicists or 
 mathematicians of the country, or indeed anywhere except from among the ranks of 
 communication engineers in the strictest and narrowest sense of the term…to turn such an 
 individual loose in your laboratory without special training, no matter what a big shot he may be 
 in his own subject, is like ordering a corn-doctor to amputate a leg.
18
 
The anchoring in reality by means of machine-construction should provide a hub for the 
encounter of heretofore separated disciplines. They all had to converge in one physically 
embodied project. This was an instance where an applied interdisciplinarity had to be the norm.
19
 
Realizing that it was not going to happen, Wiener renounced this project. With renewed 
motivation the scientific duo returned to its own project, aware that theirs had the potential to 
engender a much better prognosticator. A considerable amount of data was produced by 
Bigelow’s machine, and the results finally began to be entered and crunched by Wiener’s new 
predictor.
20
 Soon the mathematician grasped two identifiable phenomena. One seemed positive 
for the project, the other one less so.  
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 The machine would be fed with data produced by observation of aircraft behavior. Beforehand, Wiener’s statistics 
would predict where the target would be 1-2 seconds before it reaches its position, extrapolating from observations 
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every time new “real life” input is fed into it, rendering in advance the precise spot where and when the gun should 
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 On the one hand, pilots were exceedingly consistent while in the simulator. This finding 
seemed to match Wiener’s assumption that humans under stress tend to act repetitively. For 
Wiener, this also cast a light on the apparatus that made it look like a precursor to a learning 
machine. The predictor seemed to be good at learning how to accomplish a pilot’s death in a 
rather “personalized” manner. Speculating, the machine could be successful at knowing how to 
effectively kill one individual, statistically extrapolating data based upon his past behavior. In the 
area where the predictor was shining, it seemed that it was indeed managing to foretell the future. 
As the visiting supervisor George Stibitz put it in his working diary, referring to the impression 
the machine caused on Warren Weaver… 
 It simply must be agreed that, taking into account the character of the input data, their statistical 
 predictor accomplishes miracles… For a 1-second lead the behavior of their instrument is  
 positively uncanny. WW [Warren Weaver] threatens to bring along a hack saw on the next visit 
 and cut through the legs of the table to see if they do not have some hidden wires somewhere.
21
 
Indeed some technicians jokingly made allusions to the “gremlins” that were surely inhabiting 
and controlling the machine –venting the feeling of “uncanniness” present when the non-living 
                                                                                                                                                             
in real-life. And since a shell would take 20 seconds to explode from the moment it is shot, it would seem that 
Wiener’s machine was indeed in the right track. Wiener’s lay man explanation of his machine goes as follows: 
The proposed project is the design of a lead or prediction apparatus in which, when one member follows 
the actual track of an airplane, another member anticipates where the airplane is to be after a fixed lapse of 
time. This is done by a linear network into which information is put by the entire past motion of the 
airplane and which generates a correction term indicating the amount that the airplane is going to be away 
from its present position when a shell arrives in its neighborhood (Masani 1990, p. 182). 
David Mindell explains it with somewhat more detail: 
Wiener and Bigelow… turned to statistics and designed a new predictor based on “a statistical analysis of 
the correlation between the past performance of a function of time and its present and future performance.” 
The network calculated a future position of the target based on the statistical characteristics of its past 
performance (its autocorrelation). It then continually updated its own prediction as time passed, comparing 
the target’s flight path with previous guesses. A feedback network converged on guesses that minimized 
this error (Mindell 1990, p. 278) 
For a description of Wiener’s statistical prediction, see Galison 1994, p. 237. For an accessible explanation of the 
machine’s inner workings, see Mindell 2002, ch. 11. For a technical account of Wiener’s machine, see Bennett 
1993, ch. 14. 
 Given the later fate of this machine, the reader should bear in mind that its importance for cybernetics is not 
anchored in the details of its inner workings. Instead, its relevance is based upon the insights it provided Wiener 
while trying to “mechanize” the behavior of both the pilot and gun-man, making it overlap with that of the machine. 
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behaves in a life-like manner. Warren Weaver, after acknowledging the important result, pointed 
out that now the challenge remained regarding interfacing it with the rest of the weapons system 
in order to deploy it in the field. After all, it still had to be hooked to the British radar invention 
and the complicated manned gun turret. This proved to have many real world details that 
presented concrete problems for Wiener and Bigelow. 
 Coupling machines in order to accomplish a task was of course not a new feat. In fact, 
history registers several accomplishments where inter-regulated interface mechanisms worked 
successfully –from the Ancient Greeks on.22 However, there were some instances where they 
seemed to not work in tandem --and for somewhat mysterious reasons. For example, gun turrets 
placed in European naval vessels during the 18
th
 century sometimes tended to engage in 
recurrent “spasms”, swinging erratically and out of control for periods of time.23 A similar 
occurrence was later recognized in sound engineering. A microphone and a speaker in close 
range would trigger a high sound loop --the so-called “howling” phenomenon--, when the 
amplification of both sources went unlimited.
24
 As Bigelow reminded them, these instances of 
overcompensation in machine interfaces were gradually fixed by “negative feedback”: capturing 
a portion of the output and feeding it back into the stream, balancing it.
25
 Wiener was heavily 
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impressed by the importance of this negative feedback in mechanisms with a purpose or task 
built-in. He weighed the revolutionary importance that this engineering insight had for the 
industrial revolution
26
 and did not hesitate in asking help from an old friend, who allegedly found 
similar occurrences in living organisms.  
 Arturo Rosenblueth, a Mexican Jew of Hungarian heritage who studied medicine in Paris 
and Berlin, was the protégé of Walter Cannon –a famed biologist who pioneered work with self-
regulating mechanisms in living tissue (homeostasis). Wiener met Rosenblueth a decade before 
at the Harvard Medical School informal dinners organized by the latter. These dinners were an 
environment for free intellectual discussion on scientific matters. Both men being avid talkers 
who liked to convey their ideas and research with passion, Wiener clicked with Rosenblueth at 
once, and kept uninterrupted contact after that. 
 Upon being told of the problem Wiener was dealing with, Rosenblueth found it 
remarkably similar to a reported phenomenon occurring in some human patients: “purpose 
tremor”. This situation would manifest in the person when she would like to perform a simple, 
isolated, modular, task – like picking up an object from a table. The person’s arm would instead 
engage in uncontrollable swinging, back and forth, missing the object. If the person were handed 
a piece of candy, and was instructed to put it in his mouth, a similar occurrence would happen, 
missing the target –in this case, her mouth. Rosenblueth offered his insights to Bigelow and 
Wiener, and at least in theory, they seemed to have helped them find a solution. However, the 
implementation of these new self-regulatory aspects in the actual, physical instances of the 
machinery would prove to be a big challenge. Nevertheless, they soldiered on –as the war and 
devastation demanded.  
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 There was another realm that emerged as fundamental for accomplishing the task of 
building the new predictor. Although this aspect at first looked like a problem just for Wiener’s 
project, it planted the seed of a far-reaching change of outlook. In fact, it expanded Wiener’s 
framework to areas never before successfully treated mechanically. It was said above that 
Wiener found the pattern of each pilot’s behavior consistent with itself on an individual basis. 
However, the distressed behavior from one pilot to another did not seem to reveal any common 
pattern. The machine was falling short at capturing a recognizable behavior pertaining to humans 
in general --in order to wipe them out effectively, which was the main point of the military 
funded project in the first place. The human element in the system (the gunner and the pilot) was 
the main source of irregularities. Thus, the issue of “behavior” in general suddenly occupied the 
center of Wiener’s concerns. Given his general background in undergraduate and graduate 
studies in philosophy and biology, Wiener was well aware of the school of “behaviorism” in 
psychology. Considering his own struggles regarding the rigorous articulation of behavior in 
general, he referred to the contemporary scholarship on the subject as having missed the point: 
 Behaviorism as we all know is an established method of biological and psychological study but I 
 have nowhere seen an adequate attempt to analyze the intrinsic possibilities of types of behavior. 
 This has become necessary to me in connection with the design of apparatus to accomplish 
 specific purposes in the way of the repetition and modification of time patterns.
27
 
To be sure, preoccupation with human behavior as a source of randomness and unpredictability  
--potentially fatal when present in the chain of command-- was naturally at the core of the 
military mind. In the line of attack or defense, the human factor was sometimes regarded as less 
reliable than the mechanized parts of the weapon system --itself less prone to break, more 
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predictable, and hence more reliable. As a veteran Admiral put it to a group of NDRC scientists 
when they were invited aboard a war naval vessel: 
 
 Twenty-five hundred officers and men: gentlemen, twenty-five hundred sources of error.28 
 
Although the problem of (human) behavior was part and parcel of the nature of military 
command, now Wiener had this problem affecting the very design, construction and probability 
of success for his predicting machine. Wiener realized that the notion of behavior was at the crux 
of both his empirical and theoretical dilemma. Given the state of psychological knowledge 
regarding this issue, where “no behaviorist ha[d] ever really understood the possibilities of 
behavior”,29 and considering the urgency inherent to war-related enterprises, Wiener exercised a 
philosophical extension that would later prove to be prescient. 
  It does not seem even remotely possible to eliminate the human element as far as it shows itself 
 in enemy behavior. Therefore, in order to obtain as complete a mathematical treatment as possible 
 of the over-all control problem, it is necessary to assimilate the different parts of the system to a 
 single basis, either human or mechanical. Since our understanding of the mechanical elements of 
 gun pointing appeared to us to be far ahead of our psychological understanding, we chose to try to 
 find a mechanical analogue of the gun pointer and the airplane pilot.
30
 
Given the state of darkness regarding the study of behavior in general and human behavior in 
particular, extending the realm of the mechanizable seemed like the logical course of action.  
Surely much needed to be understood regarding the new realm of control theory. But it struck 
Wiener as evident that such knowledge, even if limited, was still greater than knowledge about 
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man. Thus the source of irregularities (namely, the human element in the system) could be 
identified with a tractable aspect within the realm of machinery… 
 We realized that the "randomness" or irregularity of an airplane's path is introduced by the pilot; 
 that in attempting to force his dynamic craft to execute a useful manoeuver, such as straight-line 
 flight or 180 degree turn, the pilot behaves like a servo-mechanism, attempting to overcome the 
 intrinsic lag due to the dynamics of his plane as a physical system, in response to a stimulus 
 which increases in intensity with the degree to which he has failed to accomplish his task.
31
 
Identifying that the pilot’s behavior is comparable with (as in “is amenable to be subsumed under 
the study of”) servomechanisms expanded the power of what could be mechanically tractable. 
From that point on, the usage of the term behavior (and its derivations) by Wiener and 
colleagues went well beyond the usual understanding of the notion as an exclusively Skinnerian 
concept –which also referred to a human being in machine terms, after equating it with a black 
box. However, as George Stibitz wrote in his report, Wiener’s ideas, even if enriched, were still 
unmistakably anchored in clear behavioristic roots. He acutely pointed out that Wiener’s 
“extension” of what behaves machine-like was based not upon the structure of the entity, but 
upon its behavior.
32
  
 W[iener] points out that their equipment is probably one of the closest mechanical approaches 
 ever made to physiological behavior. Parenthetically, the Wiener predictor is based on good 
 behavioristic ideas, since it tries to predict the future actions of an organism not by studying the 
 structure of the organism but by studying the past behavior of the organism.
33
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Regardless of the project’s outcome, Wiener saw a new and powerful paradigm beginning to 
take shape, capable of encompassing realms heretofore banned from a purely mechanical 
discourse. He did not hide his enthusiasm towards what was emerging before his eyes.  
 At this point, the machine was tested only in the laboratory and with data obtained ad 
intra. Let us recall that so far the data was produced by Bigelow’s simulator in the carefully 
measured environment of the small MIT laboratory assigned to Wiener. Before the predictor 
could be deployed to a field test (like the one Wiener and Bigelow attended for testing the Bell 
predictor), they needed to input real-world data. For this, both men toured several proving 
ground facilities, getting all the information they could lay hands on regarding aircraft behavior. 
A particular piece of data was particularly useful. Flights 303 and 304 from the North Carolina 
proving ground registered telemetry that reported aircraft behavior every second. This was 
exactly what Wiener and Bigelow needed. Equipped with it, they crunched the data with the 
predictor for the next 5 months.  
 In practical terms, the results were not too encouraging. Wiener’s predictor was 
compared with the mentioned simpler --and tested in front of him-- machine constructed under 
Bell’s Hendrick Bode. Bode’s predictor relied solely on a calculation of the target’s location 
based upon input angles and distances, and a re-computation every 10 seconds to correct the 
aiming. It did not have statistical analysis, unlike Wiener’s, but it was based upon readily 
available technology –and hence it was comparatively easier to construct and deploy. Wiener’s 
machine with all its bells and whistles performed barely better than Bode’s for flight 303 and 
even slightly worse for 304. The attack on Pearl Harbor had just occurred and imminent practical 
results were urgently needed: The United States had finally entered the global conflict. Wiener 
and Bigelow realized that hundreds of telemetry samples would need to be input into the 
24 
 
machine in order to make it practically functional, and the chances of having it finished before 
the end of the war were slim. They had to agree that Bode’s machine was the one to be favored 
by the military, and thus abstained from recommending their own machine for construction. 
 Given his relentless patriotic spirit, Wiener was obviously disappointed in failing to 
provide tangible help by means of this project. However, he did substantially collaborate, in the 
larger scheme of things, to the cause of the war. Wiener was acknowledged --by both the 
engineers behind Bode’s predictor and the scientists at the Rad Lab-- as responsible for 
improving the machine that the latter had already constructed. He would even go on to help “on 
the field” when this “rival” predictor would malfunction (e.g. aboard a naval vessel).34 
Furthermore, he produced by this time (1942) a manuscript summarizing the evolution of the 
theory of servomechanisms up to that point, improved with his insights on negative feedback, 
entitled “The Extrapolation, Interpolation and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series: With 
Engineering Applications”.35 The piece was immediately labelled as “classified” the moment 
Warren Weaver received it. The “Yellow Peril” --as it was nicknamed due to both its staggering 
complexity and the yellow cover proper to classified documents at the time-- became a legend of 
sorts among military engineering circles.
36
   
 Importantly for this thesis, the apparent failure by Wiener to accomplish the task of a 
new, substantially enhanced predictor yet opened up new routes of thinking. In the attempt at 
constructing this ambitious predictor, Wiener had had a profound insight –one that laid the 
foundations of a new science that would soon be regarded as revolutionary on a global scale. 
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3. The pre-meetings and founding articles. 
 
Before the predictor project came to its conclusion, Wiener already had grand plans stemming 
out of his experience. Indeed it was reported that at the time he was working on the machine, his 
mind was seemingly already on something else --as reported by his direct project supervisor, 
Warren Weaver. One should also take into account Wiener’s outspoken dislike for war-related 
secrecy –parameters which, to his understanding, run against the very notion of scientific 
practice. Wiener needed a freer environment to develop his new insights.  
The Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation is a funding institution rooted in a wealthy family of 
merchants, interested in the interdisciplinary advancement of sciences --particularly medical 
sciences.
37
 In 1942 it organized a gathering of 20 scientists to take place in New York, on May 
13 and 14. Wiener seized the opportunity. 
 The conference was supposed to deal with issues of hypnosis and conditioned reflexes. In 
its spirit of interdisciplinarity, related approaches were welcome, and so Wiener’s findings would 
allegedly fit. Wiener himself could not attend: the deadline for presenting his predictor was 
coming close. The person in charge of conveying his newly found ideas was a good choice. 
Arturo Rosenblueth, the medical scientist referred to above, who helped Wiener theoretically 
dissect the disconcerting endless loops, was to channel these ideas to the world for the first time 
–although to a small group, to begin with. This aspect was in fact the remarkable feature of the 
presentation, since much of the punch of Wiener’s novelty had precisely to do with these circular 
loops disentangled with Rosenblueth’s help. And indeed Rosenblueth did deliver. Although no 
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written records remain of this “Cerebral Inhibition Meeting”, personal recounts of the gathering 
described it as intense and powerful.
38
  
 Rosenblueth carefully conveyed what was possible without breaking the war-related oath 
of secrecy --e.g., he left aside much of the technicalities of Wiener’s “Yellow Peril”. He 
managed to deliver the core notions that the three men dealt with during work on the predictor. 
Rosenblueth reported that there was a novel notion of causality in nature that should be 
understood as “circular”. More specifically, given that some sub-parts of relatively complex 
systems sometimes seem to be caught in endless loops, there seem to be cases where 
overcompensating forces push the system “out of whack” (e.g., wild swinging of a person’s arm 
when she wants to take a bite of food, with tremor illness, missing her own mouth, or an anti-
aircraft cannon wildly oscillating back and forth without apparent cause). However, there is a 
countervailing input, a “negative feedback”, that seems to correct this potential error, aligning 
the system back on track. A typical example would be that of a torpedo guiding itself, making 
the necessary corrections, so that it keeps aiming at its target (a ship or submarine) by following 
the noise of its machinery or the magnetic force exerted by its hull. Both the homeostatic self-
regulation of body temperature in animals, and the phototropic behavior of a plant, are no 
different in substance. Rosenblueth thus stated that approaching these phenomena without 
understanding these occurrences within the framework of a “circular causality” would miss the 
mark for appropriately understanding the array of causes at play. This remark raised a few 
eyebrows. 
 Some of the attendees were the neurophysiologists Warren McCulloch and Rafael 
Lorente de Nó, the neurologist and psychoanalyst Lawrence Kubie, and the anthropologists 
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Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead –a married couple. What Rosenblueth was saying felt for 
some of them like an escape valve out of years of frustration in their research and the scholarly 
literature of their own fields. Lawrence Kubie turned from neurology to psychoanalysis precisely 
due to what he would regard as intolerable reductions of the human psyche. The Spanish-
American neuroscientist Lorente de Nó had found evidence for continuous loops in neural 
activity some years before –but no paradigm in which he could make sense of them. Bateson and 
Mead decried the lack of a sufficiently rich model to understand cultural exchanges and 
developments. In the case of Warren McCulloch, it could even be said that he found light after 
years of darkness. McCulloch, as Lorente de Nó, found that neural activity regularly engaged in 
these aforementioned endless loops --without being able to make heads and tails of them either. 
With one aggravating detail. For decades McCulloch was trying to build up a model that would 
correlate the all-or-nothing character or neuronal firing with the all-or-nothing character of 
logical processes --trying to establish a hylomorphism between a neuron and a logical gateway. 
These “loops” were a major obstacle against this otherwise sophisticated mapping. And now 
there was a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
39
  
 The organizer, Frank Fremont-Smith, happy to see this positive response, asked the 
foundation for a follow up –probably as a regular recurring gathering. It turns out that Warren 
McCulloch was already lobbying for it. Nevertheless, the pressures of the war, in terms of both 
contracted commitments and imposed secrecy, made everyone agree that it should be postponed 
until it was over. However, the wheels for something much greater in scope at many levels were 
already in motion. The next year, Wiener, Rosenblueth and Bigelow published an iconic paper in 
the journal Philosophy of Science, largely based upon the presentation delivered by Rosenblueth, 
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entitled “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology”.40 There Wiener and company went the extra mile 
into controversy. After reconfirming what was said in the meeting, they advocated for the need 
to revive the notion of a final cause, which allegedly is scientifically perceived in nature’s 
doings. Indeed, they proposed the appropriation of the ages old notion of “teleology” in order to 
understand this reality scientifically. The proposal, available this time to a wider audience, raised 
many more eyebrows, but now the effects were polarizing. 
 In Aristotle’s theory of causality, of the four causes that explain the being of things 
(material, formal, efficient and final), the final cause (telos) was the most important for 
understanding things in the universe. His whole ethics stems from the notion of telos applied to 
the thing “human” (eudaimonia). This telos, after having received a profound theological 
connotation during the Middle Ages, was later rejected by the spirit of the Scientific Revolution 
–relying now on Bacon’s experimentum crucis as the sole filter and judge for an advanced 
hypothesis. Later on, philosophy (in its logical positivist version) took upon itself the furthering 
of this expulsion of anything non-empirically evidential from scientific discourse. This 
development rendered the very idea of metaphysics inimical to science –a prejudice to get rid of. 
Ultimately, behaviorism (a dominant trend in psychology at Wiener’s time, whose reductionist 
dicta he was very aware of)
41
 bracketed the mind as a metaphysical entity itself, focusing instead 
on the inputs and outputs to a “black box”. In other words, the very mention of teleology was 
grave heresy for the scientific and philosophical orthodoxy of the time –even if, in this case, 
what was labelled a ‘final cause’ made no use of any metaphysical ‘force’, merely referring to 
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the goal to which the whole system aims, making use of corrective negative feedback. Still, 
Wiener went ahead and pushed for the use of the term, stating that “teleological” can perfectly be 
predicated of the behavior of a self-guided missile. As we will see later, while some saw in this 
revival attempt the sign of a science of the future, some others did not take it positively.  
 Once McCulloch went back to his home institution (the University of Illinois), he re-
engaged into his experiments with renewed impetus, equipped with the providential insights 
from Wiener as faithfully conveyed by Rosenblueth. Norbert Wiener had met the psychiatrist 
McCulloch several years before, introduced by Rosenblueth at one of his Harvard evening 
meetings. McCulloch was already occupied with theorizing artificial neurons as early as 1927. 
The main idea, which had been haunting him for years, pivoted around the possibility of 
understanding the nervous system as a physical instantiation of a certain realm hitherto 
acknowledged as a priori, clear and untarnished: Logic. This pure realm stood in sharp 
contradistinction with the chaotic messiness of the human mind. However both realms are 
somehow uneasily embedded in the brain. Thus, the enigma arose: How is it possible that a 
fallible and unpredictable entity, such as the human mind, could possibly grasp the exactitudes of 
mathematics? Where is the link that connects and fixes the “messy” with the “exact”? These 
questions were already present in McCulloch’s early years as a college student, right in the midst 
of deciding whether to enter the theological seminary for becoming an ordained minister –
faithful to his family’s wishes.42 His spiritual mentor at the time asked him about what he would 
like to do with his life. McCulloch told him that he would like to know “What is a number, that a 
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 Puritan Protestantism ran deep in Warren McCulloch’s ancestry. His father remarried a substantially younger 
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man may know it, and man, that he may know a number?”43 He recounts his intellectual 
pilgrimage as follows… 
 I came, from a major interest in philosophy and mathematics, into psychology with the problem 
 of how a thing like mathematics could ever arise-what sort of a thing it was. For that reason, I 
 gradually shifted into psychology and thence, for the reason that I again and again failed to find 
 the significant variables, I was forced into neurophysiology. The attempt to construct a theory in a 
 field like this, so that it can be put to any verification, is tough.
44 
But the mathematical fleshing out of his developing insights was persistently evading him. 
This wait came to an end, however, after McCulloch met someone whose genius might have 
been one of the most underreported biographical stories in 20
th
 century history of science. 
Jerome Lettvin, a pre-med student who caught notice of the powerful medical experimental 
facility recently assigned to McCulloch, introduced him to the high school dropout Walter Pitts 
(1923-1969). Lettvin recounted that Pitts was once escaping from a group of bullies and had to 
hide in a library. While in his “refuge”, Pitts stumbled upon a particular book, and once he began 
to read it, he felt drawn towards it. It was Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead’s three 
volumes of the Principia Mathematica.
45
 Pitts spent the subsequent week devouring the first 
tome, and found what he thought was an error in the work triggering a letter that he sent to 
Russell. The British philosopher, impressed upon reading the missive, invited him to come to the 
UK to do graduate work by his side. Pitts was at the time 13 years old, and had no way of 
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 Warren McCulloch recalls the emergence of this question, which allegedly haunted him for the rest of his life, in 
the following manner: 
 In the fall of 1917, I entered Haverford College with two strings to my bow – facility in Latin and a sure 
 foundation in mathematics. I “honored” in the latter and was seduced by it. That winter [the Quaker 
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accepting such an offer. Two years later, Pitts --who was routinely beaten up by his own father, a 
plumber-- finally escaped from his home in Detroit and headed to Chicago, in the hope of 
finding some intellectual comprehension and acceptance. At the time Russell was visiting 
professor at the University of Chicago, and upon reconnecting with Pitts, he suggested the latter 
to attend the lectures of the logician Rudolph Carnap –which he did. Again, Pitts rather quickly 
pointed out to the logician what he thought were inconsistencies in a certain piece of his work –
to the surprise of Carnap. He was 15 years old at this time, and the university took notice of the 
boy’s powerful mind, routinely seen wandering around campus and sitting in on advanced 
graduate classes. Sensing the potential for an unusually bright future in academia, the university 
arranged for a modest amount of regular income for Pitts to literally survive –he was almost 
always homeless.
46
 
 When Lettvin introduced Pitts to McCulloch, the latter was profoundly impressed by his 
genius and soon practically adopted him, bringing both Pitts and Lettvin to live in his house. Not 
long after Walter Pitts had ironed out with passion the mathematical wrinkles that McCulloch’s 
model was suffering from. The outcome of this conjoint work was the 1943 seminal paper “A 
Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity”.47 The proposal contained there 
pivoted around the notion of very simplified and idealized “neurons” heavily interconnected with 
each other, in such a way that after a massive conjoint operation --following the rules of Boolean 
logic-- some behavioral outcomes in an organism could be accounted for. In other words, the 
mechanism taking place in animal cognition was subsumed under the realm of logical operations. 
The mind was underpinned by a real logical structure after all. It would seem that McCulloch 
was finally answering the haunting question of his youth. However, the paper failed to garner 
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attention from its main target: psychologists and neurologists. In turn, an unlikely group of 
people took a keen interest in it: the incipiently formed community of computer scientists. As we 
will see, this “productive misappropriation” would entail interesting consequences for the 
scientific enterprise that was about to be formed. 
 The mathematician John von Neumann (1903–1957), a Jewish Hungarian émigré who 
escaped to America fleeing the rising Nazi terror, was well acquainted with Wiener’s work since 
at least a decade earlier. He was also a consultant for the Aberdeen Proving Ground where 
Wiener was working. Although Wiener’s proposal for a computing machine delivered to 
Vannevar Bush was shelved at the time,
48
 it propelled Wiener to be a consultant in computation 
for both the American Mathematical Society and the Mathematical Association of America.
49
 
Indeed the paths of both men were seemingly bound to intersect. In 1943, a key year for all these 
developments,
50
 von Neumann joined the ultra-secret Manhattan Project, suddenly finding 
himself in need of a powerful computing machine that would crunch numbers with a complexity 
far beyond anti-aircraft firing tables. Mainly for this reason, he went to England to be acquainted 
with the work that the mathematician Alan Turing (1912–1954) was doing regarding computing 
machinery. When he came back, von Neumann confessed to being already obsessed with the 
enticing possibilities of computing power. Although he had access to Vannevar Bush’s second 
analog computing machine, the 100-ton Rockefeller Differential Analyzer,
51
 this machine was 
already overbooked for war-related tasks. Von Neumann thus became part of the consultant team 
for the improvement of Bush’s successor computer, the ENIAC. Von Neumann was set to 
improve dramatically its shortcomings. McCulloch and Pitts’ 1943 article was the model he used 
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for his “First Draft” for the construction of still a more powerful successor, the EDVAC --whose 
design philosophy has prevailed until today under the name of “von Neumann architecture”.52  
 In this context, Wiener called for an exclusive meeting to be held at Princeton, where von 
Neumann was professor. The invitation was sent out in 1944 to seven people, including 
McCulloch, Pitts, Lorente de Nó, and Rosenblueth (who in turn could not attend this time). The 
meeting was co-organized by von Neumann and Howard Aiken, a Harvard mathematician. In 
1945, the small “Teleological Society” meeting took place, and it served as an opportunity for 
von Neumann to reveal on the one hand the material feasibility of a working mechanical model 
of the brain, and on the other the state of computer science in general –at the time still a novel 
and fairly exotic area of knowledge. Wiener furthered his still forming views on the new science 
of communication. McCulloch and Lorente de Nó spoke about their model of the brain that was 
serving as a model for von Neumann’s machine. The meeting was a success and it further 
secured their desire to continue getting together on a regular basis. Von Neumann maintained 
close contact with Wiener from 1945 on. But the real launchpad for all these novel scientific 
approaches was just about to happen the following year. 
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 The “von Neumann architecture”, these days more commonly known as “stored-program computer”, provided the 
advantage over the earlier computer machines in that the set of instructions could be stored as software in the 
machine –as opposed to physically changing hardware switches, as it was customary up until that time. The 
downside, however, is that since both instructions and data share the same bus (data communication device), 
performance could be compromised – effect known as the “von Neumann bottleneck”. There were other differences 
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Like the tape on that abstract device, the EDVAC would possess a storage capability--von Neumann called 
it "memory"-- holding both data and coded instructions. In the interest of practicality, the EDVAC was to 
have an arithmetic component that could perform each basic operation of arithmetic… in a single step, 
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operations on numbers represented in terms of the ten decimal digits, the EDVAC was to enjoy the 
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logical control by bringing instructions to be executed one at a time from the memory into the arithmetic 
component. This way to organize a computer has come to be known as the von Neumann architecture, and 
today's computers are for the most part still organized according to this very same basic plan…(Davis 2000, 
p. 182) 
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4. The Macy conferences. 
 
The war finally ended in 1945 and the time seemed appropriate to reconvene after the 1942 
meeting. Frank Fremont-Smith was still in charge of the Macy Foundation’s arm to fund medical 
sciences, and he promptly agreed, after McCulloch and Wiener’s persuasion, to launch a 
recurring series of conferences. These series, for which they did not yet have a name, were to 
occur twice a year. The group was now richer, having merged both Macy’s 1942 first list of 
attendants and the 1945 Princeton gathering of scientists and mathematicians. The original idea 
was to discuss theory at the meeting itself, and then test it in each of the attendants’ own realms 
of practice, coming back later with a report. Subsequently, the general theory could be improved 
based upon the feedback from these reports. After the fourth conference the frequency of 
meetings was cut in half to just once a year –it was deemed more appropriate for giving 
sufficient time for implementation. The gatherings spanned the time period between 1946 and 
1953 and they did not produce an official transcript until the sixth meeting in 1949. During the 
first conferences a mechanical device for audio recordings was used, but the results were far 
from satisfactory.
53
  
 The first conference was entitled “Feedback Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems in 
Biological and Social Systems” and it took place in the Beekman Hotel, in New York.54 The first 
lecture was delivered on the morning of March 8 1946 by John von Neumann, joined by Lorente 
de Nó. They spoke about the purported correlations between the artificial networks of computing 
machinery and the mind’s logical structures embedded in real neuronal wetware –realms just 
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 “We tried some sessions with and some without recording, but nothing was printable. The smoke, the 
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Jersey, in order to accommodate von Neumann –who nevertheless ended up not attending. 
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linked in 1943 courtesy of the McCulloch and Pitts’ paradigm for the calculus of neural activity. 
Von Neumann addressed the audience from the standpoint of the mathematician-turned- 
computer scientist, providing a panoramic landscape of the state of computer theory and 
construction --including his own. Lorente de Nó, as a neurophysiologist, correlated von 
Neumann’s description of the logical processes in the metal with human physiology, pointing out 
possible instantiations where such outlook could fulfill an explanatory one --such as the yes/no 
character of neuronal firing. The proposal of an actual mechanism underlying mental processes, 
where a mechanical model of a realm that had forever escaped the grasp of science was being put 
forward, reportedly put the audience in a state of positive consternation. As with the 1942 
conference, enthusiastic discussion ensued --and this was the format kept throughout the rest of 
the conferences to come. 
 In the afternoon, Norbert Wiener finally himself delivered what he could not do in person 
the year before at the science and mathematics gathering at Princeton. He gave a report on the 
new science that was being formed out of the realization of circular causality as a more complete 
tool for understanding goal-oriented systems –both natural and artificial. Wiener delivered a 
historical introduction of the evolution of mechanisms of control, from the time of Ancient 
Greece, going through Watson’s mechanical governors and Maxwell’s mathematical treatment 
of them, all the way to his “teleological machine” built (conjointly with Bigelow) for anti-aircraft 
weaponry. Rosenblueth was his lecture-partner. Faithful to Wiener’s ideas as he was the previous 
year when delivering Wiener’s keynote, Rosenblueth took care to provide examples of the 
feedback mechanisms underlying the very survival of living systems. By this time, Wiener was 
more aware of the utmost importance of the notion of “communication” for the overall outlook 
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of this emerging science –one that successfully encompassed both living organisms and artificial 
machinery: 
[I]t had already become clear to Mr. Bigelow and myself that the problems of control 
engineering and of communication engineering were inseparable, and that they centered 
not around the technique of electrical engineering but around the much more fundamental 
notion of the message, whether this should be transmitted by electrical, mechanical, or 
nervous means... [T]he group of scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and myself had already 
become aware of the essential unity of the set of problems centering about 
communication, control, and statistical mechanics, whether in the machine or in  
living tissue.
55
 
The second day, Warren McCulloch explained the proposal put forward in his cryptic article co-
written with Pitts. As mentioned, this article failed to gain the attention of the audience to which 
it was originally intended --neurologists and psychologists-- but in an ironic twist in the history 
of science, it served as the footprint upon which von Neumann designed a powerful computer 
machine –one whose fundamental structure remains pervasive to our day. The yes/no nature of 
neural firing, since it seemingly has a fairly direct correlation with the yes/no character of logical 
gateways, can provide a way to disentangle complex mental processes --as long as one is able to 
rigorously describe its smallest units in absolute detail. Von Neumann applied this thought to a 
physical contraption, giving it empirical instantiation, and his machine was born. McCulloch, on 
the other hand, was firmly on the side of finding an explanation for mental processes, and he 
thought that he found a paradigmatic one. The messiness of the human mind, however capable of 
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dealing with the exactness of math and logic could now be demystified: it is all a matter of 
complexity, which can ultimately be parsed into primigenial pieces of a network, each of them 
tractable in a yes/no fashion. Propositional calculus could provide a tool to understand nervous 
activity.  
 In all likelihood, half of the first two lectures of the first cybernetic conference were 
delivered with a Spanish accent –by Arturo Rosenblueth and Lorente de Nó.56 The rest of the day 
was dedicated to the social sciences.
57
 Once the conference was over, scientists went back to 
their own realms of research, invigorated by these novel ideas that promised to revolutionize 
science itself, largely by means of accurately expanding the realm of physics to areas heretofore 
considered inherently outside its grasp –like life and mind (pace behaviorism, as we saw 
above).
58
  
Wiener began to work with Rosenblueth on nervous activity in living flesh --commuting 
between Mexico City and Boston one semester every other year. He was trying to make sense of 
a problem he previously saw during his work involving gun turrets. As reported above, when the 
mounted gun received undamped positive feedback, it would engage in a wild swinging until 
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some corrective (negative) feedback was applied. If his intuitions were correct, the same 
phenomenon of wild overcompensation observed in AA machinery should take place in living 
organisms
59
 –known in the latter case as clonus. Indeed, after Wiener begun experimenting with 
living animals, when an extra electrical impulse would be applied to a main nerve in a cat’s leg, 
its limb would engage in spastic convulsions. Wiener and Rosenblueth were looking for a 
pattern. But results were evading them –and Wiener was vocal about his frustration. Working 
with living tissue greatly elevated the complexity of the study. After months of perseverance, 
however, they arrived to a startling finding. The increase of nervous activity responsible for the 
animal’s limb movement was not additive, but logarithmic in nature60 –not dissimilar with what 
he encountered when augmenting positive feedback during his experience with anti-aircraft 
systems. In other words, the clonic spastic movement observed in the cat’s femoral muscle kept 
an exponential (not linear) correlation with the amount of electricity input in the animal’s leg. 
The effect of the electric input seemed to be multiplicative, rather than additive, as it was the 
case in the swing and oscillating phenomenon found in gun turrets.
61
  The significance of this 
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 Wiener and Rosenblueth were already operating within a common framework for both animal and machine in no 
uncertain terms: 
 We observed this pattern of contraction, paying attention to the physiological condition of the cat, the load  
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 In the words of Wiener: 
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logarithmic system (Wiener 1948, p. 20). 
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 Speaking of the significance of this logarithmic basis for overcompensating movements in both animal and 
machine, Wiener remarked: 
 The most striking point is that on this logarithmic basis, and with data obtained from the conduction of 
 single pulses through the various elements of the neuromuscular arc, we were able to obtain very fair 
 approximations to the actual periods of clonic vibration, using the technique already developed by the servo 
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finding was going to be spelled out shortly after. It meant reaching the zenith of Wiener’s ideas 
regarding teleological mechanisms, since it tied in with research he had been involved with 
decades ago. There certainly was stuff to report in the next upcoming meeting. 
 The second conference, entitled “Teleological Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems” 
took place in October, 1946. Although it was mostly devoted to the possible social extensions of 
feedback mechanisms, it did have some science-related news. Walter Pitts, now an MIT student 
due to Wiener’s influence, was to begin a PhD tailored to Pitts alone –under the supervision of 
Wiener himself. The aim of the doctoral degree was going to be the construction of a three 
dimensional model of neuronal structures --transcending the so-far two-plane representation of 
neurons for a model more similar to the actual object, hoping that the functions of the neuron 
would be better captured and subsequently understood. The degree of complexity sent waves of 
elation throughout the audience, especially among those well versed in mathematics, triggering 
McCulloch to declare that “the mathematics for the ordering of the [random] net has yet to be 
evolved”.62 
 Right after this conference was over, another sub-conference started at the New York 
Academy of Sciences, and this one balanced things back to the mathematics and science side of 
things. Here Wiener presented to the attendees the conclusion to his evolution of ideas, tested 
under the fire of machine-building (the servo-mechanical anti-aircraft systems), and later, by his 
experiments on living tissue with Rosenblueth in Mexico.
63
 Wiener had been noticing that there 
was a connection between what he was witnessing and thermo-dynamics. The “message” 
brought order to chaos –the default tendency in nature known as “entropy”—in both organic and 
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inorganic realms. It would seem that beyond the general notion of the message, there lay the 
more fundamental notion of information. Information indeed “in-formed”, giving shape to the 
realm in question, fighting off the primordial downward spiral of nature towards disorder and 
oblivion –the said entropy. Whenever there is information, entropy recedes –and vice versa. 
Entropy is the opposite of information, which in turn can be understood as negative entropy –or 
negentropy. Life is an informational force, negating entropy within the vastness of a merciless 
universe. Further, a working, “surviving” machine carries information that shapes its existence 
away from entropic decay.
64
  
 What Wiener was proposing was breathtaking, and the audience, by now reasonably 
adjusted to the excitement of these meetings, was once again in awe. McCulloch was sure to 
send copies of this talk’s notes to several prominent scientists and mathematicians who were not 
present –among them, to the American mathematician Claude Shannon (1916–2001). Several 
years earlier, Shannon, a young MIT graduate and recently hired star employee at Bell Labs, was 
closely acquainted with Wiener and the war-related work of the latter –in a master-disciple kind 
of way. Picking up the theme shared here, but also as a culmination of long rationalizations 
regarding communication and information, he was to publish two years later (in 1948) the paper 
“A Mathematical Theory of Communication”,65 which stands to this day as a seminal document 
for “communication theory” –a field cross-listed between information and mathematics. Shannon 
became a regular attendee from the 7
th
 conference on. The rest of the conferences will be alluded 
to throughout this thesis, some more than others, according to their relevance to this work. 
However, an outline of them follows.
66
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3
rd
 Conference: “Teleological Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems”  
(March 1947) 
 This conference was devoted mainly to psychology and psychiatry, somewhat to the 
displeasure of the members coming from the hard sciences. Von Neumann, having experienced a 
change of heart regarding the feasibility of using McCulloch and Pitts’ networks to map the 
mind,
67
 began to lobby for having the German biophysicist Max Delbrück invited to the 
meetings as a core member. 
 
4
th
 Conference: “Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems” 
(October 1947) 
 A further clash occurred between those members drawn to psychology and 
psychoanalysis, and those who were behind the more mathematical approach of McCulloch and 
Pitts’ networks --in regards to mental activity. In particular, long-winded discussions ensued 
after the proposed distinction of Gestalt “forms”, considered to be analogical, and McCulloch 
and Pitts’ networks’ inadequacy to capture them, due to the claimed digitality of the latter.68  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
conferences. First, historically, by Steve Heims (Heims1991) and then thematically, by Jean-Pierre Dupuy (Dupuy 
2000). There is also a summary that McCulloch wrote about the first three conferences in a letter written to von 
Foerster (McCulloch 1947). 
67
 I will address this reversal in the chapter concerning von Neumann’s contribution to cybernetics. 
68
 In fact, the question regarding the possibility of finding the Gestalt “forms” of perception (shapes, sizes, patterns, 
etc.) was posed right at the first conference in 1946 by the neurologist-turned-psychoanalyst Heinrich Kluver. Some 
of the attendees were amicable to the plea for help, like Warren McCulloch –perhaps in his role of Chair of all ten of 
the Macy conferences. But some attendees found the whole issue unrigorous and ultimately intractable as a scientific 
issue –like Walter Pitts, openly hostile right from the start. By this 4th conference, McCulloch also defined this 
position as squarely foreign to scientific discourse at best –and ultimately senseless at worst. By the 6th conference, 
McCulloch emerged very aggressively against the whole of psychoanalysis. By the 8
th
 conference, Rosenblueth, 
having in mind McCulloch and Pitts’ networks, asserts that mental events either occur, or they do not – a feature that 
leaves the unconscious memories of psychoanalysis, according to him, outside the realm of facticity and coherence. 
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5
th
 Conference: “Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems" 
(Spring 1948) 
 Max Delbrück attended the meeting, to the joy of von Neumann --who, by this time, was 
seriously interested in genetic self-replication, and expected Delbrück to become part of the 
group core. Unlike any other meeting until the end, the entire first day was devoted to language. 
This bad timing might have played a role in Delbrück’s disappointment. The second day Wiener 
spoke about chaos and Pitts about a formal modelling of chicken pecking. Delbrück never came 
back.
69
 
  
The Hixon Symposium: “Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior”70 
(September 1948) 
 A separate conference outside the Macy cycles took place that same year in Pasadena, at 
the California Institute of Technology. This event was remarkable due to the fact that von 
Neumann now clearly attacked McCulloch and Pitts’ networks –both McCulloch and Lorente de 
Nó were present. Von Neumann provided an alternative course of action for the cybernetic 
grand-enterprise: to shift focus towards the investigation of the possibility of constructing 
artificial cellular automata.
71
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 Heims 1991, p. 95 
70
 Published in 1951 under the same tittle (Jeffress 1951).  
71
 This is the reason why the contemporary field of Artificial Life regards it as its birthplace. See Langton 1989. 
43 
 
6
th
 Conference: “Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and 
Social Systems"
72
 (March 1949) 
 Von Neumann, who could not attend the conference, sent a message to the attendees, 
which was read out loud. The audience took this missive seriously, and a further discussion 
regarding the inadequacy of McCulloch and Pitts’ networks was triggered. This time, the issue 
was the insufficient capability of accounting for human behavior if relying on arrays of neurons 
alone –there were not enough of them. McCulloch defended its own model and Pitts eventually 
spotted an error in von Neumann’s calculation regarding the quantity of neurons in a human 
brain, bringing the discussion to a halt. 
 The Austrian physicist Heinz von Foerster (1911–2002) was named editor in chief of the 
Macy conferences –partly in order to help improve his rudimentary English. He almost 
immediately proposed settling for one name for the conferences, Cybernetics, after Wiener’s 
book, which was published the previous year. The acceptance of the proposal was unanimous. 
From that year on that title remained, and the previous mouthful was relegated to a subtitle. 
 
7
th
 Conference: "Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and 
Social Systems"
73
 (March 1950)    
 Once again, lively discussion emerged regarding whether or not an analog model of the 
mind would be more suitable than a digital one --e.g. the McCulloch and Pitts’ model. No side 
seemed to get the upper hand. Also, a renewed attack against psychoanalysis as a coherent 
paradigm ensued, this time not only coming from the hard sciences (e.g., Pitts) but from the 
social sciences as well (e.g., Bateson). 
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 Concern was voiced regarding unwarranted and overoptimistic accounts given by the 
popular media (e.g., Scientific American, Popular Science, etc.) when referring to the 
conferences as a “cohesive group” securely marching towards the mechanization of the human 
being. The environment of discussion, although exciting and lively, was far from embodying a 
“group mentality”. McCulloch recalled an occasion with Wiener asking, while delivering a 
presentation, “May I finish my sentence?” to which an angry interlocutor replied “Don’t stop me 
when I’m interrupting!”74 In that vein, a word of advice was thrown to those present coming 
from the social sciences: Not to fall for the allure of the exactness of mathematics and the hard 
sciences, which seemed to begin enjoying uncritical acceptance in their fields.   
  
8
th
 Conference: "Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and 
Social Systems"
75
 (March 1951)     
 Both Wiener and von Neumann had by this time withdrawn from the conferences –for 
different reasons.
76
 McCulloch remained the Chair, Pitts and Rosenblueth persevered and new 
people joined (e.g., Shannon). But the pair’s absence was noticeable –particularly Wiener’s. 
The British physicist and Christian apologist Donald Mackay (1922-1987) criticized Shannon’s 
views --well known by now. Shannon’s position, where the message had to be stripped from any 
aspect of “meaning” in order to account for an accurate and engineeringly feasible conveyance,77 
would have, for Mackay, disastrous consequences for the proper understanding of the intended 
                                                 
74 McCulloch gave further detail of the kind of milieu where the discussions were taking place: 
 The first five meetings were intolerable… The smoke, the noise, the smell of battle were not printable… 
 Nothing that I have ever lived through… has ever been like… those meetings… You never have heard 
 adult human beings, of such academic stature, use such language to attack each other. I have seen member 
 after member depart in tears, and one never returned (McCulloch 1974, p.12). 
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message.
78
 Donald Mackay also entertained the possibility of constructing a learning machine 
with randomness factors embedded within, in order to account for a more human behavioral 
outcome. The American statistician Leonard Savage vigorously objected to it, claiming that 
adding randomness would help in no way to mimic human behavioral processes. Savage gave a 
presentation of his own, where he proposed a calculation procedure for decision-making based 
upon statistical factors. This time McCulloch objected to Savage, advancing the idea that the 
multilevel realm of decision making is inherently contextual, and thus escapes the “linearity” of 
statistical analysis. 
 The American experimental psychologist Herbert Birch was aware of both Wiener’s 
treatment of communication as homogeneously pervading the realms of animal and machine, and 
of Shannon’s removal of semantics as essential for the rigorous treatment of communication. In 
face of this, he attempted to introduce a quality distinction. Coming from the area of research in 
animal communication itself, Birch differentiated the communication found in animals from the 
“real communication” found in humans. According to Birch, we speak of animal communication 
using a relaxed version of the notion of communication. The cyberneticists
79
 reacted very 
negatively against this observation, alluding to the mentalisms and unwarranted metaphysical 
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 Soviet critics charged that Shannon’s theory of communication reduced the human being to a “talking 
 machine” and equated human speech with “just a ‘flow’ of purely conditional, symbolic ‘information,’ 
 which does not differ in principle from digital data fed into a calculating machine.” Wiener’s formula, 
 “information is information, not matter or energy,” provoked a philosophical critique of the concept of 
 information as a non-material entity. Repeating Lenin’s criticism of some philosophical interpretations 
 of relativity physics in the early twentieth century, Soviet authors castigated cyberneticians for replacing 
 material processes with “pure” mathematical formulae and equations, in which “matter itself disappears.” 
 Cybernetics was labeled a “pseudo-science produced by science reactionaries and philosophizing 
 ignoramuses, prisoners of idealism and metaphysics.” (Mindell 2003, p. 82). 
79
 Both “cyberneticist” and “cybernetician” are still used to refer to those who were part of the cybernetic project. 
Henceforth both words will be used interchangeably.    
46 
 
tenets underpinning such distinction. This occurrence is remarkable in its irony, given the event 
that was about to occur with Ross Ashby’ presentation at the next conference.80 
 
9
th
 Conference: "Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and 
Social Systems"
81
 (March 1952)  
 This was the only conference attended by the British medical doctor and psychiatrist 
William Ross Ashby (1903 –1972) from the Ratio Club.82 Ashby presented two papers where he 
proposed the change of behavior via random trials as an appropriate articulation of the 
phenomenon of learning in natural or artificial systems. The cyberneticists objected to this, in a 
fashion not in tune with the cybernetic mandate –to some extent borrowing Herbert Birch’s 
context for argumentation alluded to above.
83
 
 Warren McCulloch voiced complaints about the governmental constraints gradually 
imposed upon several of the conference members. Indeed the Cold War had already started and 
an environment of increasing secrecy let itself be felt. These remarks might have also served to 
deflect attention from the previous withdrawal of the core members (Wiener and von Neumann). 
 
10
th
 Conference: "Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and 
Social Systems"
84
 (April 1953)  
 McCulloch acknowledged the decade of criticisms against his (and Pitts’) model –
particularly coming from von Neumann, who nevertheless built upon it arguably the most 
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advanced computer of its time. McCulloch conceded that it is honorable to stay within the fine 
tradition of scientific refutability. 
 The discussion, despite its good humor, lacked “content” according to the German 
psychologist Hans Teuber, the assistant editor. Since he was just starting his academic career, in 
his view he had much to lose if such registration of events were to become public. Teuber was to 
offer his resignation if the transactions were to be published.
85
 He later agreed to publish only the 
documents, without the ensuing discussions. 
 This was the only meeting that did not take place in New York. They moved it to 
Princeton, New Jersey, in order to accommodate von Neumann –who ended up not attending.  
 
 But this is just half of the cybernetics’ story… 
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II. Cybernetics: The book, the club and the decline. 
 
1. Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics. 
 
France might have been destined to be intertwined with the development of cybernetics right 
from its inception, as is shown by the fact that one of the first science historians who took notice 
of the movement was Pierre de Latil.
86
 In that country both engineers and the intelligentsia took 
early notice of Wiener’s ideas –while in America interest was more circumscribed to circles of 
engineering and the military, partly due to the ambience of secrecy owing to the Cold War.  
In 1946, Wiener was invited to give a talk in Paris, at the Collège de France. After the 
talk, he went for a coffee with the Mexican-French publisher Enrique Freymann, and they hit it 
off –Wiener later spoke of him as one of the most interesting individuals he had ever met. 
Freymann asked Wiener if he would like to publish his ideas in a book. Wiener, surprised, 
answered that he could not think of anyone who would be interested in publishing them. After it 
was clear that Freymann was referring to himself, Wiener promised to submit a manuscript in 
three months. He subsequently went back to Boston, and then flew to Mexico City, to spend the 
period corresponding to his funded work with Rosenblueth. It is in this city that Wiener, now 
fluent in Spanish with a Latin accent, wrote the entirety of the book --in the early hours of the 
morning, before heading to his laboratory work for the rest of the day with his Mexican 
colleague.  
Wiener was on a roll; he wrote relentlessly. It seemed that he had been accumulating all 
these new ideas for the last years, and they were now boiling and eager to come out. Freymann 
received the write up in the mail after ninety days --much to his surprise, since he actually did 
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not take seriously Wiener’s agreement to deliver a manuscript promptly. He rushed to print out a 
first draft to send it back to Wiener for revision. In the meantime, MIT caught wind of Wiener’s 
publication project and tried to persuade the publisher to concede the copyrights. To no avail. 
After intense negotiation, both publishers agreed to publish the book conjointly in the US, but 
Freymann retained the rights for the French version (also in English) which was the one 
distributed internationally.
87
 
 In the book, after acknowledging with gratitude the influence and help received from 
Bush, McCulloch, Turing, von Neumann, Shannon and others, Wiener did his due diligence in 
order to find a name for the new science he was advancing. Given that he was very well 
acquainted with the Greek and Latin classics –a legacy from his strict father, a Russian 
philologist-- it did not take long for him to engage in a thorough survey of possible terms for this 
novel discipline. At first, since “communication” lay at the core of the theory, he thought that the 
word messenger should be appropriate: angelos in Greek. However, the semantic overtones that 
this noun had historically acquired, that of an “angel” (messenger of the “good news” –
evangelion) would obviously carry a connotation that Wiener was not trying to convey. So he 
went on to explore the possibility of borrowing an image that had a long history of rich 
connotations for Greek thought, in fact used by Plato on more than one occasion: that of a 
“steersman” –kubernetes. The Ancient Greek κυβερνήτης, steersman or helmsman, is itself a 
construction formed out of two words: κυβερ (pilot) and ναυτος (ship). Plato used the term 
κυβερνητική in the Georgias, the Laws and the Republic, in order to refer to the “art of 
navigation” (or proper steering) of a community. Plato was referring to the political art of 
governance. Unbeknownst to Wiener at the time, the French physicist André-Marie Ampère did 
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use “la cybernétique” in 1834, referring also to the art of governance, but expanded to include 
elements of religion.
88
  
 Later on, the Latin derivation of the Greek word, gubernator, was acknowledged as the 
root of the English word governor, a device constructed by James Watt in the 1800s to be 
attached to steam engines for speed regulation –and later mathematically articulated. The British 
“natural philosopher” James Clerk Maxwell wrote in 1868 a mathematical treatise on these 
apparatuses –“On Governors”.89 This mechanical device is considered to have played an 
important role at the very core of the Industrial Revolution.  Even if Maxwell did not use the 
term “cybernetics” per se, his 1867 treatise showed some prescient elements of control theory 
and was thus heralded by Wiener as the founding document for cybernetic thinking.
90
 The 
mathematization of physical phenomena showing corrective negative feedback indeed lay at the 
core of cybernetics. Leibnitz, due to his idea of a universal language of calculus, was proclaimed 
by Wiener as cybernetics’ patron saint. 91 Such illustrious lineage was reason enough for Wiener 
to coin cybernetics as the word that would name from now on his newly unveiled science.  
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 Sans cesse il a à choisir entre diverses mesures celle qui est la plus propre à atteindre le but; et 
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 It would seem fair to say that the uniqueness of Wiener’s book relies on the fact that he 
managed to put under one cover many connected ideas regarding communication and 
information that were current on both sides of the Atlantic --mainly due to war-related research, 
where the United States officially invested. In fact, the British hub of cyberneticists, the Ratio 
Club,
92
 entertained the implication that such was the reason for Wiener’s in particular, and 
America’s in general, lead in the new field. Wiener had come up with a perfectly timed book that 
not only gave these ideas wide circulation, but which served as a hub for the cybernetic insights 
already floating around. These ideas were in fact emerging in several parts of the world, 
including France, Sweden, the Soviet Union and the UK. War-related research was the main 
motivation for all of them. The British and the rest, without official support, missed that 
opportunity. Wiener, who had formal government back up, seized it. 
 One could safely assume, however, that Wiener himself had the main cybernetic ideas 
boiling and looking for a release valve. For starters, he already had three written pieces 
amounting to a solid cybernetic core: The top-secret “Yellow Peril” of 1942,93 his co-authored 
1943 article on teleological mechanisms,
94
 and the 1946 lecture at the New York Academy of 
Sciences.
95
 Wiener also started with the acknowledgment of the need for a common vocabulary 
for the emerging discipline, after witnessing the slippery slope of borrowing terms from one field 
                                                                                                                                                             
 symbolism and that of a calculus of reasoning. From these are descended the mathematical notation and the 
 symbolic logic of the present day. Now, just as the calculus of arithmetic lends itself to a mechanization 
 progressing through the abacus and the desk computing machine to the ultra-rapid computing machines of 
 the present day, so the calculus ratiocinator of Leibniz contains the germs of the machina ratiocinatrix, the 
 reasoning machine. Indeed, Leibniz himself, like his predecessor Pascal, was interested in the construction 
 of computing machines in the metal. It is therefore not in the least surprising that the same intellectual 
 impulse which has led to the development of mathematical logic has at the same time led to the ideal or 
 actual mechanization of processes of thought. (Wiener 1948, p. 12. Italics original.) 
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to another, hence imposing one worldview onto the other and missing the substance of the novel 
approach.   
 Wiener’s newly found insights, regarding the poverty of the notion of behaviorism after 
his experience with the predictor, were spelled out. The utmost importance of negative feedback, 
after Rosenblueth’s input from physiology, was carefully articulated. The existence of a common 
process aimed at survival, common to both animal (homeostasis) and machine (self-regulation) 
was established: Both were teleological mechanisms. Wiener’s startling realization of the 
defining importance of “information”, as the carrier of order, into and against the natural 
tendency towards chaos in reality—entropy-- was given due treatment. Beyond control theory 
and communication, information (or “negative entropy”) was the way nature regulated itself, in 
the organic and inorganic, as already hinted in the discipline of physics by the second law of 
thermodynamics –an area with which he was intimately acquainted, from decades ago, due to his 
studies of chaotic behavior. Reality’s inherent tendency towards decay is counterbalanced by 
information, “life” being a paradigmatic example –but also, a machine, as an island of will 
surviving in the midst of, and against, chaos.  
 Wiener provided cases which, linked via mathematical treatment, convincingly showed 
that the notions referred to above equally applied to both the living and non-living –and that a 
common methodology of study and experimentation was now emerging.
96
 For example, he 
linked the case of a machine breaking down due to an unrestrained overflow of positive feedback 
with that of a brain overwhelmed with information when no more network storage is available. 
In both cases the lack of a regulative negative feedback would result in disastrous consequences 
–in the former one due to a lack of balance that breaks the system (probably a perennial loop), in 
the latter due to a circular (vicious) reasoning that results in neurosis, and eventually, insanity. 
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 Wiener also ruminated about the social consequences of the new science, and the 
consequent moral responsibility for the cybernetician. Up to that moment he was keeping those 
thoughts to himself. Two events, one past and one on-going, may have triggered his cautious 
view. Firstly, the dropping of two nuclear bombs that killed more than 150,000 people –mostly 
civilians. Secondly, the growing ambience of secrecy that was effectively crippling the otherwise 
free flow of communication between scientists –part and parcel of the very essence of scientific 
practice, in Wiener’s view. Expanding on the foreseeable consequences of a dramatically 
augmented capacity for pervasive control, he predicted a social and economic change that could 
be regarded as disturbingly prescient by some. These days, Wiener saw an ugly head gradually 
rearing out of the newly found capacity of communication engineering that does not distinguish 
between man and machine. 
 “Information is information, not matter or energy”,97 Wiener would say. Leave alone just 
the “content” of a message. The delivery of order would be, quite literally, the most powerful 
force in the universe: the very impetus that fights against reality’s own downward spiral into 
oblivion –the latter having been reason for hopelessness in more than one scientific mind. In a 
“cybernetically organized mankind”98 the manipulation of information, now understood and 
appropriated, would have the pervasive capacity of profoundly and substantially modifying the 
physical and the non-physical, bringing the capacity of reality-control and modification to a level 
never seen in history. If the industrial revolution downgraded the “human arm by the 
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competition of machinery”,99 the cybernetic revolution “is similarly bound to devalue the human 
brain, at least in its simpler and more routine decisions”.100 And that would be just the beginning. 
 The scientist or engineer vaguely familiar with cybernetic ideas was certainly expected to 
have a “field trip” of enjoyment in reading the piece. For one, engineers finally made the 
connection, only perceived before by vague intuition, between what they were doing at the level 
of electronic signals transmitted via networks (e.g., telephone), and the nature of 
servomechanisms at large. There was no articulated theory of feedback that would equally apply 
to noise channels (in order to guarantee the accurate conveyance of a message) and to industrial 
machinery (in need of self-regulating devices for smooth behavior). Leave aside the startling 
demonstration that such regulating circular causality had always been present in nature itself –
e.g., homeostasis. Several areas of science took notice at roughly the same time, while various 
engineering departments rushed to formalize the adoption of these views –which were not 
entirely new, but for the first time articulated with precision.
101
 
 Wiener’s book was riddled, after the passionately written “Introduction”, with complex 
equations --which in the first edition turned out to contain some mistakes.
102
 However, it also 
contained powerful statements, sometimes slightly aphoristic, which revealed a mind that had 
been occupied for years in the developing of these notions. Some reviewers dismissed it, partly 
due to its complex mathematics and partly due to the sometimes non-linear way of 
argumentation. But what happened not long after its publication by far exceeded everyone’s 
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expectations –not only the author’s and the publisher’s, but also the “cybernetic group”103 of 
Macy at large. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine 
became a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic. The readership exceeded far beyond those 
human groups circumscribed to mathematics, engineering or hard sciences. The social and 
political scientist, the philosopher and the humanities scholar, the middle-class intelligentsia, the 
entrepreneur and businessman, the typical university educated layman at large… all began to 
read Cybernetics.  
 Finally this legendary group, led by this mysterious genius-mathematician, was 
producing a manifesto, relatively accessible to a wider audience –the Introduction to the book is 
an enthusiastic narrative that can give a very good idea to any reasonably intelligent reader of 
what the project was all about. The popular media ipso facto noticed the shockwave and global 
buzz, and Wiener soon was the subject of articles in such magazines as Scientific American, 
Newsweek and Time. Later this wave was joined by Business Week, The New York Times and The 
Times Book Review. Later on, Wiener was portrayed in Life and The New Yorker, and Time had a 
cover story dedicated to him. Suddenly he was being invited by the most prestigious universities 
and societies for keynote addresses –e.g., the 1950 International Congress of Mathematicians, at 
Harvard University.  
Cybernetics was having a palpable impact in science, philosophy and beyond on a global 
scale –to the point of extending its influence to that part of the world that was, due to the Cold 
War, regarded as being outside Western reach: The Soviet Union.
104
 Exchanges between 
cyberneticians coming from both the political, military and economic rival sides of the globe 
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were relatively fruitful, indeed to the point of raising some eyebrows among surveillance 
authorities on both sides. Interestingly (albeit perhaps expectably, due to socialism’s canonical 
attraction towards all aspects of control), the Soviet cyberneticians counted on the tacit but firm 
support of the state,
105
 in sharp contrast with their British counterparts, who had to rely mostly on 
the practitioner’s own free time and economic means.  
Within the West, cybernetics’ reach went well beyond the English speaking world, 
overcoming the centuries-old multi-level historic animosity between Continental Europe and its 
Anglo-American occidental partner. Indeed as an enterprise whose core practitioners exclusively 
used English as their language of communication and practice, cybernetics found enthusiastic 
reception in France (e.g. Lacan
106
) and in Germany (e.g. Heidegger
107
). As mentioned, the first 
international edition of Cybernetics, to the chagrin of Wiener’s own home institution printing 
press (MIT Press), was published by a French publishing house –following up the conferences in 
France to which he was invited.  
Furthermore, it was one of the few scientific movements in modern history that managed 
to garner widespread fame –indeed well beyond scientific and academic circles. Mainstream 
media was very receptive to cybernetic developments, arguably due to the bold proposals (for the 
time) of understanding mind as machine and life as mechanical. Reasons for this existence in the 
spotlight can also be found, however, in the aura formed around the visually engaging spectacle 
that cybernetic robots used to provide –a veritable “gallery of monsters”.108 This almost surreal 
world –a pictorial reminder of the post-modern times that were being lived-- was filled with 
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reported anecdotes of autonomous robots chasing women’s legs,109 and children being 
surprisingly (again, for the time) prone to interact with these “mechanical animals”.110  
Here it is relevant to indicate that the role of Britain in cybernetics emerges as fairly 
substantial when we refer to these mechanical contraptions. The British collaboration with the 
cybernetic movement has been lately acknowledged with increased emphasis.
111
 To be fair, 
despite Wiener’s somewhat belittling remarks after a visit to the UK,112 some members coming 
from across the Atlantic did play an important role in the unfolding of the whole cybernetic 
enterprise –in particular towards the end. In line with the more informal cybernetic development 
coming from British soil, they had their own scaled down version of the reportedly fancy Macy 
gatherings
113
 –indeed, in the form of a small but exclusive “club”.  
 
2. The Ratio Club 
   
The Ratio Club was a small community of British scientists that gathered in London on a regular 
basis to discuss all things cybernetic. Just as the Macy meetings, it served as a hub where 
scientists gathered to share and discuss their insights, cognizant that there was no other forum at 
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the time where they could discuss cybernetics. Expectably, they were filled with enthusiasm, and 
members would always be looking forward to the next meeting. Nevertheless, there were some 
remarkable differences from the Macy conferences as well. Although the Macy gatherings 
appreciated the spontaneous discussions that followed the presentations, the London meetings 
had a decided bent on keeping the gatherings more informal than in New York. The pace was set 
by talking over drinks, with no records ever produced of the discussions. They were to meet once 
a month, at night, in the basement of a hospital –arranged with chairs, food and beer. These kept 
going in a relatively uninterrupted fashion from 1949 to 1955. In order to maintain the discussion 
in total freedom, without affectation from an “authority figure”, no professors were allowed. 
Also, if someone would become someone else’s boss, it was expected he would resign. 
Following this vein, the one-time proposal for a follow up in a more professional setting, 
probably with a journal, was flatly rejected.
114
  
 The origin of its name can be traced back to the semantic implications stemming from the 
fact that the Latin root ratio underpinned several concepts important for the group.
 115
 Leibnitz is 
mentioned by Wiener as a precursor to cybernetic thinking, when he acknowledged that his 
machina rationatrix  was anteceded by Leibnitz’ calculus rationator.116 The club members were 
also interested in the notions of rationarium (statistical account) and ratiocinatius 
(argumentation). Ratio, the common root for all these notions, seemed like the right choice. 
 Over and above the mentioned differences existing between the Ratio gatherings and 
Macy’s, there was a feature that set them apart in a qualitatively distinct way. Despite the highly 
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 This usually was Ross Ashby’s idea. He was more than amenable to the prospective of constituting a more 
formal, open society that could reverberate into a journal. Other members vehemently disagreed. (Husbands & 
Holland 2008, p. 128) 
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 Ratiocinatio is St. Thomas Aquinas’ term for discursive reasoning, namely, the natural reasoning used by humans 
when a truth is sought –as opposed to the angels’ intuitive  knowledge of things, or God’s (Husbands & Holland 
2008, p. 102) 
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 See above note on cybernetics’ patron saint according to Wiener. 
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abstract origin of its name, the club was largely about device making, and the reason for this lay 
partly in its recent contemporary history –indeed a sad history that for some of the members was 
still very fresh. One member died just before making it to the first meeting: Kenneth Craik 
(1914–1945). Craik’s “synthetic philosophy”, which will be addressed in the next chapter, in fact 
strongly informed and defined an essential aspect of the group: its emphasis was on device-
construction as a means of explanation. In fact, at least one Ratio member referred to what was 
going on in the American side as  “thinking on very much the same lines as Kenneth Craik did, 
but with much less sparkle and humour”.117 
One main criterion for recruiting members (which were always kept constant at around 
twenty, between core members and guests) was that they should have had, in John Bates words, 
“Wiener’s ideas before Wiener’s book appeared”.118 There was substantial emphasis placed on 
this mandate, since there was the conviction that the American side, to a great extent, was 
enjoying the fruits of having merely put cybernetic ideas together with impeccable timing. As 
advanced above, many of those ideas were allegedly already floating around before Wiener and 
company --and adding insult to injury, many were coming from Britain. In fact, the Ratio group 
did have prominent members that went down in history as prominent cyberneticians or thinkers 
in their own right
119
 --such as Alan Turing, Grey Walter,
120
 Donald Mackay and Ross Ashby.  
                                                 
117
 Husbands & Holland 2008, p. 14 
118
 This criterion was several times repeated in letters throughout the formation of the club. The neurologist John 
Bates, who came up first with the idea of these gatherings, wrote in one of his invitation letters: “I know personally 
about 15 people who had Wiener’s ideas before Wiener’s book appeared and who are more or less concerned with 
them in their present work and who I think would come.” (Husbands & Holland 2012, p. 242) 
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 They did acknowledge as “honorary members” McCulloch, Pitts, Shannon and either Wiener or Weaver. 
A list of the club membership in a member’s correspondence reads ‘Mc’, ‘P’, ‘S’ and a letter that could be either a 
‘U’ or a ‘W’. Husbands speculates that it could refer to either Norbert Wiener or Warren Weaver (Husbands & 
Holland 2008, p. 98). 
120
 William Grey Walter (1910–1977) was an American (naturalized British) roboticist and neurophysiologist, 
largely self-taught while working at hospitals. He is best remembered by his famous mechanical “tortoises”, 
displaying animal-like behavior at festivals and media gatherings. He called them both machina speculatrix (and 
each, Elmer and Elsie) because the way in which they would find their way around environments seemed to suggest 
that they were “deciding” about possible routes.  
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 These almost patriotic statements might up to some point be understood as reactive to 
some of Wiener’s remarks regarding the state of cybernetics in England. As mentioned above, 
Wiener acknowledged in his book the originality and enthusiasm that British scientists 
demonstrate, but pointed out, probably not without reason, that they were not as developed and 
organized as in America.
121
 After all, the very nature of the Ratio Club pointed to a hobby-style, 
“indie” type of pursuing of cybernetic insights,122 without an official backup coming from the 
British government.
123
 Wiener’s remarks might have been exacerbated in their effects after 
McCulloch’s talk at the Ratio Club. There was a unanimous feeling that it fell flat. In addition, 
due to McCulloch’s well-known penchant for flowery language and grandiose remarks –after all, 
he was heavily trained in the Classics—a member voiced the feeling that they found “Americans 
less clever than they appear to think themselves”. 124 Alan Turing referred to him as “a charlatan” 
straight up.
125
  
 In fact, there seemed to be an undercurrent of wounded pride throughout the British 
cybernetic development.
126
 As an example, J. O. Wisdom’s article “The Hypothesis of 
Cybernetics” might fall within this context.127 Wisdom was intrigued by both the audacity of the 
cybernetic proposals, and the rigor --even elegance-- of their theoretical premises and 
procedures. However, Wisdom somewhat reduced the cybernetic hypothesis to a sophisticated 
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mechanistic view of the nervous system. And the reason for this might be partly historical in 
nature. 
Not long after the role of negative feedback in machinery had been carefully examined, 
the hypothesis that claimed that the nervous system was, in fact, a machine with negative 
feedback, saw the light. This might have been influenced by the fact that, particularly in the UK, 
many biology researchers were recruited, due to the war efforts, to work in radar research and 
development.
128
 These biologists became thus familiarized with electronics and mechanics, and 
biological realms began to be framed under a mechanistic guise. Conversely, urgently needed 
research on radar technology was an incentive to think of it as an artificial extension of human 
sensoria. This British emphasis on radar development, as seen in the previous chapter regarding 
American predictors being coupled with English radars, was an important aspect of the context 
of development of the Ratio Club. 
 Wisdom was ultimately critical of the scope and limits of the cybernetic enterprise, 
equating it to a mechanical hypothesis of the nervous system --which was but just one aspect, 
even if important, of the cybernetic epistemology. Wisdom seemed to have missed the crux of 
the theoretical pillars of the enterprise --namely, that of the assumption of the perfect possibility, 
nay, the hitherto unacknowledged existence, of an entire class of non-material (disembodied) 
machines. And the patriotic context mentioned above might have had something to do with this. 
It could be reasonably entertained that Wisdom might have wished to point out that the tradition 
of research on the nervous system within the context of computation was on the British side at 
least as good as on the American one --as depicted by von Neumann and McCulloch. 
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 Be that as it may, the group enjoyed a frequency that Macy, only once a year, did not. 
Also, at least reportedly, the meetings were less messy and conflictual than at Macy –as reported 
above. Rather, members acknowledged that a true interdisciplinary discussion (at least in spirit) 
used to emerge.
129
 Most remembered the Ratio meetings as bringing intense academic and 
intellectual fulfillment to its members –in fact, for some, those meetings gave the most insightful 
and helpful insights for their own, later prominent careers.
130
 From 1949 to 1951, the meetings 
were as frequent as scheduled; however, attendance begun to dwindle after 1952. There were 
only four meetings in 1953, three in 1954 and two in 1955. There was one more, sort of “final 
reunion” in 1958. And the club never met again.131  
 
3. The decline. 
 
From the pre-Macy conferences up until half the lifespan of the Macy cycle, most cyberneticians 
were in a state of a nearly constant adrenaline rush. But some began to grow worried regarding 
the grand-promises that this new science was to deliver to the world, as reported by the popular 
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 As opposed to the chaos of Macy where some –mostly social scientists—used to be lost. This is how Dupuy 
describes it: 
 The cyberneticians showed no reservation about entering into technical discussion with the widest variety 
 of specialists, examining with equal ease the results of a psychoacoustic experiment and a theory of the 
 conditions under which the words of a language acquire a specific individual meaning. The few generalists 
 present, the most notable of whom was Gregory Bateson, often found themselves lost. In their frustration at 
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 Reasons for its slow decline were diverse. For one thing, it was too far for many, having to return home very late 
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uniqueness, and to some point compelling mystery and scientific heroism was no longer there. Allegedly members 
lost interest as a consequence (Husbands & Holland 2008, p. 129). Needless to say, these are just some of the 
reasons as reckoned by Husbands and Holland. There might be others that shall be gradually unveiled later in time, 
after researchers take interest in the fate of this interesting group.  
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media. This conflicting reception can be noticed when seeing from an eagle’s view both the 
unanimous motion of approval for having the series of Macy conferences’ title changed to 
Cybernetics and the words of cautious advice voiced by its own members. 
Despite being the target of popular attention (or perhaps, precisely due to it), Norbert 
Wiener was right from the beginning relentless in trying to calm down what he regarded as an 
unwarranted hype around the cybernetic project. Not only would he shun claims that could be 
deemed plain excessive, but indeed more importantly, Wiener was particularly skeptical of the 
social applications of the powerful cybernetic concept. Bridging heretofore ontologically 
incompatible realms, such as man, machine, and life –thus extending the realm of physical 
science—was difficult enough. And he felt understandably proud about such a feat. But 
extending the mechanical umbrella to portions of reality where the amount of variables was 
qualitatively over and above the tractable was the place where he would draw the line. The 
unpredictability of social behavior, for Wiener, inherently escaped numerical framing.
132
 
These are relevant observations, since they point to a web of internal tensions already 
present within the project right from the start –tensions that have been traditionally highlighted 
as part and parcel of the eventual fate of cybernetics. Almost right from their beginnings, the 
Macy conferences witnessed sociologists and anthropologists as some of the most enthusiastic 
‘converts’ to the cybernetic view --to the discreet discomfort of some cyberneticians, Wiener 
being prominent among them.
133
 Seemingly, some scholars emanating from the “soft” sciences 
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 While Norbert Wiener was voicing his cautious outlook on applying a cybernetic framework to society, just a 
year after his seminal 1943 paper, fellow cybernetician John von Neumann was publishing a book with Oskar 
Morgenstern on Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), which launched within economics --itself 
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 I mention this matter because of the considerable, and I think false, hopes which some of my friends have 
 built for the social efficacy of whatever new ways of thinking this book may contain. They are certain that 
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were more than eager to adopt a heuristic tool that would bring the scientific validation that was 
eluding them right from the foundation of their own fields –including psychology, pace 
Skinner.
134
 
The tension witnessed between these two grand realms of knowledge within cybernetics 
may well point to another source of unease: the radical interdisciplinarity of the movement. Part 
of the allure of cybernetics was the deep realization, common across fields, that this neo-
mechanistic understanding of life and mind could encompass a novel unifying language, 
structured upon the strengths of physics and mathematics. This approach, which necessarily 
entailed the interdisciplinary gatherings of Macy, was for some members one of the most 
attractive features of the cybernetic proposal. 
However, for some others, particularly coming from the “hard” sciences, the attempt at 
dialoguing with other disciplines was coming at a high price, entailing a substantial dissolving of 
their hard earned, specialized, field-centric semantics –and all that just for hooking up with not-
so-neighboring fields anyway. This alleged theoretical bridge would be founded, according to its 
critics, more on vagueness than on substance –and that was too much of a hard pill to swallow. 
Some indeed never came back.
135
 All tensions and early defections notwithstanding, the 
overlapping consensus among cyberneticians was that something deeply important –indeed, a 
type of 2
nd
 scientific revolution of sorts-- was in the making, and thus chose to be patient and 
stick to the cybernetic project. The opportunity for a profoundly positive outcome for science 
                                                                                                                                                             
 our control over our material environment has far outgrown our control over our social environment and 
 our understanding thereof. Therefore, they consider that the main task of the immediate future is to extend 
 to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences, in the hope 
 of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this necessary, they come to 
 believe it possible. In this, I maintain, they show an excessive optimism, and a misunderstanding of the 
 nature of all scientific achievement (Wiener 1948, p. 162). 
134
 See the first section of the previous chapter (I. 1.) for Wiener’s complain against the poverty of traditional 
behaviorism.  
135
 One striking example of this attitude was Max Delbrück’s refusal to return to the conferences, mentioned in the 
previous chapter. I will come back to this occurrence in the chapter pertaining to von Neumann’s work (VI). 
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would be too great to dismiss, and just due to some wrinkles in the way it was being laid out.  
Probably most importantly, and this aspect has arguably not received enough attention, is 
the impact that cybernetics had on its members, underpinning later advances in technology and 
science. In the case of American cybernetics, the fields of information theory, computer science, 
genetics, artificial intelligence and artificial life, could be traced back to its cybernetic roots in a 
fairly straightforward manner –although this uncompleted task has not received enough attention 
from the scholarship.
136
 In the case of the Ratio Club, the testimony of some of its members 
regarding their indebtedness in this regard to cybernetics is particularly striking.
137
The difficulty 
in pinning down what exactly it is about cybernetics that manages to carry until now an aura of 
fascination might be deeply intertwined with this holistic and fluid aspect of its scientific ethos. 
All these historical circumstances, theoretical features and even spin-offs emanating from the 
cybernetic enterprise, stand as witness to the greatness of the project according to its founders, its 
profound role displayed upon its members, and its well acknowledged influence at the time on 
the scientific community at large.  
 However, after an intense decade of enthusiastic interaction between scientists, 
mathematicians and engineers of the first order --reciprocally connecting in one novel theoretical 
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 arise (Husbands & Holland 2008, p. 129). 
66 
 
structure of common knowledge-- a sudden general vacuum seemed to have taken over. Despite 
the success and fame that the movement enjoyed from 1943 on, just a decade later it came to a 
relatively abrupt halt. By 1951 two of its main contributors, von Neumann and Wiener, 
permanently dropped out from the Macy conferences. By 1953 the last Macy conference took 
place. Not even informal gatherings ever happened again in America. Whatever happened 
between 1943 and 1953 that took the world by storm, way beyond the exclusive realms of 
academic and scientific circles and into the educated average population at large, was not there 
anymore.  
 Their British counterpart, the Ratio Club, continued to meet sporadically, gradually dying 
out during a span of five years, until 1958. By the time the penultimate Ratio Club reunion was 
taking place in 1955, the American side of the cybernetic movement was practically dissolved. 
By that time, having morphed into another project, which did not have the flare, allure, tenets 
and members of the original project, cybernetics ended up in a relatively obscure program in an 
American university for one more struggling decade. It was led by one of the scientists who was 
in charge of publishing the proceedings of the Macy meetings, Heinz von Foerster, and provided 
institutional cover for one of the last raunchily self-proclaimed cyberneticians, the British Ross 
Ashby. Aside from this attempt to keep it alive in a substantially different guise, the ground 
shaking ideas firing up bold statements in the media and elsewhere were all but gone.
138
 For all 
intents and purposes classical cybernetics was effectively dissolved and its electrifying vibe dead 
by 1954.  
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 This is an astonishing development, even today, after the fact. Six decades later, we are 
still asking ourselves what happened. How can one explain this? How can a movement that 
merited the appraisals (sometimes tinged with fear) of thinkers such as Heidegger and Lacan, 
that was touted as the science of the future by eminent thinkers, that received substantial funding 
by the state (at least on the American side),
139
 and that was hailed by media as the next step for 
humanity, come to such an abrupt and unremarkable end?  
 Several attempts at answering this inquiry have emerged –each tackling one or more 
levels of explanation. Indeed there have been attempts at articulating this demise coming from 
several regions of knowledge. Each one has its own strength, and each one points to different 
aspects of the troubled project towards the end. Some bring economic reasons for cybernetics’ 
death. Competing cognitive proposals soaked up all the available funding for this type of 
research, effectively leaving cybernetics to dry out. Some others point to the inherent tensions 
alluded to above. Some even pin it to reasons of a personal nature. Without dismissing reasons of 
funding, uneasy interdisciplinarity, or even conflict of personalities, a philosophical assessment 
has not been sufficiently laid out so far to seek the reasons for the demise of cybernetics.  
 Indeed entering deeper into core dimensions of cybernetic theory one could find 
enlightening signs pointing to what could have happened, at the level of the solidity of its 
theoretical framework. Most importantly for this thesis, these cues revolve around the 
development and evolution of the nature of a machine. This evolving notion was embedded 
within the cybernetic mindset deeper than many cyberneticians probably realized. Plunging deep 
into the investigation of the nature of a machine does provide angles to understand better 
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whatever happened to cybernetics. As well, it opens up doors for understanding later and current 
approaches to science that carry the cybernetic signature. 
But first, I will provide an updated overview of the typical reasons so far adduced for the 
death of cybernetics. 
 
4. Traditional explanations for the collapse of cybernetics. 
 
Perhaps the most well-known version attempting to explain cybernetics’ demise is that it simply 
ran out of funding. This story emphasizes the alleged fierce competition that streamed from some 
of the people that were ironically under the influence of senior cyberneticians, but that later had 
antagonistic proposals of their own. The story line links cybernetics to artificial neural networks 
in an essential fashion –courtesy of having both McCulloch and Pitts’ networks as a common 
ancestor. The gist of this explanation relies on the alleged fact that a “symbolic architecture” 
approach was shown to be capable of dealing with some problems, such as theorem proving and 
chess playing. This dominant change of perspective, coming from the founders of what became 
later known as Artificial Intelligence (AI), supposedly funneled to itself most of the available 
funding. This money --still mainly being granted by military offices-- went to fund the symbolic 
approach, leaving cybernetics out in the cold. 
Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert, both disciples of McCulloch, published a book 
severely criticizing Frank Rosenblatt’s “perceptron”140 –a core element of neural networks, and 
allegedly, by extension, a core element of cybernetics. It supposedly showed the inherent 
limitations of single neurons in sophisticated thought processes, a weakness particularly shown 
in the area of problem solving. The implication was that if the artificial neuron was not capable 
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in small realms (lacking as a standalone or in simple networks), then it could not be good in the 
big ones (more complex networks would never be able to develop higher processes). This 
report
141
 was regarded by many as the final nail in the coffin for network-related research –and a 
fortiori, for the distancing from cybernetics as an acknowledged influence.
142
  
 At least two main criticisms can be launched against such an account. Firstly, as it has 
been already advanced (and will be further discussed later), although neural networks were part 
of the core of cybernetics (as we saw above, McCulloch and Pitts’ article was indeed a 
foundational one), it is clear that the networks’ approach was not the only one that cybernetics 
had at the core of its own theory. In fact, criticisms against neural networks were launched by 
von Neumann within the very heart of the cybernetic enterprise, advocating for an alternative 
view, probably even more cybernetic in spirit –namely, the possibility of building self-
reproducing machines. One could even safely assume that Wiener’s lack of reaction to von 
Neumann’s severe criticism of neural networks might be explained by the fact that for Wiener 
the core acceptance of networks was not a sine qua non condition for the cybernetic endeavor to 
continue and flourish. For him there were other more important elements whose widespread 
acknowledgement was more essential for the cybernetic insight, such as the nature of the 
message, information and control.
143
  
 The other criticism that can be pointed out against this typical account of cybernetics’ 
demise is more historical in nature. By the time Minsky was criticizing the “perceptron” (1969), 
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cybernetics was largerly already dead. This traditional account is thus best located within the 
context of the origins of cognitive science, particularly the area concerning early neural networks 
--not within cybernetics at large. And in any case, even if what little remained of cybernetics at 
the Biological Computer Laboratory at the University of Illinois actually competed for funding 
with the new and eager generation of AI researchers, it would be inaccurate to affirm that what 
such “neo-cybernetic” group was asking, namely, funding, equated to cybernetics competing for 
funding.  
 In fact, there is the view that the very existence of the Biological Computer Laboratory 
was the living proof that cybernetics was officially dead.
144
 The so called “Second order 
cybernetics” era, or “Cybernetics of cybernetics”, attempted to include the observer into the 
system, dissolving the whole mechanizing cybernetic view of control. It effectively nullified the 
bold proposals being advanced by classical cybernetics a decade before, leaving its strong 
ontological stance.
145
 It switched to an epistemological preoccupation with the observer of the 
system, partly inspired in quantum mechanics’ concern with the pervasive role of the observer in 
any possible measurement within subatomic phenomena. Von Foerster was indeed a physicist by 
training and was keenly interested in quantum problems right from the moment he entered the 
first Macy conference. All these “autopoietic” insights, which brought Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela to the laboratory, escaping from Pinochet’s Chile and infused with “the Buddha 
and the French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty”,146 as well as with some allegedly 
Heideggerian insights, could have evolved into something unique and interesting –and maybe it 
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did.
147
 But what is clear is that it resembles little to the original cybernetic enterprise. So if it is 
indeed the case that it replaced it, then one could conclude that cybernetics was, in a very real 
sense, dead. 
 What is more, a further detail can shed some light on the misconstruction of identifying 
the advance of AI as spelling doom for cybernetics. The generation of disciples that followed the 
cybernetic masters went the extra-mile to deny acknowledgement of having its parental roots 
squarely set in cybernetics. After the attack of AI to networks research, anything related to the 
latter –including cybernetics-- would suffer being side-stepped for funding. This “guilty by 
association” context might have had deeper reasons than just playing safe for obtaining grants. In 
fact, it is an area of history of science that has been largely unexplored.
148
 Again, this 
explanation, situated at the beginning of cognitive science (1960s) accounts for a time when 
cybernetics was already dissolved. Denying the cybernetic origin of cognitive science is an issue 
worth studying in its own right, but it gives little in terms of explaining why the theoretical 
parent experienced atrophy in the first place. 
 Still related to theoretical issues, there is another one that has lately attracted more 
attention, but that is nevertheless intertwined with personal issues. It has to do with what 
occurred after von Neumann’s letter to Wiener, regarding the inadequacy of McCulloch and 
Pitts’ neural networks for articulating the human mind --and von Neumann’s subsequent 
proposal for exercising a “back to the basics” move, instantiated in the study of the self-
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reproductive capabilities of virus. This (in)famous letter was sent after von Neumann delivered 
the opening talk at the first Macy meeting --and actively participated in the second one. It set up 
a meeting with Wiener that supposedly took place in December of the same year (1946). 
Whatever happened in that meeting set out to discuss the discomfort vented in the letter, it was 
evident for many that a rift between the two heretofore close-friends had occurred --and this rift 
was expressed in almost eccentric ways. It was reported that Wiener would loudly snore at von 
Neumann’s talks. Von Neumann, in turn, would loudly flip the pages of the New York Times, 
seated in the front row, while Wiener was lecturing.
149
  
 Whatever the effect the letter might have had, there were reasons for Wiener’s reaction --
even if delayed. For starters, when the friendship between both men was at its pinnacle, Wiener’s 
lobbying at MIT managed to procure for von Neumann a position at the mathematics 
department. MIT had a long tradition of engineering, while Princeton had a number of Nobel 
Laureates. Wiener was probably interested in bringing that kind of flare to the cybernetic hub –
which for the lack of an official institutional setting, was de facto occurring at MIT. Von 
Neumann used this important offer as leverage to persuade Princeton to give him funding for 
building his computer machine –which he obtained, promptly refusing MIT’s invitation.   
As if that maneuver was not enough, von Neumann asked Wiener to “lend” him his chief 
engineer, Julian Bigelow, whose genius was so crucial for building his predictor --and Wiener 
agreed! The double irony of this move is that the machine to be constructed had as its main aim 
the aiding of von Neumann’s secret assignment –the building and improvement of atomic 
bombs. All these while Wiener had already become deeply disturbed on account of the 
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destructive capabilities of nuclear power –and hence the grave moral responsibilities of men of 
science. 
 Von Neumann was an active advocate of a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet super 
power. In sharp contrast, Wiener was severely affected after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki; his stance regarding war changed 360 degrees, making him a vociferous peace 
supporter. In fact, this newly acquired stance, which was represented in his resolute decision to 
walk away from all government and military contracts, was seen with suspicion by the 
McCarthyism of the Cold War era. This development has been identified as one more reason 
why cybernetics fell out of grace. Adding insult to injury, Wiener kept a close relationship with 
his Russian peers in science –who had developed a keen interest in cybernetics, and were largely 
backed by the Communist Party. This might have triggered a negative aura around Wiener and 
his project --a “cautious” view promoted by the government.150 
 As to what strained his relations with von Neumann, we have no proof, but Wiener might 
have caught wind of von Neumann’s side agenda. Or he might have had a delayed reaction 
regarding von Neumann’s Janus-faced “move” to obtain funding for his computer machine at 
Princeton –at the expense of Wiener’s good intentions. Or perhaps it was a combination of the 
above.  
 Not all outward resentment came from the side of Wiener, however. It is acknowledged 
that when Wiener made the link between his cybernetic incursions into control, communication 
and negative feedback on the one hand, and thermodynamics and chaos on the other (thus 
identifying information with negative entropy) von Neumann took it personally --and rather 
badly. Von Neumann had been also studying chaos for years, and he made a name for himself 
from his earlier years in the realm of the mathematics of quantum mechanics.  However, he did 
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not elaborate his insights into chaos and entropy in connection with information to the point that 
Wiener did. In fact, there might have always been a rivalry particularly coming from him, who 
probably felt that Wiener always had the upper hand in mathematics –after all, the latter had 
been recognized as a veritable genius since his childhood. Von Neumann became jealous that 
Wiener established the startling correlation and not him. So what might have started as friendly 
academic competition could have developed into mutual hostility.
151
 
 There was still a further detail that might have played a role, above and beyond the 
distancing with von Neumann –in fact, with his distancing from the whole cybernetic group: an 
occurrence that has lately received more attention in terms of its possible influence on the 
dissolution of the whole enterprise. 
 Margaret Wiener, who was literally “shipped in” from Germany to marry Norbert, 
belonged to a severely conservative Protestant Puritan tradition. Also, she was a fairly overt 
admirer of Adolf Hitler, and her family, proudly Nazi. In fact, one of her brothers ran a 
concentration camp. Barbara, their first daughter, once got in trouble in elementary school 
because she candidly talked about the (Nazi) literature her mother avidly read at home. 
Apparently, the secularism of Wiener’s parents might have been sufficiently profound for 
Margaret to ignore Norbert’s Semitic roots. Rather, it was clear that for Margaret, the fame and 
stature of her husband on the world stage, and hence her social position, was the absolute 
priority. The whole family, Norbert included, went to a church of her denomination in a 
disciplined manner.  
Since it is until now unclear what happened between both men, it is not out of the realm 
of possibility that Margaret, at a certain moment, turned her husband’s mind against von 
Neumann --a Jew (despite the fact that his family adopted Catholicism in the 1930s). They 
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already half-mocked von Neumann’s impeccable dressing and ultra-formal manners.152 She 
knew how to get Norbert Wiener to steer things her way --as it will be shown below. Margaret’s 
ideas were likely already beginning to be distilled, following her own motto, despising the ways 
of a liberal life.
153
 Von Neumann divorced and remarried after his first wife ran away with a 
graduate student of his. 
If Wiener grew apart from von Neumann, chances are that the latter was not profoundly 
affected, since von Neumann always kept some distance from the cybernetic group anyway. He 
was in the group, without being part of it, so to speak. This might be explained, beyond his own 
way of being –a cosmopolitan man gifted with political maneuverability—with the sort of secret 
appointments that he took for the most part of his career. But the distance that occurred between 
Wiener and the rest of the group certainly had dramatic consequences. In 1951, three years after 
the publication of the book, Norbert Wiener severed all ties with his close friends and 
cyberneticians, particularly with Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. This episode has not 
attracted enough attention until lately,
154
 and a brief exposition of what occurred seems fitting, in 
order to assess the degree of influence that this episode had in the entire cybernetic endeavor.  
From the moment that Wiener and McCulloch had met, a gradual but eventually close 
friendship was formed; it was only to grow more intense in the subsequent years after the 
publication of the article in 1943 and the years of the Macy conference. McCulloch acquired a 
ranch (with a farm) in Old Lyme, Connecticut, which he renovated and put to work. This place 
was a hub for all the intellectuals, scientists and academicians that were around for a conference, 
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or who just wanted to drop by and mingle with the McCullochs for a while. In fact, the place was 
big enough for guests to spend the night –even several days.  
Reportedly, Norbert Wiener always was in the happiest of moods while he was at the 
ranch. The lake, the nature, the late chats over drinks over entire weekends, all these were a 
relaxing antidote for Wiener’s frequently stressed mind. The McCulloch’s were a remarkably 
liberal couple and such things as swimming at the lake in the nude was customary –for them and 
their guests. At least one person recalls the usual sight of Norbert Wiener floating on the lake, 
huge belly up, cigar in hand, loudly talking while floating away. Such was the happy, if 
permissive, ambience at the McCulloch’s ranch. 
Needless to say, Margaret Wiener would not have ever approved of their conduct. In fact, 
unlike the other wives, she never accompanied Norbert to any of his weekend getaways at the 
McCulloch’s. Warren McCulloch’s pomposity, eccentricity, and for the time, markedly liberal 
ways, were more than what a conservative Puritan German could take --and the open repulsion 
against Wiener’s friend was immediate from the first time they met. Wiener’s daughters, Barbara 
and Peggy, recall that with absolute certainty, their mother Margaret never found out about this 
“debauchery”. Her reaction would have been, in all probability, nothing less than cataclysmic. 
Margaret Wiener’s disgust for this circle of friends triggered a long-term plan that seemed to 
have worked out at the end.  
In 1951, three years after the publication of Cybernetics, and having published another 
successful book,
155
 Wiener was trying to publish his memoirs --to no avail. Publishers found the 
manuscript to be too vitriolic and ridiculing of some people who had been Wiener’s mentors. 
Even Wiener’s portrayal of himself was embarrassing. The intended book was coming across as 
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a personal rant against both the author himself and people who were still alive. Publishing 
companies did not find this material attractive. Some found it even parochial.
156
 The uniform 
rejection, even from the publishing house at his own institution which previously fought for co-
publishing Cybernetics (MIT), was taking a toll on Wiener’s state of mind. In fact, it was 
exacerbating the intense depression into which he submerged himself out of writing about his 
own (not particularly happy) childhood. Wiener was as vulnerable as a seriously depressed 
person can get. His wife Margaret saw the opportunity to advance her plan of secession.  
Some years before, when Barbara had begun her undergraduate studies in Chicago, 
Warren McCulloch expectably offered his house for her to stay, since it was close to her school. 
Wiener was grateful for the offer, accepted it, and sent Barbara to stay there for quite some time. 
The McCulloch’s were so attentive about her staying with them, that once they even confronted 
her regarding a medical student she began dating. She was 19 years old and they felt responsible. 
It was all innocent and nothing came out of it, but history turned that episode into an irony.  
Recall that this was the same period during which McCulloch gave shelter to Pitts and 
Lettvin. Margaret Wiener told Norbert, at the lowest point of his depression, that during the time 
when Barbara was staying with the McCulloch’s, “the boys” (as the young cyberneticists used to 
be called) seduced their young daughter more than once. And more than one... Norbert Wiener 
went into shock and rage ensued. 
Margaret Wiener had an extreme fixation with the perverse (for her) nature of sex, having 
submitted her daughter Barbara to several humiliations –all sex-related, and all implying she did 
something gravely inappropriate, when she did not. The Puritanical rattle was sometimes so 
                                                 
156
 As a publisher put it while rejecting the manuscript, “a book of almost wholly American interest.” (Conway & 
Siegelman 2005, p. 218) 
78 
 
evident, that even Norbert Wiener, despite his legendary absent-mindedness,
157
 on more than one 
occasion came to the rescue of his daughter from the intrigues of the mother.
158
 However, by this 
time, Wiener’s psyche was at an all-time low,159 allowing Margaret to instill venom in his 
defenseless mind. Given the (sexual) nature of the accusation, and given the social ways of the 
time, Norbert was never going to further stir things and damage his daughter’s reputation by 
inquiring about the truth of this revelation –outcome that Margaret likely knew quite well, 
successfully sealing her master plan.  
Around the same time, Walter Pitts and Jerome Lettvin were in the best of moods. The 
Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab) mentioned in the previous chapter was morphed into the 
Research Laboratory of Electronics after the war ended. This new lab had more than sufficient 
funds for serious research, and had Warren McCulloch as its head –for which he left his 
permanent professorship at the University of Illinois in Chicago. As if that was not good enough, 
the laboratory was going to have research bent towards human cognition inserted in the “bigger 
picture” of military research and development. Pitts and Lettvin, with their new fancy machines 
and bright prospects of adventurous investigation, were ecstatic and overjoyed. In accordance 
with their mood, they wrote a bombastic letter to Wiener (and Rosenblueth) the language of 
which was supposed to be taken as a prank. It started with the words “Know, o most noble, 
magnanimous and puissant lords…” In all likelihood, Wiener would have found it amusing, had 
he found himself in a “normal” state of mind. Margaret’s “revelations” of his daughter’s 
permanent “stain” at the hands of these “boys” had occurred just the night before. Wiener’s 
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answer was terse in the extreme. The telegram that he sent in response to a colleague of theirs, so 
that he passed on the message, read (caps original): 
IMPERTINENT LETTER RECEIVED FROM PITTS AND LETVIN. PLEASE INFORM 
THEM THAT ALL CONNECTION BETWEEN ME AND YOUR PROJECTS IS 
PERMAMENTLY ABOLISHED. THEY ARE YOUR PROBLEM. WIENER
160
 
As for McCulloch, Wiener opted instead for applying a permanent “silent treatment” --while at 
the same time vituperating his persona, academically and professionally, among common 
colleagues. Both McCulloch and Pitts (and Lettvin) were first in shock, then in denial. For a 
while, they thought that it was going to be a passing phase,
161
 that things would later come back 
to normal, and that they would find out what happened. They simply did not (and could not) 
understand what took place. Gradually, however, it became clear that Wiener’s decision had a 
permanent character, and a dark cloud settled in for everyone. 
 McCulloch took it badly. Although he would continue with a “business as usual” attitude 
in his life and work, it was clear for those surrounding him that he was hurting and merely 
“pushing through” --surviving. The years of joyous friendship, of meeting for the most fulfilling 
conferences and gatherings, of seeing eye-to-eye on fundamental ideas about the world… these 
were not going to go away easily. Wiener himself confessed later that the break up with his 
colleagues and friends was taking a toll of him, not only mentally, but with psychosomatic 
consequences as well. He alluded to having contracted a painful heart condition due to this 
episode. By all accounts, however, the one who took it the worst, and by far, was Walter Pitts. 
 Pitts regarded Norbert Wiener as the father he never had. Even if McCulloch exercised a 
de facto “adopting” of him by letting him stay at his house when he was homeless, McCulloch 
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did the same for several other students. McCulloch was, to put it simply, just a generous man 
who cared in a very concrete sense for his students’ well-being. With Wiener, however, it was 
different. Wiener brought Pitts to MIT, vouched for him, put him under his direct supervision, 
and lobbied for scholarships, grants and job positions for him. Wiener only had two daughters –
as smart and intelligent as they were, given the times, he might had desired to have his legacy 
passed through to a son. In pressing Pitts to perform his duties and accomplish his goals (Pitts 
had a severe habit of procrastination), Wiener was very likely re-enacting the rigor that his own 
father had with him for his own good. Pitts, who escaped an uneducated environment where he 
used to be beaten, found in a very literal way, a father.   
After Wiener dispatched the above missive (and knowing that Wiener was mouth 
trashing him and McCulloch), Pitts entered a spiral of self-destruction. He burnt all the research 
and writing that was going to grant him his PhD on a three-dimensional model of neural 
networks –a proposal that baffled mathematicians at the time with admiration, as mentioned 
above. He isolated himself from people. He stopped talking. He began to drink heavily. And he 
remained in that deplorable state until his death, which was alcohol-related (cirrhosis).
162
 
Tellingly, Pitts died only five years after Wiener, despite being considerably younger than 
him.
163
 
 Pitts’ friend, Jerome Lettvin, the last cybernetician alive, died in 2011. Later in his life, 
he was asked to give an account of Norbert Wiener at a conference in Genoa, which he did with 
most empathy and in the best manner. At almost 80 years old, he was still hurting from the break 
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up. Ten years after this episode, Arturo Rosenblueth finally told him what happened, recounting 
the machinations that Margaret Wiener put in place to secure their separation.
 164
 In spite of it all, 
Lettvin respected and admired Wiener until the end. Wiener’s widow, Margaret, was at the same 
conference, and approached Lettvin to thank him for his kind words about her late husband. This 
is how Lettvin recalls the encounter: 
I prepared a very careful, very adulatory talk and, afterwards. Mrs. Wiener came up to 
congratulate me and offered her hand –you know, she was a slight woman—but I really wanted to 
hit her as hard as I could, because I knew that she had contrived the break.
165
 
Jerome Lettvin did not want to open up much regarding this painful episode for him and his 
friends, but being the last cybernetician alive, he did set the record straight before his recent 
death in 2011. These revelations have spanned a new round of possible explanations for 
cybernetics’ decline. Given the powerful effects that passion and human emotions may have on 
historical occurrences of long lasting consequences, one could be tempted to reduce the whole 
development of cybernetics implosion to a unique, selfish and hidden act of a sole person. After 
all, Henry VIII’s infatuated lust for Anne Boleyn in the 17th century ended up in the subsequent 
breakup of the entire United Kingdom from Rome, effectively creating an unsurmountable 
wedge in a divided West.
166
 Could it be that one person’s “matters of the heart” affect in such a 
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profound way the future of an entire worldview? Indeed Oliver Selfridge
167
 said of this gossip 
that 
It really fucked up cybernetics…because here you’ve got the guy who invented the term and 
invented the idea right there with you, but there was no interaction at all with Norbert, which was 
a crying shame.
168
  
Without attempting to subtract the causal power from the passionate act of a woman with twisted 
intentions upon a man’s overreaching actions (be it Anne Boleyn or Margaret Wiener) one could 
however recall the traditional advice given to any first year philosophy student: A cause for an 
effect is seldom exhaustive. One particular situation may have several valid explanations 
intertwined, spanning across several levels of discourse and reality. In this section some of these 
levels have been laid out –theoretical, social, economic, political and personal. But projects that 
advance bold ontological (and epistemological) proposals in a robust way tend to supersede their 
own founders. In the words of Wiener himself, 
We have contributed to the initiation of a new science which… embraces technical developments 
with great possibilities for good and evil. They belong to the age, and the most any of us can do 
by suppression is to put the development of the subject into the hands of the most irresponsible 
and the most venal of our engineers.
169
 
It is reasonable to entertain the possibility that there is space for a further philosophical 
interpretation of what happened with cybernetics at the theoretical level. This is particularly 
appropriate given the fact that after the breakup, some cyberneticians were not only still active 
with a classical cybernetic outlook on things, but indeed took the project to the next level in 
different ways --indeed away from “irresponsible and venal engineers”. This was precisely the 
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case with William Ross Ashby and John von Neumann.  Identifying what went on in each case 
will, I hope, further contribute towards the understanding of a notion of machine, and with that, 
shed some light on what possibly occurred with this movement. But first, I will lay out in the 
next chapter the context that allowed for the rise of cybernetics in the first place. 
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III. Pre-cybernetic context: An early 20
th
 century ontological displacement of the machine.  
 
       …understanding by a purely mechanical process 
       one which could be carried out by a machine.
170
 
 
1. The “Foundational Crisis of Mathematics” and the response from Formalism. 
 
In the second half of the 19
th
 century, the German mathematician George Cantor (1845-1918) 
engaged in a series of investigations regarding infinite numbers. Some of his observations were 
considered disturbing by some schools of thought in mathematics, and even more so the 
conclusions that were being reached from them. A typical Cantorian reasoning would lead to a 
paradox involving operations with transfinite numbers. For instance, if we have an infinite set of 
natural numbers, and a set conformed by all the sub-sets of natural numbers, which set would be 
larger? The notion of a cardinal number is introduced to account for the situation in which two 
infinite sets would still give an infinite set. This seemed self-contradictory and the tension was 
denounced, since it was occurring at the foundation of arithmetics --at the very core of 
mathematics.  
 The association of the notion of the “infinite” with the idea of God, put in place since 
early medieval philosophy, was still present in its own nuanced way, at the end of the 19
th
 
century. Indeed Cantor thought of himself as being the receptor of the mathematical insight 
regarding infinite numbers as a message delivered by God. In an occurrence that shows how 
controversial were his investigations at the time, Leopold Kronecker, Cantor’s own mentor, 
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reportedly stated that “God made the natural numbers; all else is the work of man”.171 Adding 
these metaphysical underpinnings to the extent of the consequences of his musings, might help 
clarify the reasons behind the subsequent furor against Cantor --who eventually broke down 
psychologically, ending his days in a mental ward.  
 This whole episode is prelude to what was known as the “Foundational Crisis of 
Mathematics” (Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik). The four main schools of thought in 
mathematics (logicism, formalism, intuitionism and Platonism) reacted to the claimed paradoxes. 
There is widespread consensus that the first two, logicism and formalism, which were 
substantially related, got the upper hand in responding to the crisis. Each displayed its own 
particular emphasis in the treatment of the problematic situation, and each triggered a different 
(although again, related) effect on mathematics, philosophy and science. 
 The logicist attempt at giving a solid foundation to mathematics resulted in efforts to 
reduce it to an extension of logic. But this route had some pre-conditional issues to resolve. 
Immanuel Kant famously stated that analytical judgments do not advance knowledge. Following 
the principle of non-contradiction, analytical propositions merely contemplate their own 
concepts as their object of understanding, finding the idea that was already embedded in them 
(e.g., a triangle has 180 degrees). Logic is the analytic discipline par excellence: obeying the law 
of non-contradiction, it engages in the contemplation of itself as an object of study. Although it 
provides no augmentation of knowledge, its own nature made it remain stable, not having 
changed since the time of Aristotle: 
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 For the advantage that has made it so successful logic has solely its own limitation to thank, 
 since it is thereby justified in abstracting – is indeed obliged to abstract – from all objects of 
 cognition and all the distinctions between them; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to 
 do with nothing further than itself and its own form.
172
 
Thus, the rescuing strategy for attaining a solid body of mathematics would somehow have to 
base mathematical knowledge on the secure foundations of logic. However, the mere mentioning 
of the notion of mathematical knowledge, which implies an epistemic gain, already suggests that 
we are facing a stumbling block --since there is no augmentation of knowledge from strictly 
analytical grounds. However, mathematics, by most accounts, indeed provides an increase of 
knowledge. And this goes against, to repeat, the very nature of an analytical enterprise --such as 
logic. After all, logic is secure, but at the price of not having changed in millennia; whereas 
mathematics has clearly advanced. In fact, Kant viewed mathematics (specifically of arithmetic, 
geometry and algebra) as being synthetic a priori --just as the judgments that form the natural 
sciences (e.g., physics) are, where the advances after Newton were staggering. Kant defended 
arithmetic as synthetic in one of the passages that has garnered the most dissatisfaction among 
his readers, ever… 
 We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytical 
 proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction) from the conception of a sum 
 of seven and five. But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of 
 seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at 
 all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both… We must go beyond these 
 conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two—our five 
 fingers, for example… For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid 
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 of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to 
 make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, 
 and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have 
 certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12. 
 Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly 
 convinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and twist our 
 conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum 
 total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions.
173
  
However, the German mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) took upon himself the task of 
showing that arithmetic, which does provide augmentation of knowledge, is in fact an analytic 
discipline. The question is how to provide the solidity of logic without removing the capability of 
furnishing new knowledge? In his Foundations of Arithmetic, he severely criticizes the idea 
instantiated in the paragraph above –which to Frege’s credit, did trigger much discomfort not 
long after Kant provided his “visual” explanation. Frege’s attack, to some degree 
commonsensical, involved the multiplication of very large numbers, the premise being that one 
does not refer to spatial objects (e.g., fingers) when operating with those…  
 [I]s it really self-evident that 135664+37863=173527? It is not; and Kant actually urges this as 
 an argument for holding these propositions to be synthetic… Kant thinks he can call on our 
 intuition of fingers or points for support, thus running the risk of making these propositions 
 appear to be empirical, contrary to his own expressed opinion… [H]ave we, in fact, an intuition 
 of 135664 fingers or points at all? If we had, and if we had another of 37863 fingers and a third of 
 173527 fingers, then the correctness of our formula, if it were unprovable, would have to be 
 evident right away, at least as applying to fingers; but it is not. Kant obviously was thinking of 
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 small numbers. So that for large numbers the formula would be provable, though for small 
 numbers they are immediately self-evident through intuition.
174
 
Having accused Kant of underestimating the power of analysis (in the operationally fruitful 
sense), the ground was ripe for declaring that arithmetic is both a knowledge-augmenting 
discipline and an analytic practice. What was being accomplished was no small feat, as Frege 
was keenly aware. He was one small step closer to the ambitious Leibnitzian dream of 
subsuming everything under heaven to the power of calculus rationalis, getting thus closer to the 
sort of idealized visio Dei always longed for by philosophers. Now that arithmetic could be 
spoken of as analytical (without destroying its capacity for knowledge-rendering), the path was 
clear for mapping it upon that other discipline known by its secure foundations: logic. Being 
analytical no longer was a cardinal sin against the augmentation of knowledge.  
 As indicated above, there was more than one response to the foundational crisis that 
mathematics was experiencing. Besides the logicist account outlined above, what came to be 
known as the formalist approach exercised an impact in the history of mathematics that spilled 
over to neighboring areas of possible research, which gradually morphed into fields of their own. 
The German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943) envisioned the construction of the whole 
mathematical edifice not based on logic, as Frege, Whitehead and Russell would like. He rather 
preferred anchoring mathematics upon foundational conventions to which mathematicians would 
arrive after sorting out some basic issues that were marring, according to Hilbert, the solid web 
of deductive truisms characteristic of mathematical knowledge.  
 Accordingly, at the International Congress of Mathematicians of 1900, convocated in 
Paris to celebrate the turn of the century, Hilbert addressed the audience in an original manner. 
Instead of delivering a presentation that would contribute to the increase of mathematical 
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knowledge, he produced a set of 23 mathematical problems that according to him would set the 
pace and provide the motivation for the development of mathematics in the following century. 
Only 10 of these problems were actually presented at the conference –the rest were made 
available later. Further clarification in the articulation of these problems evolved during the 
following three decades, and two of them (problems 2 and 10) begot what came later to be 
known as the “Decision problem”. Originally, the 2nd problem (named “The compatibility of the 
arithmetical axioms”) which asked whether the axioms of arithmetic were consistent, was stated 
in the form of a question, asking… 
 Whether, in any way, certain statements of single axioms depend upon one another, and whether 
 the axioms may not therefore contain certain parts in common, which must be isolated if one 
 wishes to arrive at a system of axioms that shall be altogether independent of one another.
175
 
The 10
th
 problem (entitled “Determination of the solvability of a Diophantine equation”) asked 
for a “procedure” that would allow for the discovery of whether an equation is true or false –at 
the time, Hilbert circumscribed the task only to “Diophantine equations”: 
 Given a diophantine equation with any number of unknown quantities and with rational integral 
 numerical coefficients: To devise a process according to which it can be determined by a finite 
 number of operations whether the equation is solvable in rational integers.
176
 
In 1928 at Bologna, in another meeting of the Internal Congress of Mathematicians, Hilbert 
expanded the reach of both problems into a more general and relevant set of questions affecting 
the whole of mathematics. Although Hilbert presented them as open questions, he was of the 
idea that the answer to each one of them would be in the positive --this effort constituted what 
came to be known as “Hilbert’s Program”. These questions, each under the banner of their 
identifying issue, were thus:  
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 1) Completeness: Are the true propositions of mathematics all provable?  
 2) Consistency: Is the set of true propositions in mathematics free of contradiction?  
 3) Decidability: Is there a procedure by which every true proposition could be         
                provable?
177
  
The Austrian mathematician Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) was in all likelihood present at this 1928 
talk, which also served as a retirement speech for Hilbert. They never met in person, but two 
days later, at the same conference, during a round table, Gödel gave a presentation regarding 
certain aspects of the Principia Mathematica. By this time, Gödel had already reached his “First 
Incompleteness Theorem”. The threat to Hilbert’s goal was noticed by the previously mentioned 
mathematician John von Neumann, who took him aside to talk. The next year von Neumann 
communicated to Gödel that he followed up on his presentation and reached a second 
incompleteness theorem. By this time Gödel had already done so as well. In 1931, only one year 
after the completion of his Doctorate, at 25 years old, Kurt Gödel published “On Formally 
Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I”.178 After this paper, 
quick and wide (but not absolute) consensus was reached in asserting that, at least in the way he 
framed Hilbert’s first and second new problems (completeness and consistency), Gödel showed 
that the answer was in fact in the negative. Or rather, that the very idea of wanting a solid system 
that is both complete and consistent, was ill formed.  
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 The text of the conference has been translated as “Problems of the grounding of mathematics” (Mancosu 1998, 
pp. 266-273).  Stephen Hawking’s somewhat canonical abbreviation of the triad problem reads like this:  
 1. To prove that all true mathematical statements could be proven, that is, the completeness of mathematics. 
 2. To prove that only true mathematical statements could be proven, that is, the consistency of 
 mathematics, 
 3. To prove the decidability of mathematics, that is, the existence of a decision procedure to decide the 
 truth or falsity of any given mathematical proposition (Hawking 2005, p. 1121). 
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 Gödel 1931. There was supposed to be a follow up paper by Gödel, which never occurred –hence the “I” at the 
end of the title. 
91 
 
 Gödel’s “first theorem” asserted that if in a sufficiently robust arithmetic system the set 
of axioms is consistent, then there will be at least one true proposition that cannot be proved.
179
 
The “second theorem” showed that if a system is consistent, such consistency cannot be proved 
from within the system.
180
 Arithmetic, and by extension mathematics, if understood as founded 
upon a strong body of propositions, is incomplete if it is found to be consistent: there will be at 
least one axiom that, even if true, will not be provable from within the system.  
 These findings were devastating for Hilbert --who never formally replied-- and by 
extension to Russell and Whitehead --whose logicist approach was partly shared by Hilbert for 
number theory, but was later rejected. In fact, at a certain point, Hilbert was in principle 
amenable to relying on Principia Mathematica to formalize arithmetic, since a mechanized way 
of proving the whole mathematical edifice would be close to his goal of making mathematics an 
orderly and tightly fit structure. The effect of the incompleteness theorems for mathematics in 
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 Kurt Gödel’s article is famous not only due to his mathematical rigor (accessible only to the trained 
mathematician), but also due to the fact that its translation into English is an issue in itself. One could safely state 
that he never was fully satisfied with any of the several translations that took place throughout the years while he 
was still alive. In a translation by Elliott Mendelson, the one which he was the least unhappy with, Gödel’s very 
technical text excerpt regarding what came to be known as his “first theorem” –in fact, the sixth theorem in the 
paper-- reads: 
 Theorem VI: For every ω-consistent recursive class ϰ of FORMULAS, there exists a recursive CLASS 
 EXPRESSION-r, such that neither v Gen nor Neg (v Gen r) belongs to Flg (ϰ) (where v is the FREE 
 VARIABLE of r) (Gödel 1965, p. 24). 
In layman terms, this formulation could be paraphrased as: 
 the first theorem… asserts for any formal theory… rich enough to include all the formulas of formalized 
 elementary number theory… that if it is consistent… then it is incomplete (Stoll 1979, p. 446). 
By all the formulas of elementary number theory we can understand the whole of arithmetic. It follows that: 
 the entirely natural idea that we can give a complete theory of basic arithmetic with a tidy set of axioms 
 is wrong (Smith 2007, p. 13). 
 It would thus seem that if the set of all arithmetic propositions is complete, then it is inconsistent –and if consistent, 
then it is incomplete. 
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 The surprisingly clear textual reference in Gödel’s paper appears as follows: 
 Theorem XI. Let ϰ be any recursive consistent class of FORMULAS; then the SENTENCE which asserts 
 that ϰ is consistent is not ϰ-PROVABLE; in particular, the consistency of P is unprovable in P, assuming 
 that P is consistent (in the contrary case, of course, every statement is provable) (Gödel 1931, p. 36). 
Here Gödel would deduce a truism that follows from the previous (so-called “first”) theorem. If there is a 
proposition that would prove the consistency of a set of propositions, then this proposition would lie outside the 
system of such set. 
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what regards its decidability was certainly foreseen by Gödel. However, as we will see, Hilbert’s 
third problem took on a life of its own. 
 
2. A machinal understanding of an algorithm and the material liberation of the machine. 
 
The Cambridge mathematician Max Newman had a student in his 1935 class, recipient of a 
fellowship for King’s College, at the same institution. A young Alan Turing (1912-1954), after 
completing a dissertation in Gaussian theory for his undergraduate degree, joined professor 
Newman’s course, which dealt with fundamental mathematical problems. Noticing that the 
“Decision problem” was so far deemed unsolved, Turing embarked on its solution. Professor 
Newman had in his lectures identified the quest for an “effective procedure” for deciding 
whether or not a mathematical equation is true. What an “effective procedure” stands for will 
show itself to be an issue soon. 
 The notion of “mechanical” was not foreign in mathematical logic, particularly among 
logicists. An entity “affecting” something implies a certain action, a change. A procedure that 
affects a change in a deterministic manner could be spoken of as being mechanical. Alan Turing 
was receptive to this qualification. Further equalizing the notion of a mechanical procedure to 
that of computability, he aimed to show in his paper that not the whole of mathematics is in fact 
computable –thus answering Gödel’s third problem (whether there is an effective procedure to 
prove any true mathematical proposition) in the negative.  
 Just before publishing the paper, Turing (and Newman) found out that both Gödel and the 
American logician Alonzo Church (1903-1995) were separately working on the Decision 
problem at roughly the same time. In fact, Church had already published his findings in 1935. 
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Expectably, Newman was at first reticent in supporting Turing publishing his paper, but later he 
was convinced that the angle was sufficiently different, giving Turing the get go –which 
happened in early 1936. The name of this historic paper was “On Computable Numbers, with an 
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem”.181 
 Turing took the “mechanical procedure” seriously enough as to devise an abstract 
machine that would function qua algorithm –the very definition of which was being sought after 
by Gödel (via the notion of recursive function) and Church (by means of his own mathematical 
construction, the “lambda calculus”). Key notions in Turing’s imaginary engine were 
determinism and the “brute” following of instructions. The Turing machine (as it quickly began 
to be called) was constituted by an endless tape, a reading “head” (which can also write and 
erase), and a set of instructions. It works in an ingeniously simple way. The endless tape is 
divided in squares (just as the old film tapes), and each square can have written the symbols 0 or 
1 in it; or it can be empty. The instructions will be constituted by a set of commands that will 
instruct the head what to do if it finds, say, a “1” (erase, write “0”, move to the right) or a “0” 
(erase, move to the left) or an empty square (write “0”, move to the right), or another “1” (move 
to the left), and so on.
182
 
 Turing was aware of what he was accomplishing. He provided, as Church put it later, an 
intuitive notion of computation that becomes immediately clear to the reader –as opposed to, say, 
the one given by his own lambda-calculus. Turing exhausted the realm of possibilities of what a 
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 This is how Turing described it: 
 The machine is supplied with a “tape” (the analogue of paper) running through it, and divided into sections 
 (called “squares”) each capable of bearing a “symbol”…We may call this square the “scanned square”. The 
 symbol on the scanned square may be called the “scanned symbol”. The “scanned symbol” is the only one 
 of which the machine is, so to speak, “directly aware”… In some of the configurations in which the 
 scanned square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol) the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned 
 square: in other configurations it erases the scanned symbol. The machine may also change the square 
 which is being scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right or left (Turing 1937, p. 231). 
94 
 
computation could do –at least in this intuitive way—by this machine: “It is my contention that 
these operations include all those which are used in the computation of a number”.183 Further, he 
also gave an algorithm (the set of instructions) the absolute power over its effected procedure: it 
would completely determine the behavior of the chosen parsed area of reality…  
 We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only 
 capable of a finite number of conditions q1, q2, ..., qR which will be called “m-configurations”... 
 The possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is determined by the m-configuration qn 
 and the scanned symbol S(r). This pair qn, S(r) will be called the “configuration”: thus the 
 configuration determines the possible behaviour of the machine.
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To recall, the main challenge was to find out whether there was an effective procedure by which 
one could demonstrate, in finite time, whether a given mathematical proposition is provable from 
a finite set of axioms. It soon became evident that the notion of an “effective procedure” should 
be defined --or at least clarified. As mentioned above, Alonzo Church identified an effective 
procedure with an “algorithm”, thus making inroads towards its definition. And we have seen 
how Turing’s insights into the nature of an algorithm, within the broader aim of answering 
Hilbert’s challenge, coincidentally encountered the parallel development of Church’s work. As 
also mentioned, Church beat Turing to the punch in publishing similar findings some months 
before the latter was given the placet by his supervisor, Max Newman, for submitting his own 
piece in 1936 –and published the next year. However, by recommendation of his own supervisor, 
Turing was by the end of the same year at Princeton University, pursuing graduate studies under 
Alonzo Church himself.  
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 Two years were enough for Turing to obtain his Ph.D., with a dissertation entitled 
“Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals”.185 This monograph, often historically overlooked, built 
upon the idea of the noncomputability of certain realms of mathematics. Within this framework, 
the thesis left important cues regarding Turing’s own later theoretical evolution. More relevantly 
to the issue that concerns the present work, Turing’s dissertation contains seminal insights into 
what he would consider to be a machine. In this thesis, in an excerpt that could be taken as joint 
statement regarding the equivalence between the definitions of computability reached by Gödel, 
Church and himself, Turing wrote: 
 A function is said to be "effectively calculable" if its values can be found by some purely 
 mechanical process. Although it is fairly easy to get an intuitive grasp of this idea, it is 
 nevertheless desirable to have some more definite, mathematically expressible definition. Such a 
 definition was first given by Gödel at Princeton in 1934… These functions were described as 
 "general recursive" by Gödel. We shall not be much concerned here with this particular 
 definition. Another definition of effective calculability has been given by Church…, who 
 identifies it with lambda-definability. The author has recently suggested a definition  
 corresponding more closely to the intuitive idea…186 
Turing then puts emphasis on the identification of effective calculability with a mechanical 
process, equation that permits the other two definitions (Gödel’s and Church’s) to also emerge. 
Here Turing came close to identifying what a machine might stand for,
187
 doing it in a reverse 
manner: if a process is said to be “purely mechanical” then one is to expect that there is a 
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of any machine would indeed be captured by classical computation”, and that is the closest that Turing gets to define 
a machine (Hodges 2008, p. 88). Hodges however reduces Turing’s probable meaning of “machine” to “Turing 
machine” (Hodges 2008, p. 77). 
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machine carrying that process. “Purely mechanistic” implies a machine doing the job.188 Turing’s 
thesis states that 
 "a function is effectively calculable if its values can be found by some purely mechanical 
 process". We may take this statement literally, understanding by a purely mechanical process one 
 which could be carried out by a machine.
189
 
This machine, bounded by its own nature, exhaustively generates something germane to its own 
being: a mechanical process. In fact, the analytical relation between a concept and an idea 
already contained in the concept (e.g., a triangle has three sides) is not foreign to this relation. A 
mechanical procedure is already contained in the idea of a machine. The machine, emanating 
what is to be understood as mechanical per se, completely determines what the mechanical 
procedure will be.    
 The suggestion of having a model of machines --a paradigm of what can exhaustively 
perform a mechanical process—where its physicality is irrelevant, did not go unnoticed. Indeed 
the “purely mechanical process” here is instantiated by an algorithm190 (a set of commands) – “a 
machine”. What makes a machine ultimately a machine, even if it is not yet defined, is just 
tangentially related to its possible physicality. The latter is not referred to as a sine qua non 
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condition pertaining to its nature.  Instead, what makes a machine to be itself is its inherent 
capability of producing a determinate and effective procedure, a “purely mechanical” outcome. 
 There had certainly been in history several metaphysical appreciations of mechanical 
entities. The Scientific Revolution emphasized mechanisms, beyond experimentation, as a sure-
proof way for building up grounded theoretical edifices.
191
 Rene Descartes embodied this lemma 
with an intensity that is often overshadowed by his legacy of “substance dualism”. A less often 
noticed side of his philosophy was his faithful reliance on a literally machinal view of organisms. 
Historically recalling, Descartes divided reality in two qualitatively distinct substances: res 
extensa and res cogitans. The first one referred to things that had materiality (physical 
extension), e.g., rocks, plants, animals, human bodies. The second one referred to a substance, 
equally existent and real as the first one, but which lacked physicality: minds, angels and God.
192
 
The theological benefits of this separation have been often pointed out as a purported move to 
“protect the soul”, given the advances in the new sciences. But another alleged advantage gained 
from this was the possibility of denying outright any animal participation of soul properties, 
avoiding the ontological  hassle of distributing watered down versions of the logos throughout 
the animal kingdom (from primates all the way down to insects and beyond). In this way the 
special place of man in the universe, as image and likeness of God, gets removed from an 
otherwise dangerous situation of being superior only as a matter of degree, and not in kind. 
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mind, or, in short, in any substance that is not a body” (Descartes 1649, p. 293). 
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Another alleged benefit was the continuation of the tradition of guiltlessly practicing vivisection 
–following the Greek physician Galen and Leonardo Da Vinci, who reported important insights 
into physiology as an outcome.
193
 
 The soul is far removed from this picture in its quality of res cogitans, and thus, safe. 
However both animals and human bodies pertain to the realm of an organic res extensa, and thus, 
they are totally subjected to the deterministic laws of mechanics, which could now be pursued. 
On his Treatise of Man, Descartes refers to the intricacies of the human body, with all its 
vegetative and non-vegetative functions, in the following terms: 
 I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions in the machine naturally proceed from 
 the mere arrangement of its organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock, or 
 other automaton, from that of its weights and its wheels; so that, so far as these are concerned, it 
 is not necessary to conceive any other vegetative or sensitive soul, nor any other principle of 
 motion or of life, than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which burns continually in  
 the heart, and which is no wise essentially different from all the fires which exist in 
 inanimate bodies.
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flavours, heat, and such like qualities, in the organs of the external senses; the impression of the ideas of these in the 
organ of common sensation and in the imagination; …the retention or the impression of these ideas on the memory; 
the internal movements of the appetites and the passions; and lastly the external movements of all the limbs, which 
follow so aptly, as well the action of the objects which are presented to the senses, as the impressions which meet in 
the memory, that they imitate as nearly as possible those of a real man.” (Descartes 1662, § 202) 
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As one can readily notice, what is relentlessly mechanized is still the realm of material entities –
res extensa. The demystification that is taking place is circumscribed by stripping the organic 
area of res extensa from any purported vitalism inherent to the phenomenon of “life”. Clocks are 
as much automata as animals and human bodies are. But the mind, inhabiting the realm of res 
cogitans, is still perfectly safe –anticipating Kant’s anxiety regarding human freedom for almost 
150 years.
195
 In fact, the mechanization of something other than res extensa would probably not 
have made much sense for Descartes.
196
  
 In contrast, with Alan Turing we have the notion of a non-physical entity as a certain type 
of machine --a non-material one. This never happened before. It had not happened because the 
notion of a machine had not yet been developed to a point at which it would give up its 
physicality as a non-essential feature. Although the horizon of this insight might have been 
already simmering for a while, it was not made explicit until the above addressed evolution of 
logic and mathematics took place. That development was the articulation of the notion of an 
algorithm --explicitation deemed necessary for fully clarifying the basic notion of an effective 
computation. As previously mentioned, this definition was in turn necessary for addressing 
Hilbert’s dramatic question regarding the possibility of producing an algorithm that would solve 
any mathematical problem within a finite time and within a finite set of axioms. Both Turing and 
Church attempted to define such a notion (of an algorithm), and the isomorphic correspondence 
to a familiar object in the physical world was soon evinced. That object, to rehash, was a 
machine. More specifically, a physical machine is but one instantiation of what a machine is per 
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 century context, 
somewhat crude (Wheeler 2008). The mechanization of the whole of man (not only of his body), a related but 
different issue --where Julien Offray De La Mettrie (1709 –1751) would be relevant-- lies ahead in the near future. 
100 
 
se, since physicality is not a sine qua non feature of a machine qua machine. With this new 
understanding of a machine, devoid of a heretofore deemed necessary physicality, previous 
realms hitherto beyond the scope of a rigorously mechanistic explanation were suddenly 
amenable to being encompassed. Such as life and mind. 
 Something remarkable –over and beyond the response to an admittedly important 
mathematical problem-- was thus accomplished in Turing’s “On Computable Numbers”. 
Although no definition of machine was given in the article (or in any other writing by Turing for 
that matter),
197
 the seeds of an insight that would prove powerful for subsequent scientific, 
technological and philosophical endeavors in decades to come were already there. Turing 
stopped short of defining a machine, but the rigorous explicitation of what stands for a 
“mechanical procedure” demanded from him the abstract construction of a machine that would 
do precisely that. This abstract machine, capable of exhaustively (and effectively) performing 
any possible computation (as construed by Turing), became a paradigmatic machine. An ideal 
machine, model of all machines. Again, nothing had so far put forward the notion of a non-
physical machine. Hence this observation was rather quickly noticed by some scientists, 
mathematicians, psychologists and thinkers alike, expanding their foreseeable theoretical 
exercises and scientific playgrounds. Here we come to a realization of something that, although 
probably still unaware of its full impact, might have changed the course of recent history. This is 
one of the pillars upon which a scientific movement that lasted a decade (1942-1952) was built. 
Turing’s insight into the nature of an algorithm, an essential feature of which being that it 
maintains an isomorphic relation with an entity in the physical world --namely, a machine-- can 
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be regarded as the theoretical foundational bedrock upon which this was devised as a general 
scientific theory. The name of this scientific outlook went under the name of cybernetics. 
 
3. Alan Turing’s strange reversal regarding the question of Artificial Intelligence. 
 
We have seen how the need for an explicitation of the notion of an algorithm was a pre-condition 
for defining the idea of a computation, with the goal of addressing Hilbert’s problem. We have 
also seen how this task opened up insights into the nature of a machine, first captured, although 
not fully worked out, by Alan Turing in his “On Computable Numbers”. There is another realm, 
however, in which cybernetics and Turing might have been deeply theoretically intertwined as 
well. The question of Turing’s reversal regarding the possibility of a machine possessing 
intelligence has been tangentially addressed, but the puzzle regarding this dramatic turn seems to 
remain. The puzzle would involve finding out what went through Turing’s mind to make him 
change his view on the philosophically important issue of Artificial Intelligence.  
The development of cybernetics might shed some light on what went through Turing’s 
mind for the span of a decade, probably pointing to the reason why he evolved into an early 
advocate of AI, epitomized in his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”.198 At 
some point between 1936 and 1946, Turing’s views regarding what a machine could do 
underwent a strange reversal. In fact, the contrast between what Turing would say regarding the 
possibility of machine intelligence
199
 in 1936, and then almost 15 years later is startling. Let us 
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machine --as we will see below. The nature and evolution of the notion of intelligence (which allowed its usage in, 
for example, contemporary electronic engineering) is beyond the scope of this work. 
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return to the interesting quote of the 1936 article:
200
  
 We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only 
 capable of a finite number of conditions q1, q2, ..., qR which will be called “m-configurations”... 
 The possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is determined by the m-configuration qn 
 and the scanned symbol S(r). This pair qn, S(r) will be called the “configuration”: thus the 
 configuration determines the possible behaviour of the machine.
201 
The reader will surely note the quiet comparison between a man and a machine. This analogy has 
triggered some confusion in the past. Let us be reminded that the existence of computers, as we 
know them now, still lay somewhat far in the future, at least one decade later. At the time, 
however, the task of computing numbers already existed –in fact, it always did.202 The task of 
crunching numbers with a pen and paper was part of the idiosyncratic picture of available jobs at 
the time (indeed usually held by women). This job, infamous for its tediousness, required the 
blind following of a rule, absolutely and without deviation. In this vein, Wittgenstein has a 
relevant remark that reeks of mysticism only if taken without the above context: “Turing’s 
‘Machines’. These machines are humans who calculate”.203 The machinic204 character of jobs of 
such nature (e.g. the endless and monotonous repetition of a small task or movement), where 
“mechanical” and “mindless” were referred to as synonymous, was a common theme in the 
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popular culture of the time.
205
 In fact, the media began to refer to computing machines as 
“computors” in order to differentiate them from “computers”, the latter being humans who had 
the hard and boring job of building up number tables. As machines gradually (and literally) took 
over the job, they were eventually referred to as “computers”.206 Turing’s 1937 paper, therefore, 
should not be regarded yet as a precursor to what later came to be known as “Artificial 
Intelligence”. Not only were there no computers (in the modern sense) at the time, with which 
humans could be compared, but the very notion of “mechanical” carried an epithet of 
“mindlessness” inherently attached to it. This pejorative adjective ascribed to a machine was 
accepted and defended by Turing himself –which would make the notion of “machine 
intelligence” an oxymoron, and by extension “artificial intelligence” senseless.  
 Further, the paper had as its original aim answering Hilbert’s Decision problem, and 
since this answer was given in the negative, the paper showed that some mathematical 
propositions are in fact not computable –hence the answer must be in the negative. Some 
incomputable realms of mathematics a fortiori cannot be treated by a machine. This limitation as 
to what a mechanical procedure can do puts a machine further away from a possible comparison 
with the human mind, canonically agreed to be capable, by Turing’s own standards, of dealing 
with non-mechanical realms, as it is the case with “intuition” –indeed a familiar occurrence 
reported among mathematicians like him while engaged in problem solving. Turing’s change of 
mind, giving a machine a qualitatively new kind of cognitive powers, still lay ahead in the future. 
 After Turing had defended his dissertation, he was offered a position at Princeton, but he 
refused it in order to go back to Britain. The shadow of war was already looming and it is quite 
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possible that he was moved by patriotic considerations. From 1939 (year in which his thesis was 
published) to 1945, Turing was submerged in war-related tasks –the secrecy of which partly 
explaining a publishing hiatus. By 1945 the design for an early electronic computer, the 
Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) was finished, a task that demonstrated, beyond his 
mathematical brilliance, also his engineering skills.  
 Tinkering with machines was not an altogether new experience for Turing –it is reported 
that he had an uncanny attraction towards machinery since his childhood (for example, with the 
nature of the typewriter). During the span of this decade, something occurred in Turing’s mind 
regarding the status of machines, the computable and intelligence. In 1946, in a report on the 
ACE, he suddenly (and mellifluously) introduced for the first time the idea of “mechanical 
intelligence” –a notion regarded at the time as radically senseless. But he did it in such a 
tangential, almost cryptic way, that it seemingly did not raise many eyebrows (which could be 
partly understood given the ambience of secrecy in that era)…  
 We stated... that the machine should be treated as entirely without intelligence. There are 
 indications however that it is possible to make the machine display intelligence at the risk of its 
 making occasional serious mistakes.
207
 
Advancing an insightful premise, it was suggested that making mistakes could be a sign of 
intelligence. Moreover, one could certainly program a computer in a way that it could “make the 
machine display intelligence”.208 Turing did not elaborate much on the bone thrown there. Why 
would mistake-making be a reproducible sign of intelligence? In 1947, in a presentation for the 
London Mathematical Society, Turing expanded on the bizarre idea of “machine intelligence”, 
again touching the issue of what mistake-committing might entail for a machine. Connecting 
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with previous work done in the foundations of mathematics, he described what the outcome is 
for both a machine and a mathematician dealing with paradoxes encountered in logic and 
arithmetic. By the very nature of mathematics, according to the recent discoveries by Gödel, 
Church and himself, there cannot be an algorithm that would find out whether any mathematical 
proposition is true or false --indirectly answering Hilbert’s problem. That entails that a machine 
will eventually stop in its attempt to prove a certain equation, in a particular system –one in 
which there will be at least one true proposition that is not provable… 
 It has for instance been shown that with certain logical systems there can be no machine which 
 will distinguish provable formulae of the system from unprovable, i.e. that there is no test that the 
 machine can apply which will divide propositions with certainty into these two classes. Thus if a 
 machine is made for this purpose it must in some cases fail to give an answer. On the other hand 
 if a mathematician is confronted with such a problem he would search around and find new 
 methods of proof, so that he ought eventually to be able to reach a decision about any given 
 formula.
209
 
Given the undecidability of mathematics (even given the non-facile nature of mathematics, 
period), humans commit errors in looking for solutions to complex problems. But we still call 
them “intelligent”. The “intelligent” mathematician will look for other ways, attempt other 
strategies, in order to continue the task. However, when it comes down to machines, the pre-
conceived notion exists that “if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be 
intelligent”.210 Turing denounces that this is “unfair play” to the machine. 
 I would say that fair play must be given to the machine. Instead of it sometimes giving no 
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 answer we could arrange that it gives occasional wrong answers. But the human mathematician 
 would likewise make blunders when trying out new techniques. It is easy for us to regard these 
 blunders as not counting and give him another chance, but the machine would probably be 
 allowed no mercy.
211
 
If, somewhat ironically, the mistake-committing human is regarded as intelligent, whereas the 
infallible machine is not, then let us make the machine become fallible. A machine that commits 
mistakes will then display a feature so far reserved only for humans --hence Turing’s 1946 
remark that “it is possible to make the machine display intelligence at the risk of its making 
occasional serious mistakes”.212 This allowance for mechanical mistakes opens up another realm 
of theorizing about the possible intelligence of a mechanical entity. After technology advances a 
fair bit (Turing wonders about a future with machines bearing a substantially expanded “storage 
capacity”) nothing would in principle preclude the machine from changing its own set of 
instructions. Therefore, the machine would be allowed to commit errors so that it could be able 
to reorganize itself, even if for this “the machine must be allowed to have contact with human 
beings in order that it may adapt itself to their standards”.213 This suggestion, namely, that of a 
machine self-changing its internal parameters, carves up still another area of comparison 
between a machine and a human being –this time with a child, in the context of the infant’s 
learning process: 
 Let us suppose we have set up a machine with certain initial instruction tables, so constructed that 
 these tables might on occasion, if good reason arose, modify those tables. One can imagine that 
 after the machine had been operating for some time, the instructions would have altered out of all 
 recognition, but nevertheless still be such that one would have to admit that the machine was still 
                                                 
211
 Turing 1947, p. 497 
212
 Turing 1946, p. 16 
213
 Turing 1947, p. 497 
107 
 
 doing very worthwhile calculations. Possibly it might still be getting results of the type desired 
 when the machine was first set up, but in a much more efficient manner. In such a case one would 
 have to admit that the progress of the machine had not been foreseen when its original 
 instructions were put in. It would be like a pupil who had learnt much from his master, but had 
 added much more by his own work. When this happens I feel that one is obliged to regard the 
 machine as showing intelligence.
214
 
The picture of a creature surprising its creator with its behavior has been a common Golem-type 
theme among humanists worried about the possibility of “playing God”.215 Self-modifying 
algorithms could in principle, eventually, remove from the machine the stigma of being a mere 
instruction-following brute. However, this would be just a first step towards the mechanical 
appropriation of the notion of “intelligence”. Turing was aware of this, and he went on to address 
the notion of “learning”, revealing quite evident behavioristic cues.216 Thus in his 1948 report 
“Intelligent Machinery”, the iconoclastic comparison of a “learning machine” with a “learning 
child” was further elaborated.  
 Firmly entrenched into the grand-idea of a Mechanistic Continuum
217
 underpinning much 
of modern science and philosophy, Turing was well aware of the foundational experiments in 
behaviorism performed by the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1836) and his followers. 
The phenomenon of “learning”, when broken down into pieces, reveals a “mechanism” (as 
anything amenable of scientific treatment, for that matter): a building and reinforcement of 
neural pathways, conditioned by external stimuli. This mechanism can be ascribed across the 
natural spectrum to the lower forms of life, as well as to the higher vertebrates.
218
 Any spiritual, 
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irreducible, epiphenomenal understanding of ‘learning’ that recoils against this ‘empirical’ 
explanation of what actually occurs behind the phenomenon (namely, its ‘mechanics’), would 
merely be the death rattle of a metaphysically-ridden Medieval understanding of man and nature.  
 In that vein, for Turing a child’s cortex “is an unorganized machine, which can be 
organized by suitable interfering training”.219 The training of the child, the “teaching”, is not 
different in principle than those occurring in Pavlov’s dogs, laboratory worms, and “evolving” 
machines. Learning pathways get created, and then reinforced, when associations between a 
certain state and a stimulus of pleasure (or pain) are repeatedly allowed to occur. The 
“unorganized machine” with the capacity of altering its own instructions (with a storage capacity 
that would provide enough “memory”), would be equally suitable for showing off real learning, 
after a period of productive interaction with a (probably human) master who has delivered the 
appropriate punishments and rewards.  Three years later, in a talk similarly entitled as the report, 
albeit with a bolder twist --“Intelligent Machinery, A Heretical Theory”—Turing was more 
specific regarding the behavioral training of this “child machine”:  
 I suggest that there should be two keys which can be manipulated by the schoolmaster, and which 
 can represent the ideas of pleasure and pain. At later stages in education the machine would 
 recognize certain other conditions as desirable owing to their having been constantly associated in 
 the past with pleasure, and likewise certain others as undesirable.
220
 
The next year Turing began to write the seminal AI paper “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence” (to appear in 1950 in Mind, the only philosophy journal where he published 
throughout his career --a testament for how his ideas got wide circulation, attracting the attention 
of the philosophical community). This paper has been one of the most quoted philosophy papers 
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from the second part of the 20
th
 century on, so I will not dwell on it here. Suffice it to say that to 
a great extent this paper put together in an organic manner the ideas put forward by Turing since 
1936 –but especially since after the war, where his commitment to a total mechanization of 
intelligence was clear. For instance, the famed “Turing Test”, subject of much philosophical 
debate up to these days, can already be foreseen in the 1946 paper (the ACE report). There 
Turing writes about paying the price for “seeing” intelligence in the machine by allowing it to 
have errors, suggesting that “it is possible to make the machine display intelligence at the risk of 
its making occasional serious mistakes”.221 
 We are here in front of a full 360 degree turn in what concerns the possibility of a 
machine being intelligent --from its denial, based upon the machinal incapacity of dealing with 
intuition, to its defense, based upon the possibility of a machine displaying human features, such 
as mistake-committing and learning.  Since arguably much of contemporary cognitive science 
pivots upon the notion of “artificial intelligence” as articulated in this 1950 paper, the question 
still remains regarding Turing’s change of mind. What made him go from the position where 
mechanical procedures merely were those underlying the accomplishment of tasks by 
instruction-following brutes, to the position where these very mechanical processes could expose 
true intelligence in those bearing them? One can rephrase the question factoring in the historical 
framework. What went on with Turing behind his gradual dismissal of the previously vigorously 
defended
222
 “oracle-machine” --the fabled machine that could compute the uncomputable? This 
first position was changed later on, where not only the discrete areas of thought dealing with 
mathematical problems, but the whole human intelligence, was to be understood as being 
essentially computational in nature. Oracle machines were no longer necessary to account for 
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those areas that cannot be subsumed to a machine, since everything was machinal in one form or 
another, e.g., even via subconscious computations. Now, intelligence could be one day 
artificially constructed.  
 
4. Cybernetics as a possible missing link regarding Turing’s change of heart. 
 
There are those who find reasons of a personal character regarding Turing’s change of heart. 
Alan Turing had an early love in his teenage years who died prematurely of tuberculosis. This 
death haunted him for the rest of his life. It has been speculated that a subconscious wish of 
bringing back the beloved one (or making a beloved one never die) was behind the relentless 
desire for making the whole of intelligence mechanizable –and thus, constructible and 
retrievable.  Turing handwrote in 1932 a short essay on the “Nature of the Spirit” where he 
wonders after his friend’s death whether a detached spirit can re-inhabit another adequate vessel: 
 … as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I consider that the body by reason of 
 being a living body can ‘attract’ and hold on to a ‘spirit’, whilst the body is alive  and awake the 
 two are firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but when the 
 body dies the ‘mechanism’ of the body, holding the spirit is gone and the spirit finds a new body 
 sooner or later perhaps immediately.
223
 
There seems to be the hope that a mind could exist without its biological brain, probably 
amenable to be re-instantiated once a proper holding mechanism is achieved.
224
 This would not 
seem too farfetched from Turing’s mechanistic views if we understand both realms, the material 
and immaterial, as being equally machinal –and hence, with a nature determined not by 
physicality, but by mechanicity. Turing’s later strong correlation between the notion of an 
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algorithm and that of a machine might have been a cornerstone towards a further enrichment of 
his notion of a machine –culminating in the oracle machine (below) where determinate-behavior 
as an inherent feature of a machine is superseded.
225
  
There are others, more lenient towards a “Science and Technology Studies” view, that 
give a prime role to Turing’s confrontation with engineering feats during the war, which 
allegedly affected his subsequent views. Turing saw first-hand the power of machines, designed 
and constructed by him to break the German code of the sinister U-Boats.
226
 For Winston 
Churchill, this accomplishment greatly contributed towards Great Britain’s victory,227 
acknowledging Turing’s essential contribution towards the Empire’s victory228 –a victory that 
might not have happened if the calculations would have been performed solely by humans. Thus, 
Turing witnessed the rapid improvement in the construction of these all-important machines, 
going from entirely re-wiring the machine to vacuum tubes and from there to relays –one design 
material making the machine faster and smaller than the next one. What could the future hold in 
50 years from then? That is the question that Turing poses towards the end of his 1950 paper, 
and he is of the idea that intelligence will be mechanical.
229
 And this would not be our 
intelligence, but the machine’s: it would be artificial intelligence. 
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 Still others, more philosophically oriented, in a view not altogether unrelated to the 
previous one, see in Turing’s change a gradual but firm realization of his own place in the grand-
scheme of the above mentioned Mechanistic Continuum. If he was to bring his own insights --
already firmly set in such a tradition-- to their rightful completion, then thinking machines would 
necessarily follow. Learning, or the acquisition of knowledge, as indicated above, can be broken 
down into pieces that are so small that they can be found neatly interacting with the overall 
machinery of survival, even in the simplest organisms. Relevant connections for survival are 
forged and reinforced via trial and error, the environment producing stimuli in the form of 
reward or punishment. Certainly the learning process of a worm and of a classical composer can 
be regarded as vastly different, but this difference would not be one of kind, but of degree. The 
latter is greatly more complex, but the principle of productive change upon which both rest is 
largely the same.
230
 This realization might have further laid out in Turing the foundation for the 
hope of an artificial intelligence to emerge. 
 All these interesting reasons notwithstanding, there nevertheless is a venue of possible 
explanation for Turing’s reversal that has been less explored --but which popped out as a 
recognizable clarifying scheme during this writer’s research. This explanatory path goes through 
the historical cross-roads that one could identify within the decade mentioned above (1936-
1946). Between Turing’s insights characterizing a machine as being inherently incapable of 
intelligence, and the now ubiquitous AI-friendly classical computationalism stemming from 
Turing’s later position, there is a missing link. To explore this suggestion, we have to go back to 
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the time frame occurring between Turing’s 1937 paper and his subsequent thesis dissertation 
under Alonzo Church. Laying out this venue of explanation, which emerged in the midst of my 
own investigation into the nature of a machine, will hopefully open up the context for 
introducing a theory in the history of science that revolved around the notion of a machine tout 
court—cybernetics. 
Turing’s paper “On Computable Numbers”, as previously mentioned, contains the seed 
of a radical view of a machine, which seized the attention of a handful of scientists –who were 
soon to engage in the cybernetic enterprise. Turing, to recall, further elaborated the notion of a 
machine for his doctoral dissertation under Alonzo Church. However, instead of staying in 
America, he chose to return to England, likely motivated to help his country vis à vis the looming 
war on Europe.
231
 Once back in England, Turing was a regular attendee at the British version of 
the Macy Conferences –the much smaller and informal Ratio Club.232 Both gatherings, Macy’s 
and Ratio’s, exchanged some speakers –mostly coming from the US to the UK. That’s how 
Wiener and McCulloch showed up in England on occasion. Turing, later on, while engaged in 
the war effort, would go to the US to share knowledge regarding the construction of the novel 
computing machines. Even if he did not ever attend a Macy meeting, he was in constant contact 
with the cyberneticians --especially with von Neumann, due to the common task of building the 
first computers-- who would act as hosts during his stay in America.  
In other words, although Turing left aside further developing the notion of a machine per 
se --and engaged instead in implementational endeavors emanating from it, such as breaking the 
German encrypted communications by means of the urgent construction of a computer machine-- 
he was still in proxy contact with the cybernetic enterprise, running strong in the US. Ten years 
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later, when Turing wrote the 1946 report where he muses about the possibility of a thinking 
machine, cybernetics was reaching its own pinnacle. The cybernetic view of a machine was 
much further elaborated, and the notion of a de-physicalized mechanical entity already had full 
and rightful existence.
233
 The mind was already a machine. So when someone like Turing would 
ask, in his own terms, the heretical question “can a machine think?”, the answer, coming from 
cybernetics, could only had been in the positive: they obviously can --they already do! The 
existence of our mind is there for proof. Ours is a mechanical intelligence.  
This slow but firm parallel development, which ended in a reversal of the question, might 
have dynamically exercised influence upon Turing himself, in order for him to state his famous 
rhetorical question.
234
 It is not farfetched to suppose, then, that cybernetics own nuanced 
development of the nature of a machine (encompassing non-material entities through and 
through) might have played a non-minor role in Turing’s evolution regarding the capabilities of 
mechanical entities --indeed particularly regarding thinking. Just as the computer was an 
implementational spin off from the attempt to effectively logicise the mind,
235
 cybernetics was 
just as much a spin off from the attempt to understand the nature of computability --articulating 
the nature of a machine. But while Turing seemingly wanted to give machines anthropocentric 
features, cybernetics wanted to make of man a machine. 
 Artificial Intelligence left aside further investigation into the nature of a machine --and 
marched forward instead with the anthropomorphization of a machine (they would want a 
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machine to show a human feature: thinking). A key for understanding the theoretical launch of 
AI would thus be Turing’s late change of mind in terms of what machines could do. First, they 
could not ever show capacities reserved only for humans --such as intuition. Later, in principle, 
they could do just that. The subsequent development in Turing’s thoughts could help understand 
why not only cybernetics ended up being a somewhat “fringe” occurrence in science history, but 
could also help clarifying the reason behind the overemphasis on classical computationalism in 
today’s cognitive science.236 
 A novel science, cybernetics, might have deeply influenced the mathematician Alan 
Turing towards a profound change in perspective regarding a metaphysical and ontological issue: 
the possibility of an artificial, mechanical construction possessing human-like thinking 
capabilities. It is thus fitting to attempt approaching cybernetics from the angle of the 
philosophical tenets on which it was based, and the philosophical conclusions that it entailed. 
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IV. Cybernetic tenets: Philosophical considerations. 
      
      …there is considerable reason to suppose we have not  
      yet defined the nature of "machine" with sufficient  
      precision or abstraction.
237 
 
1. Pinning down the core of cybernetics. 
 
Even if the proper definition of cybernetics is an issue without closure,
238
 key ideas underpinning 
the enterprise were present right from its inception –such as circular causality, negative 
feedback, teleology, information, self-regulation, self-replication and complexity. These 
semantically dense notions have prompted some minds to find cybernetic signatures embedded 
in nature as early as in pre-Socratic times. Indeed it is claimed that even the early philosopher 
Heraclitus of Ephesus already had “proto-cybernetic” insights of sorts. Some arguably 
recognizable instances of a cybernetic flair could be mentioned:
 239
 
 
Circular causality and feedback: 
 The way up and the way down is one and the same (DK 60)
240
 
 Upon those who are stepping into the same rivers different and again different waters flow  
 (DK 12)
241
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Cybernetics as control: 
 Thunderbolt steers all things (DK 64)
242
 
 Wisdom is one thing: 
  to know the Thought… 
  by which all things are steered through all… (DK 41)243 
 
Information: 
 This world-order, the same for all…: 
  an ever–living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures (DK 30)244 
 If you have heard… not me but the Logos, 
  It is wise to agree that all things are one (DK 50)
245
 
 Connexions: 
  …out of every thing there can be made a unity, 
  and out of this unity all things are made (DK 53)
246
 
 Invisible connexion is stronger than visible (DK 54)
247
  
 The real constitution of each thing is accustomed to hide itself (DK 123)
248
 
249
 
 
Self-organization and equilibrium (Ashby):
250
 
 War 
 is father of all… (DK 53)251  
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Martin Heidegger, who in a later period of his life closely followed cybernetic developments on 
both sides of the Atlantic, addressed the claimed connection between Heraclitus and cybernetics 
in his famed Heraclitus’ Seminar.252 Prima facie, it would seem that the notion of steering, 
fundamental for cybernetics to the point of conforming its very etymology, and pervasive in 
some Heraclitean fragments, would point towards a deep shared core between the prescient pre-
Socratic thinker and the novel science.
253
 However, Heidegger was quick to point out that we 
should not confuse the Greek primal imagery of Zeus affecting nature (φύσις) using the lightning 
bolt as a stirring hand --a paradigmatic Heraclitean figure
254
-- with a nascent cybernetic 
epiphany. In this case, for instance, it would lack the cybernetic feature of a dynamically 
involved systemic action, Zeus not being “stirred back” or modified in any way, by the affected 
φύσις. There is an absence of negative feedback, thus rendering the Heraclitean insights as not 
properly cybernetic. Even if there is a deep connection between Heraclitus and cybernetics, 
which Heidegger does not deny, it would be beyond our grasp, given our poor current 
knowledge.
255
 Still, some persist in seeing a proto-cybernetic epistemology in Heraclitus –and 
probably not without reason.
256
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 Heidegger did have a deep grasping of the cybernetic ethos, referring to it on one 
occasion as the “metaphysics of the atomic age”.257  In an interview he granted to the German 
magazine Der Spiegel (with the explicit condition that it was not to be made public until after his 
death) he referred to cybernetics in a rather obscure manner.  Five days after Heidegger passed 
away, it was accordingly published.
258
 In the translation done by his lifetime friend, Father 
William Richardson S.J., one can find a dramatic view regarding the role that cybernetics was to 
assume in mankind: 
Heidegger: …The role philosophy has played up to now has been taken over by the sciences 
today… Philosophy dissolves into the individual sciences: psychology, logic, and political 
science.  
Der Spiegel: And what takes the place of philosophy now?  
Heidegger: Cybernetics.
259
 
In order to attempt to further understand the gist of Heidegger’s remarks, it is helpful to cradle 
them within the broader context of the gradual embodiment of Machenschaft --the gigantic “all-
pervasive and totalizing ‘makeability’ of everything”.260 This notion, almost exclusively 
Heideggerian, has gained renewed attention in the Anglo-American world after the translation in 
1996 of Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning),
261
 considered by some to be Heidegger’s 
magnus opus after Being and Time. “Machination” as it is sometimes translated, is a process 
bound to eventually convert everything thinkable into the buildable, and is a parallel outcome of 
the unfolding of technology --which in Heidegger’s thought amounts to the evolution of 
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metaphysics itself. In this later book Heidegger further explicates this heretofore somewhat 
cryptic notion.  
 Machination is the domination of making and what is made. But in this regard one is not to think 
 of human dealings and operating but rather the other way around; such [human activity] is only 
 possible, in its unconditionally and exclusivity, on the basis of machination… At the same time 
 machination contains the Christian-biblical interpretation of beings as ens creatum –regardless of 
 whether this is taken in a religious or secular way.
262
  
Heidegger wrote a treatise on the metaphysical foundations of logic, where he referred to 
Leibnitz as a major force behind “framing”263 and machination --due to Leibnitz’ ideal of a 
universal language based upon logic and calculus.
264
 As Wiener himself did, he found in Leibnitz 
the same “patron saint” for this omni-encompassing machination. However, for Heidegger the 
impetus of this “machinization” (as Machenschaft is sometimes translated), goes well beyond the 
17
th
 century. For him machination is nothing less than just the other side of the coin regarding 
Western thought itself. For Heidegger “we know too little of it, even though it dominates the 
history of being in western philosophy up to now, from Plato to Nietzsche”.265 It is so profoundly 
engrained into who we are that 
 It is the double and contradictory process of ‘humanizing’ of everything, pioneered by the 
 Cartesian conception of the ‘de-humanizing’, typical for an age which has been submitted to the 
 total ‘machinization’, in order to achieve the absolute grip on being, in a  word, an age totally 
 enslaved by planetary technology.
266
 
Now one can be more equipped for further grasping the reason for such darkness in Heidegger’s 
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remarks regarding cybernetics. Heidegger has some rather unsettling remarks concerning the 
future of mankind in what pertains to the consequences of the advance of contemporary science 
for the human condition vis à vis its undisclosed cybernetic identity:  
 No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be 
 determined and guided by the new fundamental science which is called cybernetics…Cybernetics 
 transforms language into an exchange of news. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments 
 of information. The development of philosophy into the independent sciences which, however, 
 interdependently communicate among themselves ever more markedly, is the legitimate 
 completion of philosophy. Philosophy is ending in the present age.
267
 
Even if this impulse towards framing and machinization --which reached its zenith in 
cybernetics-- already was with us for as long as there is metaphysics (with its own impetus for 
understanding, manipulating and controlling), it was Alan Turing who let the machine finally 
break free. His inquiry into the nature of an algorithm, in order to properly address the nature of 
computability, let the door open. And even if there is consensus in that a formal and finished 
definition of an algorithm is still lacking,
268
 it exercised a clear influence in the progress of 
technology.
269
 Probably more importantly, as in many intellectual endeavours, Turing’s 
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tangential (to the nature of a machine) but dramatic insight opened up a new realm of thinking.  
The rediscovered awareness regarding this normally overseen nature of a machine, 
namely, that it did not need to be materially instantiated to be such, is what lies at the core of the 
cybernetic impetus. This quintessentially cybernetic tenet has been usually overseen when 
articulating cybernetics as a historical event. Precisely this liberation from the machine’s 
heretofore physical constraints is what made the machinal idea amenable of instantiation in 
previously mechanistically-unfriendly realms. The enhanced notion of machine substantially 
extended the realm of what could be tractable under a straightforwardly mechanical approach --
or, in the view of the incipient cybernetic scientific community, subsumable under science, 
period.  
 Arguably a major contribution from Turing to the cybernetic enterprise (and eventually 
probably to science at large), is the insight that the existence of a mechanism necessarily implies 
the existence of a machine, namely “understanding by purely mechanical process one which 
could be carried out by a machine”.270 Behaving machine-like is the outcome of a mechanical 
structure: A machine acts like a machine. Indeed pondering on this observation seems to begin to 
resolve some conundrums in scientific explanation. To the question of whether or not the 
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recognition of a mechanical process in a phenomenon (natural or not) entails the recognition of a 
machine, one should, if switching our metaphysical dampers offline, answer in the positive.  
 Physical entities previously regarded as fundamentally different from machines, are now 
amenable to being treated mechanically. This occurs due to the fact that physical processes 
canonically regarded as pertaining to living organisms only --such as self-adaptation to internal 
and external (environmental) change-- were now found to be mechanizable. When the theoretical 
(mainly metaphysical) divide between the natural and the artificial collapses, one could start the 
endeavor of understanding and developing one theory of “control” for both animals (humans 
included) and machines. By “machines” we could thus refer indistinctly to both the traditional 
machines and to living organisms. As radical as this view may sound, it would however hardly 
qualify as radically new. The novel aspect of cybernetics, the one that sets it apart, is an aspect 
that was qualitatively distinct –and that the culmination of the crisis of mathematics indicated 
elsewhere. Cybernetics now referred to immaterial entities as machines.   
 One of the objects of study that thereby became scientifically approachable was the 
human mind. Animal cognition and life in general were now amenable of being treated at the 
same epistemological level, as complex artificial machines: both display features of successful 
coping with environments – what in biology was already called “homeostasis”. Recognizing that 
the very nature of what a machine is lies at the very foundation of cybernetic thinking might put 
Wiener’s experience with the predictor as midwifery to what was already in the making. At the 
very least, it qualifies re-reading cybernetics from the standpoint of its unique tenets regarding 
the nature of a machine.  
 There have been several ways of classifying the main theoretical tenets of cybernetics, 
each based upon its founders, its founding papers, its philosophical tenets, its scientific tenets, its 
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subsumed disciplines and even its subsequently founded disciplines.
271
 This writer proposes still 
a new classification, based upon the conceptualization that, for our purposes, best encompasses 
the multifarious, multilevel theoretical signature that cybernetics came to be known for. Ross 
Ashby, the British cyberneticist who might have had cybernetic insights even before Wiener did, 
spoke of cybernetics as “the domain of ‘all possible machines’”.272 Departing from this 
approach, one could get adequately equipped for digging into the metaphysical assumptions 
behind cybernetics, in order to unveil, tackle and articulate its underlying ontology. Accordingly, 
this writer found appropriate to predicate of cybernetics as relying on three main theoretical 
pillars themselves cradled on fundamental aspects of the nature of a machine. I will proceed to 
spell out the cybernetic hypothesis subsuming its different foundational elements under this 
proposed triad. 
 
2. Machines can be teleological: Machines are islands of order in a chaotic world. To speak of 
a deterministic system aiming at an ultimate purpose is not contradictory. 
 
The notion of a final cause had been cast out from mechanistic explanations due to the alleged 
fact that it locates “the cause after the effect”, so to speak, in the natural phenomenon being 
studied. The cybernetic proposal of “teleological machinery” was, thus, controversial to say the 
least, and for some, just plain scandalous. However, this proposal was justified by retaining an 
important aspect of such teleological explanation, namely, that it describes a physical process as 
aiming towards a goal to which such process is projected or attracted, aided by corrections 
exerted through “negative feedback” --this last being a characteristic feature of cybernetic 
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parlance.  
 It has been previously mentioned how the better understanding of the interface between 
man and machine came to be a crucial priority for anti-aircraft weapon development in the early 
1940’s. As an important aspect of this effort, the notion of a “machine” had to be meticulously 
dissected, in order to situate “man” as a smooth moving gear within the whole mechanical 
system --in fact an integral part of the bigger machine (the anti-aircraft gun). A salient feature of 
this mechanical operation is the role of feedback for the proper functioning of the weapon. 
Negative feedback
273
 allows a machine to engage in self-correction in order to maintain stability 
toward a certain goal--in this case, hitting the airplane. Information had to be fed into the 
machine in such a way that it could reliably plot an extrapolation of the future position of the 
flying target, in order to shoot projectiles in the right direction at the right time. This situation 
was compared to a strategic movement found in nature itself, namely, that of a cat hunting a 
mouse. The feline would supposedly not run behind the rodent; instead, it foresees the future 
position of the prey, and then the hunter runs directly towards the precise point where the 
nutritious moving target would arrive.  
 As we saw in chapter I, Norbert Wiener (after sharing his thoughts and enticing the 
audience at the “Cerebral Inhibition Meeting” in 1942) further articulated his claims in a 1943 
article under the title “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology” --published in conjunction with the 
Mexican cardiologist Arturo Rosenblueth and the MIT engineer Julian Bigelow. Publishing this 
article presented to a larger audience the notion of a teleological machine: a machine whose 
operation towards a set goal is kept in check by negative feedback, without human intervention. 
Negative feedback in a physical process had as its aim to regulate the mechanical operation in 
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such a manner that the disturbances that would direct the processes away from its goal are 
corrected --checked and put back on track. A paradigmatic example of this dynamical interaction 
occurs in the famed steam governor mentioned in the first chapter. The three cybernetic authors 
asserted in this article that a self-regulated anti-aircraft gun machine, a self-guided torpedo, and 
an airplane’s auto-pilot, are all examples of teleological machinery. 
 Although the article was primarily aimed to a scientific audience, these statements 
expectably caught the attention of the philosophical community. Indeed, since the idea of a “final 
cause” always was a problematic issue in philosophy and science, the notion of a teleological 
machine attracted the interest of some philosophers of science, with the expectable sharp 
criticism. Attacks against the usage of the term “teleological” were soon targeting the cybernetic 
authors --in a typically severe Anglo-Analytic manner. In 1950, the then young philosopher 
Richard Taylor
274
 vigorously attacked the cyberneticists’ choice of “teleology” as a wishful 
scientific neologism, claiming that it shared only a superficial resemblance with the classical 
term used in philosophy from times immemorial. But precisely keeping this term was indeed 
keenly desired by the cyberneticists, arguing that, with some modification,
275
 it was a 
quintessential aspect of the whole cybernetic stance. They would not want to give it up. 
Disregarding this, Taylor claimed that, in principle, a torpedo being pulled by a ship by means of 
a wire or rope attached to its nose could also qualify as a “teleological machine”, since its “aim” 
(eventually reaching and hitting the vessel) would also be accomplished --and indeed even by 
means of correcting possible disturbances in its trajectory. He trivialized Wiener’s view of 
teleological behavior. 
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 Rebuttals came from both sides.
276
 Taylor’s criticism was solid and well argued. 
Nevertheless, Wiener and Rosenblueth firmly stood by their ideas. Probably their strongest point 
against Taylor was that he was still operating within a notion of physics that could be understood 
as thoroughly Newtonian –the so called “philosopher’s physics”. Causality in complex systems 
occurs in non-linear ways, and they were referring to those. Also, Wiener and Rosenblueth 
hinted at some of the problems raised by Taylor as being purely “verbal” in nature, lacking any 
substance. Finally, they just dismissed some of the philosopher’s concerns as simply not worth 
addressing. Wiener published in 1945 a piece on the “The Roles of Models in Science”277 to 
justify his choice of retaining the somewhat modified notion of teleology, so that it could be 
applied to mechanical systems --and he referred the reviewer (Taylor) to this article in his 
response to the critical piece. It is worth noting that of the 10 conferences held by the Macy 
foundation, a professional philosopher was invited only to the first one –Filmer Northrop (1893–
1992). Interestingly, however, most cyberneticians pursued formal studies in classical 
philosophy for some time earlier in their academic lives.
278
 
There was, however, another episode that would point out to a later deep rift in scientific 
worldviews among cyberneticians regarding the idea of behavior-with-an-aim. This rift might 
have partly spelled out the implosion of the enterprise itself at the theoretical level. This could 
indeed be one of the first instances where a new paradigm of science, which is reportedly 
advancing in the 21
st
 century,
279
 trumpeted across the legacy of a previous one, bringing the 
latter into oblivion. Cybernetics might have inadvertently been one of its first victims. This 
assertion requires some explanatory context. 
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Just as Wiener’s ideas were already known in relevant circles before the publication of 
his book in 1948, a younger mathematician and engineer was, around the same time, beginning 
to gain notoriety. Since his years as an MIT electrical engineering graduate student, Claude 
Shannon (1916–2001) was already interested in Wiener’s work, knowing that the latter was 
doing important research at his same institution. While pursuing a Master’s degree, Shannon 
became an assistant for Vannevar Bush’ second differential analyzer mentioned above.280 Once 
he landed a permanent position at Bell Laboratories, war-related work put both Wiener and him 
in direct contact, since Wiener had to deal with the Bell Company on a frequent basis (both Bell 
Labs and MIT were funded under the referred above subsection D-2). Shannon started to pay 
Wiener frequent visits at his research lab, seeking inspiration and advice on relevant topics. 
These tours became so frequent indeed, that at a certain point –and aware of the closely related 
research occurring at Bell Labs—Wiener begun to be concerned about the possibility of having 
his ideas siphoned out without his due acknowledgement.
281
  In fact, the same year that Wiener 
published Cybernetics, Shannon published the famed “A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication”--a long article delivered in two installments, soon acquiring legendary status 
within engineering circles.  
 Warren Weaver, still supervising the military-related research of section D-2,
 282
 endorsed 
the paper by later expanding it into a joint book –coauthored by Shannon and himself— and 
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given the more ambitious title The Mathematical Theory of Communication.
283
 The monograph 
included Shannon’s paper and Weaver’s simplified explanation and assessment of the theory’s 
foreseen import, taking advantage of the latter’s gift for conveying otherwise cryptic concepts –
both as a people’s person and in writing. The paper acknowledged very clearly Wiener’s 
influence, and Wiener was thankful and respectful of such homage.
284
 Shannon carried on 
Wiener’s insight on the digitality of information, asserting logarithm at base 2 at the core of the 
general equation of information. In fact, even if Shannon’s Bell Labs colleague John Tukey first 
coined the term “bit” for “binary digit”,285 Shannon established the term as a core part of 
information theory’s structure.286 However, Shannon’s proposal had, as Wiener publicly praised, 
original features of its own. 
 As advanced above,
287
 the paper started putting forward (or “clarifying”, in Shannon’s 
view), the controversial claim that information has nothing to do with meaning –or rather, that 
the problem of semantics should be bracketed as irrelevant to the fundamental problem of 
communication –namely, “that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a 
message selected at another point”.288 As shown in the first chapter289 several people at Macy 
were concerned about this move away from the “significance” of the message conveyed --among 
those being Donald Mackay and the editor in chief, Heinz von Foerster. However, much of this 
unease might had been partly triggered by a misunderstanding fostered by the intense enthusiasm 
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of cybernetics itself.
290
 In any case, due to its simplifying character, more suitable for 
engineering purposes, Shannon’s take prevailed as the approach of choice.291  
 An interesting shift away from Wiener’s views, however, occurred in Shannon’s paper. 
Wiener’s views on entropy, as previously pointed out,292 largely came to him out of the 
realisation of deep correlations found between on the one hand his early works on chaos and 
thermodynamics, and on the other the nature of the message occurring between internal 
structures and their environment in surviving systems. This context led Wiener to equalize 
information with negative entropy. Information provided organization to a reality that inherently 
tends towards chaos. But Shannon stated that information was just the opposite: that information 
was entropy itself --and not negative entropy. This reversal carries relevance since it would come 
back later under disguise with important consequences for the cybernetic enterprise. 
 As Weaver explained Shannon’s view of information, “information is associated with the 
amount of freedom of choice we have in constructing messages”.293 If the message conveyed 
happens to bring to the receptor what the receptor already has, then little information has been 
conveyed. If, on the other hand, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the possibility of 
reconstructing the message at the receptor’s end, then one can talk of a greater amount of 
information at stake. So it would seem that information would amount to being a function of the 
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amount of randomness in the conveyance of a message --or as Weaver would put it, “a measure 
of one’s freedom of choice in selecting a message”.294 Indeed, Weaver would cleverly capture 
the case where a good degree of order is present, and the amount of choice is poor, saying that 
this “situation is highly organized, it is not characterized by a large degree of randomness or of 
choice, the information (or the entropy) is low”.295    
 In contrast, Wiener stopped short of identifying entropy with “evil;” we are after all 
destined to turn to ashes at the end, due to reality’s tendency towards chaos and disorganization. 
Should we thus consider Shannon’s approach as inimical to that ultimate challenger of entropy, 
“life” –that most excellent embodiment of information? That would not seem to be the case, 
given Shannon’s keen interest in synthetically recreating instances of living systems, as 
portrayed in the construction of his famous robotic “maze-solving rats”.296 It would also be 
relevant to point out that the scientific and intellectual environment regarding the physical and its 
semantic implications for chaos where about to begin undergoing revision. Entropy, or the 
randomness present in a physical environment started to be seen as a fruitful environment for 
complexity to arise. Physical systems, organic or not, had to engage in a certain degree of self-
organization in order to be able to cope with that changing physical environment. Lack of 
flexibility would entail destruction –and death.297 
 Wieners’ view on entropy as contrary to life and organization largely comes from the 
observation of an isolated system’s behavior under the 2nd law of thermodynamics. Since energy 
is not created or destroyed, in an exchange of it something has to give, and that would be the 
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order (information) that maintains the system together.
298
 This inverse relational status between 
entropy and life was sanctioned by Schrodinger
299
 –which Wiener approved. Once the 
environment is factored into the picture, it would seem that the emergence of complexity (partly 
due to random changes in order to cope) is now the friendly context for life to emerge. Indeed it 
seems as if self-organization would need such an explosion of variables to successfully match a 
changing milieu and reach homeostasis.  
 Claude Shannon, in that respect, advanced what was to be later given empirical 
plausibility by the 1977 Nobel Prize in chemistry Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003) for his study of 
self-organization and thermodynamics. It would seem that order in nature (and life itself) are 
necessary processes of reciprocal coping balances that are actually bound to happen –contra the 
traditional view regarding the consequences of entropy.
300
  
 Matter near equilibrium behaves in a "repetitive" way. On the other hand, far from equilibrium  
 there appears a variety  of mechanisms corresponding to the possibility of occurrence of various 
 types of dissipative structures. For example, far from equilibrium we may witness the appearance 
 of chemical clocks, chemical reactions which behave in a coherent, rhythmical fashion. We may 
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 also have processes of self-organization leading to nonhomogeneous structures to 
 nonequilibrium crystals.
301
 
The consequences of this surreptitious semantic change regarding information as a fundamental 
element of cybernetics might have entailed a deep displacement in the ontological commitment 
underlying the project. I will come back to these effects in the chapter regarding the work of 
William Ross Ashby.
302
 
 
3. Machines can be immaterial: In virtue of this feature, they can be “extended” to encompass, 
beyond the organic realm (life), non-physical entities as well (mind). 
 
It has been mentioned that McCulloch was tinkering with the notion of idealized neurons, in 
connection with the premise that there should be a logical way of transducing cognitive 
processes --so that we can have a glimpse of hope for relating the exactness of mathematics with 
the chaos of thinking. Indeed McCulloch already had for a while a nagging insight which 
suggested that the nervous system was nothing but the ‘wetware’ instantiation of a higher, more 
universal, abstract logical machine. In fact his artificial neurons would stand for the logical 
gateways existent thanks to Boolean logic (‘and’, ‘or’, etc.). It is in this context that Turing’s 
observations regarding an “ideal” machine importantly shaped McCulloch’s own educated 
musings. He recalls that  
 it was not until I saw Turing's paper that I began to get going the right way around, and with Pitts' 
 help formulated the required logical calculus… The important thing was, for us, that we had to 
 take a logic and subscript it for the time of the occurrence of a signal (which is, if you will, no 
 more than a proposition on the move). This was needed in order to construct theory enough to be 
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 able to state how a nervous system could do anything. The delightful thing is that the very 
 simplest set of appropriate assumptions is sufficient to show that a nervous system can compute 
 any computable number.
303
 
This model, which re-instantiated a pristine logical platform into an object of reality, thus 
“purifying” the latter, was a major impulse for cybernetics, which was now holding a mechanical 
explanation for the mind’s hitherto scientifically intractable operations. Indeed the article turned 
out to be a theoretical pillar not only for cybernetics, but also for the start-up of the field of 
computer science. John von Neumann’s famed First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC304 used, to 
the puzzlement of the engineers hired to build these early computers, McCulloch’s vocabulary 
and symbols of “neurons” throughout his paper. He was open about having written the draft 
based upon McCulloch and Pitts’ proposal.305 Von Neumann’s paper served as a blueprint for the 
construction of one of the first “stored-program” computers (the EDVAC306) to be delivered, as 
it was expected given the urgencies of the time, for ballistics research at the Aberdeen Proving 
Ground.
307
 The model can be explained in the following way.  
For instance, in the case of an organism (e.g., a bird) “deciding” whether or not eating an 
object (e.g. a blueberry), something like the following procedure would take place. The animal’s 
neuron would receive two possible inputs, one regarding shape (roundness) and the other 
regarding color (purple). When the bird’s biological detector perceives “roundness”, it would fire 
a signal (symbolized by a 1). If it does not --if the object is squared--, then there would be no 
firing (symbolized by a 0). By the same vein, if the detector perceives “purple”, then 1 would 
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occur --if it perceives blue, then 0 would happen. The situation that we have thereafter is that 
when the bird perceives a blueberry, a threshold would be formed in the ideal neuron. This 
threshold would be represented by the number 2, formed as a result of detectors firing due to the 
perception of both roundness (1) and purpleness (2): 1 + 1 = 2. If this threshold is reached, the 
neuron will this time itself fire a response, represented by 1 if the command is “eat”, and by 0 if 
it is “don’t eat”. Only if a threshold that is equal or more than 2 is reached, then the positive 
command will occur. Since both the roundness and purpleness of a blueberry causes the 
detectors to send overall signals that reach the 2 threshold, then a 1 signal will be fired and the 
bird will eat it. If on the other hand, the bird sees a golf ball, there would be roundness (1) but no 
purpleness (0), forming a total output of just 1 (1+0=1). Since the threshold requires a minimum 
of 2 for the neuron to fire “eat” (1), the bird would not eat. A similar situation would happen 
with a violet, where there is purpleness (1) but not roundness (0), and so the total output would 
still be below the minimum required threshold of 2 (1+0=1). Still in the case of a hotdog, lacking 
this food both roundness and purpleness, the outcome will fall further below the minimum 
required to reach the 2 threshold --since 0+0=0. And so on and so forth.
308
 Expectably, 
McCulloch and Pitts’ networks get quickly more complicated once more features are added into 
the operation. 
 Part of the fame of this article resides in its almost epic difficulty. John von Neumann 
was quick in pointing out that its cryptic nature was in great part due to the usage of Rudolph 
Carnap’s sui generis and somewhat convoluted symbolic nomenclature. This unfortunate choice 
--in the eyes of von Neumann-- was probably unavoidable anyway, since Carnap was one of 
Pitts’ admired mentors. Despite its inaccessibility (which partly almost cost it its publication), it 
became a theoretical bedrock for cybernetics. It was not, however, devoid of problems.  
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 The complexity that is rapidly attained after more elements enter the cognitive picture 
turned out to be particularly problematic in a two-fold manner. On the one hand the networks, 
even if complex, were still considered too simple for occurrences of higher cognition. On the 
other, even if immensely more complex cognitive processes were to be mapped, the 
constructability of the model would get severely compromised. Since cybernetics had as a 
signature feature the buildability of its models,
309
 this also brought about theoretical unease. In 
fact, there were later developments of the model, largely side-stepping the constructability 
mandate, (e.g., the perceptron), to some extent betraying the cybernetic mandate of material 
grounding.  
 Pointing out the importance of this paper for the theoretical genesis of computer science 
is indeed relevant for a better understanding of what later occurred to the cybernetic enterprise.  
Right from the start, von Neumann, who certainly saw its usefulness --even built an impressive 
physical device out of it-- insightfully saw its shortcomings as well. These weaknesses became 
evident for him when the model was applied to what was supposed to understand in the first 
place: the mind. When the neatly abstract and disembodied machine is instantiated back into 
materiality, a remodeling of the studied object seems to occur, severely complicating it right into 
intractability, evincing deep theoretical problems in the model. Thus it is from insights into the 
feasibility of the McCulloch and Pitts’ model into realms other than computer machines, that the 
most severe criticisms against the core of cybernetics would be launched.
310
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4. Machines are embodied theories: Physical constructability should act as theory grounding. 
Theoretical investigation ought to be constrained by a concrete empirical buildability  
 
Probably the most famously peculiar characteristic of the cybernetic movement was its emphasis 
on the necessary constructability of whatever was proposed –instantiated in cybernetics’ 
legendary autonomous robots. Certainly this leniency towards the engineering aspect of a theory 
has older roots.
311
 Constructability turns out to be the strongest sign of a model being truthful 
and reliable: knowledge entails buildability. True epistemic assets entail engineering success, our 
model enjoying an equilateral isomorphism with the modeled.
312
  
 It is relevant to point out that the cybernetic collaboration coming from Britain had this 
distinctive feature, which hitherto lacked, at least in such measure, in the American side of 
cybernetic research: machine building as theory testing.
313
 In fact, it could be maintained that if 
the English were not as actively engaged as Americans in cybernetic research (as both 
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McCulloch and Wiener asserted after visiting their English counterparts),
314
 the British definitely 
compensated for that lack with their emphasis on machine building. This aspect of British 
cybernetics might have been partly the result of the particular orientation of their military 
research, due to their own urgencies of war: less theoretical investigation and more quickly-built 
defensive gadgetry. Such a circumstance would not only put a constraint in terms of time and 
secrecy (which the Americans also had), but also foster a hands-on approach to scientific 
research. In addition, since cybernetics did not have in the UK the official financial backing that 
it enjoyed in the US, much of the British cybernetic developments took place as side jobs, even 
as hobbies, being performed in the scientists’ kitchens and garages during their spare time.315 
 The physical embodiment of an otherwise non-material machine, not only as a heuristic 
tool, but as the ultimate ontology of a living object, was an idea already present in a premonitory 
way in early 20
th
 century British psychology. Both the Ratio Club and a thinker who never made 
it to his first meeting due to untimely death, become here highly relevant. Kenneth Craik (1914–
1945) was a young philosopher with an intense interest in the workings of the mind and a 
confessed passion for machinery. After studying philosophy, he began pursuing a Ph.D. in 
psychology. In 1943, five years before Wiener’s Cybernetics, he published a book entitled The 
Nature of Explanation. The thesis in this book had profound implications for cybernetics on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
 Craik advanced the idea that one of the most startling capacities of the mind was the 
possibility of putting together prediction models about the state of affairs of reality. That is 
largely what thinking would amount to. In principle, Craik stated, a machine should be capable 
of doing the same: be able to predict situations in reality. In fact, the mind was itself, a type of 
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machine capable of constructing models of the world. This manner of understanding reality, by 
means of actual model-building, was called the “synthetic method”.316 And this idea began to 
make a profound impression in those who would later become British cyberneticists. Emphasis 
in robot making as a heuristic tester for psychological theories was his explanatory signature. 
However, just two years after the publication of his book, and just before the first Ratio Club 
meeting, he was killed in a bicycle traffic accident –at only 31 years of age.  
 It has been previously pointed out that the Ratio Club, in an important way was marked 
by this legacy.
317
 In fact, the group, which deeply lamented this loss, considered naming itself 
the “Craik Club”. Craik’s emphasis in his “synthetic method” as a way to understand physical 
phenomena (i.e., gadget building) allegedly set the British cyberneticians apart from their 
American counterparts --mainly focused in mathematical expansions of what could be 
physicalized by means of extending the notion of what can be understood mechanistically. Also, 
the social implications of cybernetic thinking, which allegedly gave the American side a strong 
footing in terms of mainstream attention and founding, was entirely avoided by the English 
group. In fact, Grey Walter, who later became a ‘media personality’ of sorts due to his artificial 
tortoises, not only openly acknowledged receiving inspiration from Craik, but furthermore, 
characterized the American cybernetic movement as embodying Craik’s ideas --minus the fun.318  
 Having in consideration that Ross Ashby himself --who was keen to convey the 
plausibility of his ideas by means of showing, in the metal, constructed devices-- kept active 
correspondence with Craik, one would be tempted to agree with such remark.
319
 In fact, Craik 
was already publishing in 1943 what would provide important cybernetic insights later –the same 
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year when Wiener was just publishing his foundational paper with Rosenblueth and Bigelow, 
and full five years before the publication of his book in 1948. These timeline considerations 
could point out to a prescient philosophy that could concede to Craik the position of a cybernetic 
pioneer. However, in all fairness to American cybernetics, one would have to also consider the 
machines built in the US, and recognize that they did not play a small role in the development of 
cybernetic thinking. A list of relevantly built cybernetic machines, both British and American, 
would be: 
 - Ross Ashby’s Homeostat –a machine that will have substantial implications   
              for cybernetic thinking.
320
 
 - Grey Walter’s “tortoises” –phototropic, self-charging robots that launched cybernetics  
              in popular culture.
321
 
 - Wiener’s (and Bigelow’s) Predictor –the machine that inspired the 1943 foundational  
         article.
322
  
 - Von Neumann’s computer –mapped upon McCulloch and Pitts’ article,    
     and then the source of further cybernetic thinking.
323
 
 - Claude Shannon’s “rats” –maze-solving small mobile robots.324 
The first two machines were British. The remaining three were American. An important aspect 
of the operation of anti-aircraft weaponry that jumpstarted the cybernetic movement in America 
was the need to make the calculations for future positions of the target aircraft, tractable in a 
timely way, for the expectably urgent reasons that characterize war times. If done by hand, these 
procedures could have taken months. There was a pressing need to develop a mechanized way to 
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compute these numbers. This set America on a different path from Britain concerning the 
orientation and purpose of their computing research. After Turing’s contribution with his On 
Computable Numbers to the understanding of the notion of a machine, by means of spelling out 
what an algorithm stands for, John von Neumann, almost in parallel with the British allies, 
embarked upon the goal of constructing a machine capable of doing algorithmic computations --
among other tasks. The British were instead focused on cracking the coded German 
communications. Meanwhile, the American interest in computer building morphed into von 
Neumann’s involvement with the EDVAC project, a computing machine to be delivered to the 
Ballistics Research Laboratory of the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland --the same facility 
where Norbert Wiener was doing ballistics research, applying his studies of Brownian motions. 
 As pointed out in chapter I, it has to be said for the American side of cybernetics 
regarding the anchoring of theoretical advancement in physical substrata, that Wiener was right 
from the beginning of his projects vehemently pushing for required engineering practical skills 
for his working team --given his past own misfortunes with the hands-on aspects of his 
theoretical musings.
325
 In fact, he politely scolded von Neumann at some point for not having 
sufficiently performed a transition from designing computing architecture to immersion into 
control theory.
326
 He looked for scientists with hands-on knowledge in at least basic electrical 
engineering --even as a hobby (e.g., radio construction). This type of approach underpinned 
Wiener’s whole project of the Anti-Aircraft Predictor, as also seen by his enthusiastic support of 
Julian Bigelow’s ingenious fighter simulator. Hence, there was a clear and unambiguous 
emphasis in cradling mathematics and physics in the engineering-conscious, nitty-gritty 
sensitive, aspect of machinery. In Wiener’s mind, proper modeling was of utmost importance in 
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the advancement of scientific knowledge, as both him and Rosenblueth emphasized in their 1945 
paper on “The Role of Models in Science”,327 --stating the peculiar claim that “the best material 
model for  a  cat  is  another, or preferably the same cat”.328 
 It is suggested that the cybernetic emphasis on this useful theoretical constraint --the need 
to ground it in physical operability-- is what made cybernetics a qualitatively different proposal 
in the history of science. It allegedly shifted the usual theoretical focus from being 
epistemologically-based to one founded on the ontology of objects.
329
 Indeed, testing how a 
certain philosophical or mathematical insight would work-out by means of observing the coping 
of a machine (metallic or organic) with the environment, fundamentally mattered. This approach 
in fact went well beyond a mere methodological choice for scientific research. As seen above, 
Wiener regarded the reality of a “machine” as “islands of hope”, as pockets of intention and will, 
in the midst of the deadly indifference of entropy --the ever-present dark reminder that reality 
spirals down into oblivion.
330
 
 Considering the importance that machine-building had for the cybernetic ethos, there is 
something to be said regarding the way in which these instantiations affected its own theoretical 
cores. The next two chapters will attempt to show the influence that the relevant constructed 
machinery had on cybernetics’ evolution itself. One machine will be British, by Ross Ashby, and 
the other(s)
331
 American, by von Neumann. This machinery provoked, on the one hand, the 
unveiling of problematic commitments that were not in the open when they still remained solely 
in the realm of theory. On the other, it triggered retreat into realms rejected by cybernetics in the 
first place as part of its fundamental mandate, going against ultimately cybernetic standpoints.  
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V. Extending the scope of a machine ontology. 
  
       [Cybernetics] takes as its subject-matter  
       the domain of ‘all possible machines’332 
 
1. William Ross Ashby’s nature-machine equalization 
 
If one is to make a philosophical survey of what the notion of machine stands for, one will be 
quickly surprised by the fact that there is little written on the topic per se --"surprised" because 
philosophers and scientists have been extensively using its derivatives (mechanistic, mechanical, 
machinal, etc.) for at least three centuries by now. Indeed, upon tracing back the history of 
modern science, one cannot find a rigorous attempt at a definition of a machine.
333
  
 There have been good studies on the notions of automaton,
334
 artifact,
335
 and even 
gadget,
336
 which go all the way back to Ancient Greece.
337
 However, these refer, once again, to 
derivatives of the more general and substantial notion of a machine, and not to the object, or the 
idea of the object, in itself. This reason alone (namely, the lack of a historical factum pointing 
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towards a rigorous treatment of the idea of a machine) would already justify addressing the 
philosophical underpinnings of what a machine stands for. But there is a more relevant, 
compelling reason for squarely tackling the idea of what a machine means. Ashby attempted to 
define cybernetics as the theory of all possible machines.
338
 This machine-based approach to the 
understanding of cybernetics gained strength after it was gradually realized that for 
understanding animal (man) and machine under the same mechanistic laws,
339
 a clarification of 
what a “machine” actually meant was desirable –not in an altogether different fashion as to what 
occurred a couple of decades earlier, concerning the need for articulating the notion of an 
algorithm, in order to realize what can and cannot be computable.
340
 
 The scientist who somewhat mysteriously asserted this preeminence --of the machine as 
lying at the hard core of cybernetics-- went by the name of William Ross Ashby. This British 
medical doctor and psychiatrist was a founding member of the Ratio Club: the famed “study 
group” that stood as the (more humble) English parallel to the Macy gatherings in the US, and 
which included Alan Turing and Grey Walter as regular members.
341
 Ashby’s theoretical 
developments were imbued, pretty much right from the beginning, with the characteristic 
cybernetic signature. Already in 1940, a full three years before both foundational articles by 
Wiener, McCulloch and company saw day light,
342
 Ashby published a distinctly cybernetic 
article that would go on to serve as the cornerstone of his own subsequent plethora of ideas.
343
 
 Ashby confessed that for several years an apparently insurmountable difficulty regarding 
the possibility of understanding a living organism as a machine haunted him. There seemed in 
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place a default view of an utter incompatibility between the notions of a machine and, say, a 
brain --due to the notorious adaptive capacities of the latter, allegedly inherently lacking in the 
former. Candidly referring to himself in the 3
rd
 person, he shared: 
 The author has been concerned for some years with attempting to reconcile the fact of the 
 occurrence of this type of adaptation with the usual hypothesis that the brain is a machine, i.e., a 
 physico-chemical system. In the opinion of some, there is a fundamental impossibility that any 
 isolated machine could show behaviour of this type…344 
Ashby thought that what may lie at the crux of this claimed incompatibility might be a poor 
understanding of the entity to which the nervous system is being compared. He asserted that “[i]t 
seemed possible, however, that a more elaborate study of the essentials of ‘machines’ might 
show possibilities hitherto overlooked”.345 Accordingly, he proceeded to gradually break down 
the task at hand --namely, to find out what a machine is-- into pieces, carefully re-building the 
notion, along with the isomorphic characteristics allegedly shared with the nervous system, in a 
meticulous and sequential fashion. His suggestion for a “more elaborate study” took him almost 
a decade.  
 As stated above, Ashby’s cybernetic argumentation started in 1940. In an article entitled 
“Adaptiveness and Equilibrium”, he began by addressing the very feature that supposedly sets 
the nervous system irreconcilably apart from a machine, advanced in its title: adaptiveness. He 
proposed equalizing it with the familiar and recurring physical phenomenon of equilibrium. This 
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should, for him, provide an objective approach to adaptiveness, void of subjective appreciations 
and metaphysical preconceptions. For this, he began scrutinizing the said notion of equilibrium, 
incrementally building up on top of some basic propositions.  
 For heuristic purposes, Ashby encouraged the reader to imagine three physical objects, 
each showing a distinct type of equilibrium: a cube lying on one of its sides (stable), a non-
moving sphere (neutral) and an inverted cone resting on its tip (unstable). If we try to tilt the 
cube, it will resist before it reaches 45 degrees; after that, it will topple over. If we push the 
sphere, it will roll. If we touch the inverted cone, it will fall on its side. In regards to the resulting 
distribution of forces, one could say that in the cube’s case the disturbing force acts against the 
resultant force; in the case of the sphere the resultant force is the disturbing force (there is only 
disturbing force); and in the case of the inverted cone the resultant force acts along with the 
disturbing force. 
 This quantitative approach to what equilibrium stands for suggests two important 
features: 1) Equilibrium does not imply immobility: a perfect pendulum, with a frictionless 
hinge, stands for a system in equilibrium. 2) Equilibrium is inherently dynamic: if the three 
objects alluded above were unaffected by any disturbing force, ascribing any type of equilibrium 
present would hardly make sense --one could say at most that Newton’s First Law is being 
witnessed.
346
  
At this point, Ashby was ready to more clearly specify what equilibrium is, advancing 
that “a variable is in stable equilibrium if, when it is disturbed, reactive forces are set up which 
act back on the variable so as to oppose the initial disturbance. If they go with it then the variable 
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is in unstable equilibrium”.347 Once he accomplished this clarification, Ashby made an 
interesting move. He proposed that every system in equilibrium implies a circuit. How could this 
be so? The system of opposing forces reveal a circuital flow: a variable that is affected by the 
disturbing force affects back the disturbing force itself. Graphically, it could be displayed as 
something like this: 
    (fig. 1)
348
 
Moreover, Ashby further stated that the reverse is also true: that the existence of a circuit entails 
an existing equilibrium! And this is so because the flow of disturbance to the variables also 
denotes a system with a reciprocal interaction of forces. X1 affects X2, which in turn affects X1; 
once we compare the range of change, we can find a stable equilibrium --or not, in which case it 
would be an unstable one. 
 In continuing with this line of reasoning, and building upon this found range of 
variability, Ashby stated that all systems in equilibrium have a neutral point. This is pointed out 
as an important claim, since the stable equilibrium of a system would depend on the amount of 
variation away from this neutral point: if the disturbance pushes the system out of the said 
neutral threshold, then it becomes unstable. In fact, this ontological leash, within which the 
system can still be said to be in stable equilibrium, is given by Ashby the name of “range of 
stability”.349 
 Since the whole point of the argument is to adequately articulate the notion of a machine 
in order to defend its claimed isomorphism with the nervous system (or any other living 
organism), Ashby readily acknowledged that one likely criticism would be that such circuitry is 
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way too simple for it to have any hope of being compared to a living entity. To this, he advanced 
the response that such “simple” circuits can very quickly become complex --and in an extreme 
manner. Consider the following case: 
      (fig. 2)
350
 
Or even… 
     (fig. 3)
351
 
One could readily notice that the modification of just one variable will alter the whole system. 
And so, if we have more variables, and each one of them is itself modified, the compound 
circuitry can quickly engage in dramatic complexity. The adaptive circuitry of a natural machine 
(a living organism), thus, should no longer be regarded as belonging to a very high complexity of 
a different kind --it is rather different in a matter of degree. Ashby was reassured that what he 
found has serious implications for our properly mechanistic understanding of life. He exhorts us 
to see that… 
 there is a point of fundamental importance which must be grasped. It is that stable 
 equilibrium is necessary for existence, and that systems in unstable equilibrium inevitably 
 destroy themselves. Consequently, if we find that a system persists, in spite of the usual small 
 disturbances which affect every physical body, then we may draw the conclusion  with absolute 
 certainty that the system must be in stable equilibrium. This may sound dogmatic, but I can see 
 no escape from this deduction.
352
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A system’s equilibrium has to remain within the neutral point for it to remain stable, so that the 
“range of variability” occurring in its circuitry would allow for its proper adaptation to the 
changing environment.  Ashby is well aware that when such process occurs in the natural world, 
it is called by a familiar name: survival. The mechanistic bridge with living organisms has now 
been established. The most important feature exposed by living entities, the very feature that 
accounts for its survival, would seem to be a characteristic of matter itself --as long as it is a 
coping system that remains stable. In Ashby’s own words… 
 The moment we see that “adaptiveness” implies a circuit and that a circuit implies an equilibrium, 
 we can see at once that this equilibrium must be of the stable type, for any unstable variable 
 destroys itself. And it is precisely the main feature of adaptive behaviour that it enables the 
 animal to continue to exist… Vast numbers of variables associated with the animal are all in 
 stable equilibrium. Not only is this so as an observed fact, but it is clear that it must be so because 
 any variable or system in unstable equilibrium inevitably destroys itself.
353
 
Having realized this organism-machine identity in terms of structure, Ashby went on to deal 
more specifically with the characteristics of its coping behavior. In a subsequent article five 
years later,
354
 he hypothesized about the possible processes that might take place when an 
organism copes with an altering environment in order to survive. He proposed that a living entity 
engages in a trial-and-error operation, altering variables in its inner circuit until it finally finds 
the right neutral ‘sweet spot’, where it can remain stable --alive-- exactly as when a coping 
machine reaches equilibrium.  
 The trial and error coping in the animal portrays the following characteristics: 1) It is 
called upon only when the environment provides a hostile milieu for the organism; 2) Each tried 
option remains for a determinate period of time, until it is no longer satisfactory; 3) When the 
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hostile environment remains, the trial and error dynamic does not stop; 4) The next attempted 
option is randomly chosen, not necessarily being a better one; 5) When a tried choice provides an 
adequate coping, then the system stops ‘hunting’ and remains stable. This would entail an animal 
successfully surviving.
355
  
 Ashby is here introducing an astonishing suggestion. This trial-and-error procedure, he 
proposes, is not unique to living entities; quite on the contrary, “it is an elemental and 
fundamental property of all matter”.356 In fact, this biological operation finds its mechanical 
counterpart in the phenomenon of a machine “breaking”. To push this point through, Ashby 
deemed it necessary to squarely tackle the notion of a machine, carefully picking it apart. This 
might well be the first time in history that the concept of a machine per se was directly 
addressed.
357
 
 Ashby indeed had at this stage an incipient definition of a machine --one that would be 
increasingly fine-tuned throughout the subsequent years. A machine, he claims, is “a collection 
of parts which (a) alter in time, and (b) which interact on one another in some determinate and 
known manner”.358  We are in front of characteristically machine-like features of change, 
reciprocal interaction, determinism and measurability. The parts can be called variables, since 
they are measurable. The alteration of these variables in themselves does not necessarily modify 
the overall constant of the system in equilibrium; however, a change in the organization of the 
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network of parts does. Thus the identity of a machine has to do less with changes in its parts, and 
more with the change in the constants of the overall array of variables—in other words, with its 
internal organization.  
 When a machine “breaks”, Ashby reminds us, the entity is still a machine --but another 
type of machine, since its internal organization has changed. A “break” is thus a change in the 
constant of the overall network of variables that conjointly forms the machine. And this break 
has a reason to exist. When a coping machine, due to an external disturbance, is pushed out of its 
neutral point of stability (equilibrium), its variables will individually change so that in group they 
compensate for the attempted alteration of the network. This compensation brings back the 
machine to its stable equilibrium, effectively steering it away from the overall effect of the 
disturbance: 
 A machine which has available an indefinitely large number of breaks depending on 
 configurations closely similar to one another will inevitably change its internal organization 
 spontaneously until it arrives at an organization which has an equilibrium with the special 
 property that it avoids those configurations.
359
 
When the disturbing force is stronger than what the variables are able to compensate --and thus 
collectively push back-- then a change in the overall network occurs. The constant behind the 
equilibrium point then changes to another constant –constituted by the overall change of altered 
parts—so that the machine can persist in stable equilibrium. Each break will send the array of 
parts hunting for a newly organized internal structure, until another constant is reached and a 
stable equilibrium is again found. If another constant is not eventually reached in a finite 
timeline, the machine does not break: it gets destroyed. It does not survive.  
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 Now we can better see the ontological bridge with a living organism firmly set in place. 
If we recall, an animal has to re-wire its internal circuitry in order to cope with an altering 
environment. This is done by means of a trial and error procedure, its variables individually 
changing until the overall network of parts finds a stable equilibrium with the modified 
environment. This constitutes the characteristic animal adaptiveness. The attained equilibrium 
will persist until another change will make the organism “break”, once again until a new 
successfully coping self-organization is achieved, and so on. This is survival. And this is the 
manner in which a successfully coping machine persists. Organism and machine, in virtue of 
both having one quintessentially defining behavior in common --self-organization in order to 
survive-- can be said to be, effectively, one and the same. 
 
2. The homeostat: A living machine. 
 
In an article published two years later,
360
 another previously suggested point of no small 
importance for Ashby’s subsequent proposal is reinforced. A machine’s ontological counterpart 
in nature is, according to him, a living organism and its environment --the animal alone is an 
incomplete machine. Both organism and environment, engaged in dynamical interaction, 
constitute a machine. In fact, that will be a key distinction for Ashby’s next conjecture regarding 
the fact that a certain type of living organism (the nervous system) successfully adapts to change 
–rather than being caught up in an endless internal chaotic loop, entailing what certainly occurs 
at times: death.  
 Having already established the isomorphism between working machine and living being, 
Ashby did not waste time in expressing a keen interest in having a particular type of organic 
                                                 
360
 Ashby 1947 
153 
 
entity understood as a machine: the nervous system (and its environment). In it, he advances, 
“the ‘variables’ are mostly impulse-frequencies at various points in the nerve-network. And as 
the impulses at one point affect in various ways the impulse-frequencies at other points, the 
nervous system is a dynamic system par excellence”.361 Citing empirical studies of his time that 
in his mind were suggestively friendly to his view, Ashby felt that he succeeded in providing a 
full machine-based explanation for how (at least basic) living entities survive.  
 Apparently not entirely content with what was accomplished theoretically, in elegantly 
cybernetic fashion Ashby had only one year later (1948) publicly acknowledged having 
constructed a machine that would instantiate his hypothesis “in the flesh”.362  He built what he 
baptized as the Homeostat --with obvious reference to his intellectual mentor Walter Canon’s 
studies in biological homeostasis. This machine, which was to become a celebrity among 
hardcore cyberneticians,
363
 was built from WW2 spare military parts. 
 Echoing a salient characteristic of British cybernetic pursuits, Ashby’s machine was 
gradually built during his spare time, partly at home and partly at the storage area of the hospital 
where he worked. There was no formal institutional funding behind its construction.
364
 The 
apparatus consisted of four Royal Air Force bomb control switch gear kits
365
 mounted on four 
aluminum boxes, each of which connected to a pivoting needle with a concave trough filed with 
conducting liquid (water). Each control gear switch, or uniselector, was previously hardwired 
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with random values,
366
 constituting the particular threshold that the current has to reach –or 
not—in order to be let through. The four units were electrically interconnected among 
themselves. Each had 25 possible combinations. When the current of electricity passed through 
them, the overall result was that each of the uniselectors’ floating needles would reach a middle 
point in the trough, and remain there. The pictures below show, in order, each uniselector, and 
the four of them inter-connected forming the whole homeostat.
367
 
 
 (fig. 4)
368
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 (fig. 5)
369
 
 
The peculiarity of the machine relied on the following feature. If one were to modify the 
connections, say “re-wire” the machine in another way –inverting the current, connecting the 
uniselectors in different order, messing with the needles, turning off one of the uniselectors, 
etc.—the needles would appear to go hunting for a different position, trying out different states, 
until they would all settle back into each one of their middle points in the trough. Ashby’s 
colleagues would find themselves frantically rewiring the machine several times, in different 
ways, just to witness somewhat in awe how the machine would “re-organize” itself, gradually 
returning to its initial point of stable equilibrium at the center –equidistant from either extreme, 
45 degrees at each side. Ashby would later succinctly describe its behavior like this: 
On top of each box is magnet [sic] which can turn on a pivot. The central position counts 
arbitrarily as “optimum”; at 45° on either side is the “lethal” state the brain must avoid, and it is 
at that position that the relay closes to make the uniselector change to a new position. If it is 
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stable, the needles come to the center; if they are displaced, they will all fluctuate but they will 
come back to the center. That behavior corresponds to the behavior of the adapted organism.
370
 
As we can see, Ashby expectably regarded this behavior as being one and the same with that of a 
living entity surviving. Following his previous understanding of a dynamical machine as 
conformed by both animal and environment, part of the homeostat’s configuration would be the 
organism per se, and the other would be its threatening milieu.
371
 In fact, the titles of the first 
mainstream publications that featured the machine were “The Electronic Brain”372 and the “The 
Thinking Machine”373 --in Radio Electronics, a contemporary popular electronics magazine and 
the famed Time, respectively. 
Three years later, Ashby’s book Design for a Brain (first edition 1952) gave a preeminent 
role to his machine, locating it almost at the axis of how and why we should see the machine-
based hypothesis as very likely true: It is presented as an instantiation of a theorem. That same 
year, equipped with his “cybernetic monster”,374 he was finally invited by the “cybernetic group” 
to the Macy conferences in New York. This occasion will turn out to be the first and last time 
that he had the opportunity to attend the cybernetic Mecca of intellectual exchange. As 
mentioned in chapter II, of the ten conferences that took place in a span of less than a decade 
(1946-1953), only the last five enjoyed published proceedings. Since this was the penultimate 
one, we have a fairly detailed account of what happened on the day of his presentation.
375
 It is 
helpful to complement it with Ashby’s personal diary entries,376 in an effort to shed light on what 
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took place that day. What happened in there represents a somewhat strange and unique 
occurrence in what regards 20
th
 century science gatherings. 
 
3. The Macy presentation: Keeping cybernetics honest. 
 
Right from the opening remarks of his talk, Ashby did not hide both the bold epistemic status of 
his proposal –namely, understanding the essence of life as identical with machine behavior – and 
the audaciously attributed ontological status of his machine –as inhabiting a middle-ground 
between the living and the non-living… 
I must say unambiguously what I mean by ‘alive’. I assume that if the organism is to stay alive, a 
comparatively small number of essential variables must be kept between physiologic limits. Each 
of these variables can be represented by a pointer in a dial… This, of course, is in no way peculiar 
to living organisms. An engineer, seated at the control panel in a ship, has exactly the same task 
to do. He has a row of dials some of which represent essential variables in the ship, and it is his 
business to run things so that the needles always stay within their proper limits. The problem, 
then, is uniform between the inanimate and the animate.
377
 
Ashby went to great lengths in trying to explain what he was about to show. He first wanted to 
set the proper context so that when the homeostat was introduced, the participants were already 
familiar with the issue to be addressed --namely “how the organism manages to establish 
homeostasis in the larger sense”.378 This was not an easy feat. Ashby had to carefully convey, in 
a very succinct way, roughly the gist of the research mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
An important aspect of this aim was to establish the feasibility of an unambiguous setting of the 
                                                 
377
 Ashby 1953, p. 73 
378
 Ibid. 
158 
 
problem –task which some participants clearly saw and agreed upon, while others did not quite 
get.
379
  
Ashby started asking whether or not an animal’s changing environment can be specified 
in a clear and rigorous way. The emphasis would not be placed on the environment’s complexity, 
but on its degree of determinateness. This would allow him to go on with his proposal. But for 
this to happen, Ashby had to first agree on that point with the audience. And despite the common 
cybernetic credo of the conferees, it encountered some resistance at first,
380
 probably due, to 
some extent at least, to the difficulty in understanding where Ashby was actually going with all 
these. Eventually they settled in agreeing that a sharp and clear cut structuring of the problem 
was indeed possible… 
Ashby: Let the environment be represented by the operator, E. The organism’s problem is  
to convert the brain into an operator, which might be represented by E
-1… The 
formulation with E and E
-1
 is merely meant to state the problem in a form that is clear 
physically and mechanistically… E-1 is fairly straightforward, if E-1 does not exist, the 
organism cannot find a solution and dies. If it does exist, then the animal may perhaps 
find several solutions. But what I want to know is whether E can be given a fully rigorous 
definition.
381
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Wiesner:
 382
 That is an operation we would agree it can be done. 
Pitts: It is certain that it could be. 
Ashby: You think it could be? 
Wiesner: By definition, yes.
383
 
Subsequently Ashby shared the reason why focusing right from the start on the adequate 
addressing of the environment was a mandatory requirement. Without rigorously treating, 
articulating and then factoring in the environment little would afterwards be intelligible when 
talking about the brain. Thus, a deep study of the organ ought to have an equally profound study 
of its corresponding containing milieu. He claimed that  
 there can’t be a proper theory of the brain until there is a proper theory of the environment as 
 well… Without an environment, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ have no meaning. It  is not until you say, 
 ‘Let’s give it E47, let’s see what it will do against that’, it is not until you join the brain on to a 
 distinctly formulated environment that you begin to get a clear statement of what will happen.
384
 
Ashby’s position regarding the nature of environment would appear quite reasonable to some, 
while utterly unrealistic to others –depending on one’s philosophical leniencies. The animal 
environment’s elements were found by Ashby to be existent, at least temporarily, in a physically 
discrete and non-continuous manner. However, the Humean chunks he was dividing reality into 
were not to be understood as effectively isolated from each other; rather, they were to be 
regarded as not totally and continually interconnected among themselves… 
There is a form intermediate between the environment in which everything upsets everything else  
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and the environment which is cut into parts. This intermediate type of environment is common  
and is of real significance here; it is an environment that consists of parts that are temporarily 
separable, and yet by no means permanently separable…385 
This created some tension in the audience. Bigelow replied that “[o]ur environment doesn’t 
consist of that sort of phenomena in very many ways. The statement you are making amounts to 
something that mathematically sounds independent but does not exist in the real world”.386 It 
may have been the case that Ashby was not being properly understood, since he did make the 
remark (above) that environmental factors, even if we can dissect them to some extent, are “yet 
by no means permanently separable”.387 And this misunderstanding may had not been exclusive 
to Bigelow. For instance, Heinrich Klüver
388
 politely interrupted to say:  
 Your scheme should be of particular interest to psychologists, because unlike other models we 
 have encountered here, it stresses environmental factors and the interrelations between animal 
 and environment. I did not quite follow what was implied in your statement that constancies may 
 function as barriers.
389
 
As addressed at the beginning of this chapter, once the coping machine, in trying to 
accommodate itself to the changing environment, reaches an overall stable equilibrium, this 
attained state remains constant, until another change is such that the parts/variables are obliged to 
go hunting again --in which case we can say that the machine goes through a “break”. But until 
then, this threshold, this “ontological leash” that these parts enjoy, allow them to tolerate and 
push back the changes, until the overall pressure is such that a break has to occur –so that the 
animal can again rewire itself. Also, having in consideration that in order to have a flow of 
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information, “change” must be present, a variable locked into an achieved constancy will 
effectively block the flow of information.
390
 Accordingly --and putting emphasis on the hunting 
parts-- each trying to be adequate to the changing circumstances, Ashby patiently answered 
that…  
If a system is composed of variables that often get locked constant, it tends to cut the system into 
functionally independent sub-systems which can join and separate. Instead of being a totally 
interlaced system with everything acting on everything else, it allows sub-systems to have 
temporary independencies.
391
 
And hopefully having cleared out the point, Ashby went on with his presentation, just to be 
interrupted with clarifying questions by other participants every so often, which he patiently 
addressed. The most engaged into the discussion were three authors already familiar to us, 
(McCulloch, Pitts, and Bigelow), and Wiesner. Ashby, probably acutely self-aware of the next 
bolder step he was about to take, did not hesitate in answering each and every question --
sometimes briefly, other times lengthily, but always firmly.  
What could be deemed in contemporary academic ambiences as a hostile milieu for 
debating was seemingly just part of a typical heat of the discussion in the 1950s.
392
 In fact, not all 
remarks showed puzzlement, on the spirit of “what is it that he is talking about”. Some were 
enthusiastic about the wild cues that were seemingly being suggested. Gerhardt von Bonin, 
393
 for 
example, in referring to Klüver’s above participation and Ashby’s response to it, added 
sympathetically… 
Von Bonin: To pick up the remark Klüver made a moment ago, the animal appears to break down  
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       the environment into certain patterns which seem to develop in his mind. Something     
       goes on in its brain and then that structures the environment. It perceives the  
       environment in a certain pattern, set by its brain, so that it can deal with it. 
Ashby: I assume that the brain works entirely for its own end. 
Von Bonin: Oh surely. 
 
4. The backlash: Unforeseen consequences of a behavior-based ontology. 
 
Some of the members attending the talk were taken aback by the claims of the homeostat 
behaving isomorphically to an animal in reciprocal interaction with its environment. It was not 
only that unlike Grey Walter’s tortoises and Claude Shannon’s mice this machine did not 
formally resemble any actual animal. What worried them was what was being suggested as 
entailing from the machine’s random looking for a stable equilibrium after its uniselectors were 
tampered with. Even if they would be willing to accept that some primitive organisms do indeed 
resort to random trials in order to cope with a changing milieu, it seemed that the whole image of 
four interlocking uniselectors mounted on a table behaving animal-like was more than what they 
were willing to accept. Bigelow, somewhat in confusion expressed that the homeostat “may be a 
beautiful replica of something, but heaven only knows what”.394 Others sided with him… 
Hutchinson:
395
 Do you interpret the ordinary sort of random searching movement of one of the  
lower animals as something that is comparable to the uniselector? 
Ashby: Yes. 
Hutchinson: It doesn’t seem to me that the setup gives any particular clear suggestion that this is  
comparable to the way invertebrates do behave. 
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Bigelow: Agreed.
396
  
It would seem that some metaphysical attachment to the nature of living beings was still not 
being let go. And this situation was happening among those very individuals whose aim, as 
proper cyberneticians that they were, was to dismantle any metaphysical remnants behind a 
vitalist impetus that might differentiate in kind --and not degree-- a living organism from a 
machine. Ashby seemed to have noticed it. Without a sign of dubitation, he was firm in eroding 
piece by piece the seemingly still entrenched epistemic attitudes being witnessed at work. 
Faithful to “cybernetically correct” belief, Ashby did not lose focus and rehashed on that aspect 
of both machine and organism that is core of cybernetics parlance: behavior. For all ends and 
purposes, an organism behaves in the way the homeostat behaves --literally.  
 Beginning from Bigelow’s (and company) 1943 foundational article,397 that pillar of 
cybernetics was never shaken. Ashby merely rehearsed what they already knew and indeed, 
defended
398
 –albeit probably unaware of the ultimate consequences that would naturally 
emerge.
399
 Randomness in animal adaptation was probably the characteristic that helped the most 
in establishing the ontological link between machine and living being. That was the way in 
which a living organ, as adaptationally sophisticated as a brain, could be said to behave in a 
machine-like manner. Machines can certainly adapt: the name for that in the physical world is 
equilibrium, as Ashby was careful to establish in his first published cybernetic article mentioned 
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above.
400
 And so, he pushed the idea of randomness as properly animal, and properly 
homeostatic, until the end… 
Hutchinson: I am not altogether convinced that that searching [an ant looking for sugar cubes  
dropped on a table] is in any way comparable to what we have seen here. 
Ashby: But don’t you agree that if you disturb a living organism with some vital threat and the  
organism takes steps to bring itself back to normal physiological conditions, that is  
perfectly typical of vital activity? 
Hutchinson: Yes, but I think when it does that, there is not the fluttering oscillation that you first  
        described. Isn’t that inherent in the system? 
Ashby: Well, some sort of random trial is necessary. Surely, random trying in difficult situations  
has been described over and over again from Paramecium upwards. 
(…) Quastler:401 I believe Dr. Ashby would not claim that random searching was the only mechanism  
  by which an organism finds a normal or favorable condition. 
Ashby: I don’t know of any other way an organism can do it.402 
A further point of contention derived from the above remarks was the issue of learning as an 
outcome of a random process. They seemed to be uncomfortable with the idea that a change of 
behavior --a resulting accommodation-- coming out of a random search could count as learning 
proper. Once again, it seemed that the very proponents of the treatment of machines and animals 
under the same physical laws could not foresee the metaphysical backlash that could follow. In 
cybernetics, let us recall, behavior is the sole and privileged communicator of any change of a 
state in a given living entity. In Bigelow’s (and company) 1943 article, one of its principal goals 
is indicated as attempting to “define the behavioristic study of natural events and to classify 
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behavior”.403 This most important notion is subsequently referred to as “any change of an entity 
with respect to its surroundings”.404 Further clarifying, it is claimed that “any modification of an 
object, detectable externally, may be denoted as behavior”,405 enriching the otherwise reductive 
understanding of behavior coming from psychology.
406
 A perfectly feasible outcome from this 
established framework is accepting as meaningful the variation from state A to state B in a given 
organism after it deals with a change of its environment. It did not take much for associating the 
semantics of a learning process –itself already understood behaviorally, independently of 
cybernetics—to the meaningful change of state of a machine. Change of behavior after coping 
with a modifying milieu is learning. And this necessary development is what makes the 
following lines somewhat striking in their naïveté, and fascinating when confronted with 
Ashby’s calm, perfectly cybernetic-abiding answers: 
Bigelow: Sir, in what way do you think of the random discovery of an equilibrium by this  
machine as comparable to a learning process? 
Ashby: I don’t think it matters. Your opinion is as good as mine. 
Bigelow: But I’m asking, if you place an animal in a maze, he does something which we call  
learning. Now, in what way does this machine do something like that? 
(…) Wiesner: I think that [the mechanical mouse of] Shannon and Marceu came close to  
having a learning machine. 
Bigelow: That is the point. This machine finds a solution, I grant you –and please call it anything  
you want; I’m not trying to criticize your language. I merely wonder why finding a  
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solution necessarily implies that it learns anything, in your opinion. 
Ashby: I think that the word learning, as we understand it in the objective sense, without  
considering anything obtained introspectively, is based on observations of this sort of  
thing happening.
407
  
Ashby seemed perfectly aware that the pillars upon which he was relying were as strong as they 
could get, in terms of being flawlessly consistent with essential cybernetic tenets. It is as if he is 
clarifying to the cyberneticists themselves what their own beliefs entail –besides letting them 
know at the same time how perfectly comfortable he is with those underlying frameworks. 
Further, Ashby seems willing to champion these tenets and apply them all the way down, 
regardless of the consequences. He does not look in the least afraid of forever losing a 
metaphysical anchor that might had been in some non-scientific way beneficial for the sub-group 
of machinery of which he is himself part. Faced with the awkward complaints being generated 
by the cybernetic group itself, Ashby cut clean through their malaise, and confronted them with 
the expectable effect of their own machine-based ontology and behavior-based epistemology… 
Young:
408
 [The homeostat] doesn’t show change of state. The essence of learning is that the  
system that has been through a procedure has different properties than those it had before. 
Ashby: Would you agree that after an animal has learned something, it behaves differently? 
Bigelow: Yes. 
Ashby: Well, the homeostat behaves differently.
409
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To this, Pitts interjected: 
 The homeostat is a bit better than that (ibid.) 
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This seemed to do it. The change in attitude was almost immediate. Despite the painful remarks 
thrown around that marred almost the entirety of Ashby’s talk, agreement became suddenly 
consensual, to the point that the audience, almost leaving Ashby aside, took the role of 
vindicating his proposal. As heated as debates can come, the audience took up the torch and 
continued engaged in conversation among themselves, not even allowing the speaker to formally 
end the presentation.
410
 All things considered, and checked out with the core of cybernetic 
mandates, they had to agree with the claimed facts that 1) the behavior of the homeostat is 
identical to that of an organism coping with its changing environment; and 2) the homeostat, for 
all intents and purposes (literally), learns. And so they became an audience geared into 
acceptance mode: 
Bigelow: …Do you consider this a learning device as it stands? 
Pitts: Yes, I should say so. 
McCulloch: Would you consider Shannon’s mechanical mouse a learning device? 
Bigelow: Surely. 
McCulloch: Then this is a learning device in just that sense Shannon’s mouse learns how to run  
one maze.
411
  
(…) Bateson: I should like to put a question to our ecologist: if an environment consists largely of  
organisms, or importantly of organisms, is not the learning characteristic of Ashby’s  
machine approximately the same sort of learning as that which is shown by the ecological 
system? 
 Hutchinson: Yes, definitely it is.
412
 
These were the last interventions. Ashby wrote in his diary that the presentation was “highly 
successful”413 –although acknowledging the distress of some.414 From a historical perspective, it 
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could be said that this conflicted exchange of ideas set up the environment for what could 
effectively count as the last meeting for the cybernetics group. The next meeting lacked so many 
key members and was so scattered and out of focus, that the editor of the proceedings refused to 
publish them --eventually, they were indeed published but only the papers, without the 
discussions.
415
 One cannot help but wonder if that meeting was a (probably more than) symbolic 
cout d’état for a body of ideas that was already receiving a battery of attacks from different 
flanks.
416
 What happened that day might have been just the tip of the iceberg regarding the 
deeply problematic ontology on which cybernetics was resting. That ontology was already 
leaking concerns at various levels of the cybernetic enterprise --however they were not identified 
as a whole, and anyhow there never was a unified effort to patch them.  
 Four years later Ashby would give a more detailed account of the mechanism behind the 
homeostat, paying special attention to the problematic feature of its random search. As footnoted 
above, this feature used a published table of random numbers by Fisher and Yates. The fact that 
the picked numbers from the table were fixed in the machine, occasioned some trouble in the 
audience, in regards to the veracity of the claim of the machine searching randomly. However, 
this fixation was also an essential part of the necessarily deterministic nature of the machine, as 
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Ashby indicated at some point.
417
 But it was clear that the idea of order achieved out of chaos 
was not sitting well among the cyberneticians present at that gathering.
418
 
 
5. Un-cybernetic DAMS: From behavior into structure. 
 
Another issue that Ashby would go on to treat was related to the criticism of the homeostat being 
effectively too primitive to mimic higher vertebrates’ behavior –specifically, mammals. One that 
elicited his agreement was the claim that the homeostat probably was indeed capable of 
autonomously reaching self-equilibrium due to the fact that, after all, 4 uniselectors combinable 
in 25 different ways among themselves (and accounting for a bit more than 390,000 possible 
combinations), would still fall very short of representing the extreme adaptive richness of higher 
animals. Ashby acknowledged the input and granted this point. In fact, he already was 
considering constructing something capable of more complexity than the homeostat –with more 
possible internal combinations than the homeostat’s less than 400,000-- although operating under 
the same principles. Ashby was aware that he needed to construct a machine with more 
complexity: one that, if possible, should show a behavior that would genuinely surprise its 
designer –show something that was not put there by the inventor. Indeed, almost two years 
before of the presentation, he already began thinking about constructing a more complicated 
machine.  
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I have to note a critical day. Ever since the homeostat was built (May ’47) I have been 
 thinking about the next machine, trying to find a suitable form for a more advanced 
 machine.
419
 
Its longer name was going to be Dispersive And Multi-stable System (DAMS). The report on the 
construction of such a machine appeared at the footnote of the first edition of his Design for a 
Brain –and disappeared in later editions.420  Not much is known about this machine, other than 
the entries recorded in his diary.
421
 The idea behind giving DAMS a more complex nature relied 
on the possibility of letting the machine isolate some of its parts when they would have reached 
adaptation, and letting the rest of the machine keep hunting for other “friendly” variables. What 
would be gained from this would be that it would no longer be necessary to re-wire the whole 
machine to prepare it for the next task. As seen in the previous section, given the benefit of the 
doubt, Ashby was granted that the homeostat portrayed the same level of learning behavior of the 
cybernetic mice, which could sort out a maze once, before getting ready to get re-wired for 
another task.
422
 The neon tubes installed in DAMS allowed electric current to go through just 
when they would reach a certain threshold, remaining inert and unconductive when the threshold 
was not met. This was an improvement over the homeostat’s wires --which were always 
conductive-- and affected the whole system. Always. Truer learning could allegedly be achieved 
when already reached adaptations were kept and other portions of the organism kept coping. 
However, finding the right form of design for this more sophisticated device was not an easy feat 
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for Ashby –in fact, it eventually proved to be more than what he could handle.423 At a certain 
point, believing that being stuck in the “design stage” of the construction ironically betrays the 
whole purpose of a self-accommodating ultra-stable system, he foregoes the design aspect, puts 
the pieces together, and waits to see what happens… 
Today it occurred to me that this is not the proper way. According to my own ‘theory’ all  this 
 design is irrelevant; what I should do is to throw the design to the winds, join all at random, and 
 trust.  I should not attempt to follow the consequences of the design right thorough; for if I do that 
 I’m forcing the design down to an elementary level. If I am to break right through into a new 
 world of performance I must find what my theory really  needs, attend only to that, and then let 
 the rest of the machine be assembled literally at random.
424
 
However, once that approach was put into the metal, almost right from the start, the lack of 
recognition of an identifiable pattern was gradually evident, acknowledging that “DAMS has 
reached the size of ten valves, and it has proved exceedingly difficult to understand”.425 Ashby 
patiently observed DAMS’ behavior for two years, waiting to see if it would organize itself in an 
intelligible way. No pattern was to be found, the machine behaving just plainly chaotic, without 
achieving any stability by itself --ever.  
 It is almost painful as it is fascinating to trace how Ashby patiently tries to tinker with 
parts of the machine here and there, pulling it apart and constructing it again, so that some kind 
of pattern of stability would obtain –and the subsequent ruminations that he has about the 
workings of the biological world after each tinkering.
426
 It would show that his personal views on 
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fundamental issues, such as Darwinian evolution, were being affected by it. For instance, within 
the framework of “throw design to the winds”427 in frustration with the crippling complexity of 
designing a working DAMS, he finds solace in articles that would back up such a sort of 
approach: 
 A good example of a system of knowledge, i.e. of action, that has been worked out almost 
 entirely  by Darwinian methods of trial, error, small improvements, and always following 
 whatever seemed better is the technique of histological staining, especially as shown in the 
 variety of methods worked out by Cajal and the Spanish school. Many of their methods were 
 developed to a high degree of effectiveness, and without the slightest rational foundation.
428
  
It became increasingly obvious for Ashby that certain “fixes”, “ancillary regulations” had to be 
applied for the ultra-interconnected machine to show some kind of stable state. However, it 
would seem that one would be reverting back to the issue of “design”. There is no way to 
account for the needed “gate” that would control the passage of information (the flow of electric 
current), whenever it is required, in a sufficiently complex process of adaptation. But this gate 
allegedly has to exist, since complex (biological) organisms do adapt. The question regarding the 
entity that controls this gate seems to remain.
429
 After all, the earlier homeostat’s random search 
was also an issue for some of the cyberneticians, for whom the idea of order as naturally 
emerging out of chaos due to inherent properties of matter was an uneasy concept – and 
unfaithful to Wiener’s understanding of entropy.430 Ashby would later develop an answer that 
could be seen in stark contrast with the quote above… 
 The provision of the ancillary regulations thus demands that a process of selection, of appropriate  
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 intensity, exist. Where shall we find this process? The biologist, of course, can answer the 
 question at once; for the work of the last century, and especially of the last thirty years, has 
 demonstrated beyond dispute that natural, Darwinian, selection is responsible for all the 
 selections shown so abundantly in the biological world. Ultimately, therefore, these ancillary 
 regulations are to be attributed to natural selection… There is no other source.431 
This biological “Maxwell’s Demon” in charge of a necessary-for-survival gateway operation is, 
according to Ashby, “Darwinian evolution”. As it is now known, Darwinism, beyond “natural 
selection”, was eventually improved via Mendelian genetics. In fact this improvement accounts 
for much of Darwinism’s explanatory mechanisms that would account for the mutation of a 
surviving organism in the first place. In face of this, Ashby’s radical tabula rasa epistemology 
(anti-nativist to the point of ascribing life characteristics to matter itself, and thus pushing the 
burden of causality to environmental influence alone) seems to collapse here. Evolution would 
have provided then these life-saving homunculi via genetic inheritance. There is something 
already furnished with nature that allows for living things to survive. If Ashby was not caught in 
a metaphysical web in conceding that the gateways would be the turf of Mother Nature, he did at 
least accept that whatever takes place ad intra the organism does complement behavioral cues. 
The “structure” of the living system, in particular its nervous system --and most interestingly, its 
brain—ultimately matters.  
Models based upon measurable behavior are not enough past a certain point of 
complexity. After that point is reached, it would seem that chaos ensues. Ashby might have 
robbed cybernetics of the impetus that the enterprise had as one of its most important strengths 
for growth and development. But if he did, he did it in accordance to cybernetic dogma and by 
concluding a downward spiral that was already there in potential. One of these seeds pointed to a 
                                                 
431
 Ashby 1960, pp. 229-230  
174 
 
more troubling aspect of cybernetics –from the point of view of their scientific stand regarding 
studied phenomena and the role of models in science. The early alert regarding this phenomenon 
was given, in fact, by von Neumann. The next chapter will show how those concerns were 
indeed pointing to features of cybernetics’ own undeclared metaphysics that would eventually 
prove to be harmful for the consistency of the project. A treatment of that aspect of the 
cybernetic development towards its own collapse is the content of the next chapter. 
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VI. Emphasizing the limits of a machine epistemology. 
      …one could draw within plausible time limitations a  
      fictitious ‘nervous network’ that can carry out all these  
      functions... It is possible that it will prove to be too large 
      to fit into the physical universe.
432 
 
1. John von Neumann’s appropriation of McCulloch and Pitts’ networks. 
 
One of the fiercest proponents of cybernetics even before the time it became widely known, John 
von Neumann was a prominent Hungarian Jewish mathematician educated in an elite Protestant 
school. He fled the growing Nazi terror and landed in the US, progressively becoming, probably 
partly due to émigré effusiveness, profoundly involved in secret “nation-identity-building” 
military projects, such as the development of the atomic bomb.
433
 The role of von Neumann in 
the cybernetic enterprise has been, up until now, regarded as somewhat secondary. Yet, he 
actively engaged in most of the Macy conferences, having kept close contact with its main 
protagonists: Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. In fact, the constructed 
computer machine whose internal design became known as the “Von Neumann architecture” was 
directly inspired by cybernetic discussion.
434
 Probably more importantly, some of his insights 
surmounted deep philosophical issues within cybernetics that might have not been fully grasped 
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at the time by its own members, but that nevertheless might have contributed to cybernetics’ own 
implosion. 
Originally interested in quantum mechanics and in the incipient conceptualization of 
information in physics, von Neumann maintained a close friendship with Norbert Wiener from 
the mid-1930s on. As previously mentioned, both Wiener’s insights into information and 
entropy, and the philosophical and scientific consequences coming out of them, were very close 
to his inner interests. Indeed he probably felt having been beaten by Wiener into showing first 
the import and relevance of these connections.
435
 The beginning of the 1940’s, however, marked 
a distinct moment in his intellectual journey. Having read Turing’s paper “On Computable 
Numbers”,436 and while being deeply impressed by it, he still could not get around the idea of 
applying such an outlook to the human mind. For him
437
 the apparent ontological rivalry between 
the rich, creative and messy human mind, versus the dry, exact and rigorous logic that came out 
of it, entailed an enduring interrogation mark. Indeed, he referred to Turing’s brilliant paper, in 
his own words, as being very “anti-neurological”438--until he came across McCulloch and Pitts’ 
article.
439
 This paper, itself heavily influenced by Turing’s insights, struck a chord in von 
Neumann for two important reasons. One of them, of a more practical nature: he needed a 
machine to perform massive number crunches in order to advance the secret development of a 
nuclear weapon. McCulloch and Pitts’ paper, which in his own words was needlessly convoluted 
due to the use of Carnap’s logical nomenclature, was nevertheless the basis for his EDVAC 
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project –what became the world’s first stored-program computer, whose architecture still in use 
in most computers was referred above.
440
  
Von Neumann’ secret and active engagement in atomic weaponization seemingly made 
of him a cyberneticist with his own non-disclosed agenda. Although several cyberneticists were 
involved in military projects (cybernetics itself having come out of an effort for facilitating 
complex military tasks), von Neumann went the extra mile in using cybernetic resources for his 
own military endeavors. As previously mentioned, he made Wiener buy into believing his 
willingness for coming to MIT to work with him, provided there would be adequate funding for 
constructing a remarkably expensive computing machine. Once the offer by MIT became 
concrete (thanks to Wiener’s intense lobbying), Princeton University, von Neumann’s home 
institution, took serious notice, and in turn offered funding to build the machine there. Thus von 
Neumann never went to MIT –as he probably never intended to do in the first place, merely 
using MIT’s offer as negotiation leverage with Princeton. Furthermore, he even convinced 
Wiener to send his own close collaborator, Julian Bigelow, to work with him --to which Wiener 
                                                 
440
 Chapter IV, section 3. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the popular ascription of “father of the 
computer” to von Neumann is lately disputed mainly by British scholars who resent that Turing is not widely 
acknowledged as responsible for todays’ computers. The traditional claim is that the American side, with all its 
resources, managed to “once again” kidnap an original British idea, exploit it and reap its benefits. A report by 
Stanley Frankel, a colleague of von Neumann at Los Alamos, is brought up, seemingly remarking von Neumann’s 
reliance on Turing’s 1937 “On Computable Numbers”. Indeed, US mathematicians and engineers allegedly were 
“brute forcing” by means of complicated and expensive hardware the instantiation of von Neumann’s fairly vague 
ideas laced with biological terminology (more on this below). Also, the engineer in charge of translating von 
Neumann’s manuscript into a physical machine, Harry Huskey, refers to it as being “of little help to those of us 
working on the project.” It is alleged that Turing’s approach, in contrast, mindful of the scarcity of material 
resources, would come up with clever solutions requiring the least possible hardware. On the American side, a 
report by Julian Bigelow is brought up, where he advances that the merit truly relies on von Neumann’s acumen to 
flesh out Turing’s philosophical insights into the metal. In fact, Turing’s mentor, Max Newman, spoke of von 
Neumann as being an “applied mathematician at heart” –despite the latter’s brilliance in articulating theoretical 
issues (e.g., in quantum physics, at the beginning of his career). Since both British and American governments keep 
de-classifying WWII documents, the issue is far from closed –in fact, it is gaining momentum among technology 
historians, particularly from the British side. See Hodges 1983, ch. 5; Copeland 2004, pp. 21-27; Huskey 2005, p. 
283; Copeland 2012, ch. 8; Copeland & Proudfoot 2005,  pp. 112-117. 
178 
 
candidly agreed. And so Bigelow became chief engineer for the building of EDVAC.
441
 All these 
moves were performed while portraying the building of the computer as a genuinely cybernetic 
aim –which in part, it was, but only in part, as we will see. For the time being, the secret task of 
collaborating towards a nuclear weapon was conveniently left unspoken. 
In the famous First Draft
442
 for building the EDVAC, it was mentioned that more than 
one engineer found it odd that von Neumann used biological terms for referring to the parts of 
the future machine --such as neurons, synapses and organs.
443
 This oddity points towards the less 
practical and more philosophical second reason behind von Neumann’s deep appreciation of the 
McCulloch and Pitts’ paper. He was impressed by the apparently successful effort of linking the 
two allegedly naturally incompatible entities --mind and logic, the latter having strangely come 
out of the former. The 1943 paper gave a mechanistic account of how a nervous system in 
general, and the mind in particular, might work.
444
 This was no small feat. Von Neumann 
enthusiastically jumped into the cybernetic wagon and only three years later he undertook the 
honor of giving the first ever formal talk on cybernetics at the Macy conferences in March 
1946.
445
 At this opening event he recounted and explained how his computer machine became a 
reality, clearly acknowledging his theoretical debt to McCulloch and Pitts’ work (This was 
followed, within the same presentation, by Lorente de Nó’s suggested application of the model to 
brain physiology).   
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However, after von Neumann’s 1943 ‘epiphany’ while working on the construction of the 
computing machine (with an undisclosed eye firmly set on developing the bomb), he remained 
genuinely curious regarding the actual correlation between the McCulloch & Pitts’ model on the 
one hand and real biological substrata on the other. Von Neumann, as much as McCulloch and 
Pitts,
 446
 defended the heuristic value of axiomatization and the resulting use of idealized, black-
boxed neurons, only reactive in a yes/no fashion. Armed with this methodology, von Neumann 
engaged in extensive connections with the biological and medical community, exchanging ideas 
and discussing views.
447
 It did not take long for him to begin showing warning signs regarding 
the feasibility of the newly devised artificial networks in what pertains to brain matters –at the 
same time that the computer based upon the same model was being duplicated by dozens (since 
he did not copyright the now legendary First Draft).
448
 
  Tracing von Neumann’s gradual coming to terms with the extreme complexity of the 
structure they were bracketing for the sake of theoretical operability --the nervous system and the 
brain-- is historically fascinating. Below is a critical account of what progressively grew into a 
rift within the cybernetic movement –a rift which opened up hidden assumptions whose 
implications are arguably letting themselves be felt up to our times. 
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2. The letter to Wiener: Post hoc, ergo propter hoc?  
 
As already mentioned, two years before the First Draft for building EDVAC,
449
 and enthused by 
the possibilities opened up by McCulloch and Pitts’ networks, von Neumann actively engaged in 
dialogue with the biomedical community. By November 1946, towards the end of the very same 
year when he inaugurated the 1
st
 Macy Conference with the first talk given in March, von 
Neumann wrote a revealing letter to Norbert Wiener. Its contents are of considerable importance 
if one takes it as a probe into what was going on in his mind regarding the feasibility of the 
cybernetic enterprise for modeling the brain. The letter starts with a dramatic tone, putting 
forward the issues that disturbed him. He then elaborates on them, in order to end up suggesting 
a change of focus for their future cybernetic endeavors—a change that he eventually undertook 
as a prime task of his intellectual journey, indeed until the end of his days, one decade later.  
 Von Neumann started off by acknowledging that some issues were deeply troubling him 
for the most part of the year. One could safely assume that he already was entertaining these 
unsettling thoughts while giving his presentation at the 1
st
 Macy Conference, nine months earlier. 
He mentioned his reticence for letting him (Wiener) know of these troubles up until then, due to 
the lack of a positive alternative –which he introduced towards the end of the letter. The general 
problem is stated as cybernetics having chosen, in his view, probably the absolutely most 
difficult object of study: the brain. Cybernetics relied on theories which can certainly give some 
kind of explanation, in a substantially mechanical manner. That much it is granted. But the 
situation in which the whole enterprise lies now, he continues, is not better than the moment in 
which it started. In fact, he believed that “after the great positive contribution of Turing-cum-
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Pitts-and-McCulloch is assimilated, the situation is rather worse than better than before”.450 The 
cause for this rests both in the extreme complexity of the subject at hand, and the theoretical 
models that have been used. 
 More specifically, von Neumann somewhat resented that McCulloch and Pitts’ network  
provided results in such a self-contained, exact but general manner, that it left no way to confront 
it with the object that they were supposed to understand in the first place. If the model ends up 
enjoying a space beyond the realm of testability (and thus beyond scientific verifiability) it might 
still be heuristically good for something, but likely not for a nervous system. This other 
“something” was of course already having a physical instantiation at the hands of von Neumann. 
Indeed, the weakness in the model’s refutability aspect did not remove from it its proved 
productive capacity, as the construction of his computing machine was amply evincing. 
However, once we step back and begin to really pay attention to the structure of the object that 
we wanted to originally parcel and explain, the complexity is such that one is shocked into a sort 
of epistemic paralysis: 
 After these devastatingly general and positive results one is therefore thrown back on microwork 
 and cytology –where one might have remained in the first place… Yet, when we are in that field, 
 the complexity of the subject is overawing.
451
 
Von Neumann gave picturesque analogies of the situation in which he felt they were while trying 
to study the brain with the best of the cybernetic constructs. For him to “understand the brain 
with neurological methods seems to me about as hopeful as to want to understand the ENIAC… 
with no methods of intervention more delicate than playing with a fire hose… or dropping 
                                                 
450
 Von Neumann 2005, p. 278 
451
 Von Neumann 2005, p. 278 
182 
 
cobblestones into the circuit”.452 He then proceeded to expand on the nature of the problem they 
were facing, which revealed a second discouraging aspect. If one is to scale down the choice of 
degree of complexity of the nervous system to study, say from a human one to that of an ant, 
much of what can be grasped by the McCulloch and Pitts’ model goes down the drain, since such 
simplicity in turn comes packaged with several blind spots: “As the digital (neural) part 
simplifies, the analogy (humoral) part gets less accessible, the typical malfunctions less known, 
the subject less articulate, and our possibilities of communicating with it poorer and poorer in 
content”.453 However, thereafter he tried to turn the negativity around and finally produced, all 
things considered, a radical, short and revealing suggestion, signaling the venue that cybernetics 
had to pursue in order to render more feasible results: “I feel that we have to turn to simpler 
systems”.454 
 Von Neumann tried to expose the flawed nature of the argument behind the cybernetic 
need for studying only multi-cellular entities. The idea was that since a neuron is just one cellular 
entity, only a large number of them networked together could render something meaningful. He 
pointed out to the complexity of that one cell, which shows reproductive features, and in some 
cases, it appears to be a perfectly self-contained living organism. Having in consideration these 
characteristics, which point out to a rich and likely relevant complexity in the unicellular 
organism, von Neumann cast a dark shadow upon McCulloch and Pitts’ networks: “This in itself 
should make one suspicious in selecting the cells as the basic ‘undefined’ concepts of an 
axiomatism”.455 Without specifically mentioning either scientists or their model, the reference to 
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McCulloch and Pitts’ networks is clear: The “black-boxology”456 that brackets the somatic aspect 
of the neuron for heuristic purposes might be paying a high price. So high indeed, that both the 
studied baby and the epistemic bathwater might be, in fact, being disposed of. 
 Furthermore, the whole issue was probably being approached backwards --or to be more 
precise, upside down. Von Neumann questioned the wisdom of targeting the object of study 
(particularly if it is regarded as a highly complex machine) from the perspective of understanding 
its finished “whole” --itself prohibitively sophisticated and already displaying a behavior whose 
complexity explodes off the charts. Common sense would indicate that the way to approximate 
such a complex object would be via its simpler, relatively isolated parts, and then reconstruct the 
entire machinery from the ground up. In his words, the venue currently pursued by cybernetics 
did not amount to a reasonable methodology of study –once again, due to the uniquely complex 
nature of its object of study… 
 Consider, in any field of technology, the state of affairs which is characterized by the 
 development of highly complex “Standard components”, which are at the same time 
 individualized, well suited to mass production, and (in spite of their “standard” character) well 
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 This black box approach was present in cybernetic gatherings right from the start, and it played a role beyond a 
typical behavioristic metaphor. In fact, understanding an unknown “enemy machine” would use this heuristic –all 
the more relevant due to the ongoing war. The first cybernetic gathering at Princeton, as recalled by Warren 
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 Lorente de Nó and I, as physiologists, were asked to consider the second of two hypothetical black boxes 
 that the allies had liberated from the Germans. No one knew what they were supposed to do or how they 
 were to do it. The rust box had been opened and exploded. Both had inputs and outputs, so labelled. The 
 question was phrased unforgettably: "This is the enemy's machine. You always have to find out what it 
 does and how it does it. What shall we do?" By the time the question had become that well defined, Norbert 
 was snoring at the top of his lungs and his cigar ashes were falling on his stomach. But when Lorente and I 
 had tried to answer, Norbert rose abruptly and said: "You could of course give it all possible sinusoidal 
 frequencies one after the other and record the output, but it would be better to feed it noise --say white 
 noise-- you might call this a Rorschach." Before I could challenge his notion of a Rorschach, many 
 engineers' voices broke in. Then, for the first time, I caught the sparkle in Johnny von Neumann's eye. I had 
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 stimulus for man or machine must be shaped to match nearly some of his feature filters, and that white  
 noise would not do. There followed a wonderful duel: Norbert with an enormous club chasing Johnny, and 
 Johnny with a rapier waltzing around Norbert --at the end of which they went to lunch arm in arm. 
 (McCulloch 1974, p.11). 
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 suited to purposive differentiation. This is clearly a late, highly developed style, and not the ideal 
 one for a first approach of an outsider to the subject, for an effort towards understanding. For the 
 purpose of understanding the subject, it is much better to study an earlier phase of its evolution 
 preceding the development of this high standardization-with-differentiation. I.e. to study a phase 
 in which these “Elegant” components do not yet appear. This is especially true, if there is reason 
 to suspect already in the archaic  stage mechanisms (or organisms) which exhibit the most specific 
 traits of the simplest representatives of the above mentioned “late” stage.457 
Furthermore, von Neumann suggested that they should still go one big notch down in what 
concerns the optimal selection of an object of study. In going after elementary parts to treat, once 
they are better understood, cybernetics could have a better grasp of how the whole thing works. 
This methodology, von Neumann hoped, would in turn become a firmer building block for the 
improved cybernetic endeavor.  
 Von Neumann specified that they could draw the line in terms of how far “down” they 
should go once they reached the realm inhabited by virus. He reminded Wiener that such entities 
do show features that one could reasonably ascribe to full-blown living organisms, given that 
they “are self-reproductive and they are able to orient themselves in an unorganized milieu, to 
move towards food, to appropriate it and use it”.458 Von Neumann confidently went on to 
express that “a ‘true’ understanding of these organisms may be the first relevant step forward and 
possibly the greatest step that may be at all required”.459 The word “true” was purposely put by 
him inside quotations marks, as he went on to specify what he understood by it in this context. 
His clarification of what is “true” no longer rings as being in communion with the “behavior-
with-a-purpose” cybernetic article of faith --namely, that something is a machine because it 
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behaves machine-like. This last move in effect entailed an important epistemological 
displacement in cybernetic dogma. Now the cybernetic take on “true” (understanding) would 
approximate that which was strategically bracketed off precisely for the sake of theory extension 
in the first place: 
 I would, however, put on “true” understanding the most stringent interpretation possible:  That is, 
 understanding the organism in the exacting sense in which one may want to understand a detailed 
 drawing of a machine, i.e. finding out where every individual nut and bolt is located, etc. It seems 
 to me that this is not at all hopeless… I suppose (without having done it) that if one counted 
 rigorously the number of “elements” in a locomotive, one might also wind up in the high ten 
 thousands. Consequently this is a degree of complexity which is not necessarily beyond human 
 endurance.
460
 
The suggestion of turning their focus into the structure of the object, into the stuff that makes up 
the actual body of the organism probably had a bitter taste for Wiener. Avoiding opening and 
tinkering with the innards of the black box was to a considerable degree what helped launching 
the cybernetic totalizing worldview in the first place. Recall Wiener’s struggle with a 
reductionist notion of “behavior” and subsequent musings at expanding it.461 What von Neumann 
is suggesting goes frontally against what Wiener had so effusively proposed in his 1943 founding 
paper. Towards the end, that article leaves no doubt regarding the more-than-heuristic role that a 
behavioristic approach has in the study of animal and machine as one sole entity –different in 
degree of complexity, not in kind.
462
 Wiener maintained that   
 a uniform behavioristic analysis is applicable to both machines and living organisms, regardless  
 of the complexity of the behavior. It has sometimes been stated that the designers of machines  
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 merely attempt to duplicate the performances of living organisms. This statement is uncritical. 
 That the gross behavior of some machines should be similar to the reactions of organisms is not 
 surprising. Animal behavior includes many varieties of all the possible modes of behavior and the 
 machines devised so far have far from exhausted all those possible modes. There is, therefore a 
 considerable overlap of the two realms of behavior… A further comparison of living organisms 
 and machines leads to the following inferences. The methods of study for the two groups are at 
 present similar. Whether they should always be the same may depend on whether or not there 
 are one or more qualitatively distinct, unique characteristics present in one group and absent  
 in the other. Such qualitative differences have not appeared so far.
463
 
Furthermore, Ross Ashby, the theorizer of cybernetic fundamentals --always in intellectual sync 
with Wiener-- defined cybernetics as the science that “treats… not things but ways of behaving. 
It does not ask ‘what is this thing?’ but ‘what does it do?’ …It is thus essentially functional and 
behaviouristic”.464 And we saw how steadfastly holding to this tenet cost him a high price.465 
All in all, we can see that an enriched behavioristic approach laced cybernetics from the 
beginning to the end, from the American and the British side. 
 Let us recall that von Neumann’s critical observations are coming the very same year he 
was giving the inaugural Macy conference presentation. Expectably, the letter was not sent 
without some prudent hesitation. He consulted with Walter Pitts before sending it off.
466
 What 
exactly happened after it was delivered remains largely unknown. We do know that a meeting 
between Wiener and von Neumann likely took place after the letter, in December –but we do not 
know what transpired there. We also know that Norbert Wiener did not mention anything about 
this letter to anyone --not in writing nor orally-- ever. However, as has been mentioned, right 
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after those two months people began to notice a discernible distance between these two hitherto 
close old friends. Was one fact caused by the other, given that one occurred after the other? 
Beyond merely correlating events, one can only speculate a causal connection between both. 
And even if the correlation seems to be fairly strong, we now know that there was more going 
on.
467
 Still, there is a curious epilogue regarding this letter, which might partially explain von 
Neumann’s posterior ardent impetus for further developing his critique against the (at the time) 
current methodological philosophy of cybernetics.  
 As mentioned earlier, from 1943 on, due to McCulloch and Pitts’ bold hypothesis 
regarding the brain, von Neumann developed an active interest in biology and physiology, taking 
advantage of fruitful contacts in the biomedical community. In fact McCulloch regarded von 
Neumann’s labors as the reason why the biological community took interest in his paper. Less 
than a year after the controversial letter, at the 3
rd
 Macy Conference,
468
 von Neumann 
successfully lobbied to bring the German biophysicist Max Delbrück (1906–1981) as invited 
guest. Von Neumann had in fact mentioned Delbrück’s work in embryology and bacteriophage 
virus in the letter to Wiener. All the intentions were set in place for christening Delbrück as a 
permanent member of the cybernetic group. For von Neumann, Delbrück would be the perfect 
glove for the cybernetic hand: a physicist turned biologist, trying to scientifically (and thus, for 
them, mechanically) understand life, paying due attention to the most elementary building blocks 
of a living system. Once the invitation was officially arranged, the events that followed it took a 
somewhat bizarre turn.  
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 Max Delbrück, now formally invited, could not attend the 4
th
 Macy Conference, but he 
did make it to 5
th
 one.
469
 It can ostensibly be assumed that von Neumann was quite excited about 
this. After all, the scientist who symbolized the field of research he thought to be the next 
platform for cybernetics to take off was showing up at the cybernetic hub. As it turns out, right 
after the conference ended, Delbrück made it clear that he was never going to come back again.  
 Delbrück was indeed so disappointed, that he was quoted some years later characterizing 
the Macy conference as “vacuous in the extreme and positively inane”.470 In all fairness, it might 
have been a case of spectacular bad timing. The first day that Delbrück attended practically the 
whole day was devoted to issues of language. He might have felt of it, literally, as a waste of his 
time. Delbrück was a genuine physicist turned biologist, accustomed to the rigors of hardcore 
physics --despite the cybernetic mandate, there never was even one physicist in the group.  He 
might have been turned off by the purposely “flexible” language, which always tried to 
accommodate the vastly, even disparately different disciplines being loosely matched at the 
gatherings --from mathematics and engineering to psychology and anthropology.
471
 Or it could 
be that both reasons perfectly conflated into the disastrous (for von Neumann) outcome. Be that 
as it may, it is impossible to know with exactitude what kind of effect this reaction had on him. 
But one can safely assume that he did not take it lightly. The subsequent increasing sharpness of 
von Neumann’s criticism against cybernetics might further fuel that assumption.472 
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3. The Hixon Symposium: Strengths and weaknesses of the McCulloch and Pitts’ networks.  
 
Only three months later, von Neumann was again standing behind a podium giving a talk on 
cybernetics, this time at the famed Hixon Symposium.
473
 By this time, two years after the 
infamous letter, he had his plan for the future development of cybernetics more in focus. Von 
Neumann took particular interest in the logic behind features that portray life in “very simple” 
organisms. A feature he was particularly interested in was reproduction. It was his understanding 
that thanks to Turing’s “On Computable Numbers” it was no longer a mystery how a more 
complex entity can be begotten from a less complex one --something which apparently goes 
against common sense, but nevertheless is allegedly a key feature of evolution. As von Neumann 
read Turing, a universal Turing machine embedded with sufficient instructions can produce (the 
behavior of) any other machine, provided that rigorous and unambiguous instructions are 
furnished. Von Neumann remarked that this is no more mysterious than the capacity we have for 
reading pretty much anything after the rules of grammar are firmly entrenched in our cognitive 
realm. 
 However, the logic required for the reproduction of artificial entities would have to be 
attentive to details pertaining to their structure and its elements. Such future logic should take 
into consideration issues of heat, material fatigue, friction, etc. It would be a logic acquainted 
with issues of thermodynamics. That much von Neumann had clear by that time. And the way he 
introduced “The general and logical theory of automata”474 was by means of pointing out the 
deficiencies of current cybernetic models. There had to be, after all, a core reason why 
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cyberneticists should turn their attention to his new proposal.
475
 Hence, the McCulloch and Pitts’ 
model received a gloves-off attack whose entire array of consequences might have not been 
thoroughly evaluated until these days.
476
 
 Warren McCulloch might had already been aware of von Neumann’s Janus-faced attitude 
regarding his (and Pitts’) model. It can be safely assumed that by this time he understood well 
that von Neumann was cheerful about his model only in so far as it opened up possibilities for 
constructing computing machines based upon it --machines that would perform certain tasks that 
until that moment where done by humans
477
 in an incomparably faster manner, and practically 
flawlessly. McCulloch likely was indeed aware that von Neumann was less than happy, in fact 
probably disturbed, by the association of such model to an actual nervous system. 
 McCulloch gave a talk at the very same conference entitled “Why the Mind is in the 
Head”.478 There he made a reference to von Neumann’s computers, somewhat jokingly pointing 
to their inherent limitations. In praising the practical efficiency of the brain’s neural networks, 
McCulloch said that if von Neumann’s machines would attempt to come any closer to the overall 
behavior of the brain, then the kind of resources demanded would exceed current practical 
feasibility… 
 Neurons are cheap and plentiful. If it cost a million dollars to beget a man, one neuron would not 
 cost a mill. They operate with comparatively little energy. The heat generated raises the blood in 
                                                 
475
 Later on von Neumann regarded his subsequent work in theory of automata as going beyond being a solution for 
an ill-oriented cybernetics. He saw his developing theory as a future cornerstone for the revision of not only 
thermodynamics, but of logic and mathematics in general. Thus the theory of automata was meant to be his most 
important legacy --correspondingly speaking of it with solemnity until the moment of his death, in 1957. Such might 
have been the reason why he chose to pursue it alone, unlike any other project he was involved with up to that point. 
See Shannon 1958, p. 123; Von Neumann & Burks 1966, p. 28; Goldstine 1993, p. 285. 
476
 Some people besides McCulloch did not like the criticism. Marvin Minsky, a doctoral student of von Neumann 
and later pioneer of AI, did not regard it well. Although the newly formed wave of AI researchers saw symbolic 
logic as superior to artificial neural networks, they were unfriendly to the idea that neural networks (and probably by 
extension, their own symbolic models) were that far removed from what actually occurs in the brain (See Dupuy 
2000, pp. 65-69). 
477
  Called computors, or number crunchers –a remarkably tedious job. See chapter III, section 3. 
478
 McCulloch 1951 
191 
 
 passage about half a degree, and the flow is half a liter per minute, only a quarter of a kilogram 
 calorie per minute for 10
10
, that is, 10 billion neurons. Von Neumann would be happy to have 
 their like for the same cost in his robots. His vacuum tubes can work a thousand times as fast as 
 neurons, so he could match a human brain with 10 million tubes; but it would take Niagara Falls 
 to supply the current and the Niagara River to carry away the heat.
479
 
These extraordinarily problematic outcomes would be happily acknowledged by von Neumann, 
with the following twist. These problems are in fact expectable, since McCulloch and Pitts’ 
artificial networks are good for constructing computing machines, not for telling us how our 
nervous system, in fact any nervous system, works. Further, von Neumann went the extra-mile in 
the discussion after his own talk at the conference, pointing to even more mind-blowing 
outcomes if one is to attempt modeling the nervous system with such networks. The problem is 
not his machines: the problem is the model. 
 Von Neumann started by pointing out the methodology that validated the formal 
networks in the first place. Faced with the extreme complexity characteristic of natural 
organisms, scientists can be justified (given their mechanistic leniencies) in understanding the 
object of study as constituted by smaller, fairly isolated parts. This view in turn can subdivide the 
problem in two sub-tasks: 1) The attempt to understand “the structure and functioning of such 
elementary units, individually;”480 and 2) “Understanding how these elements are organized into 
a whole, and how the functioning of the whole is expressed in terms of these elements”.481 
 The first task was dismissed by von Neumann as extremely (sometimes impossibly) 
demanding, being the core of nitty-gritty scientific experimentation, in which humans will 
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engage for likely a long time to come.
482
 He is concerned with the second task. A person with 
mathematical or logical inclinations can find fertile land here. How? By means of 
“axiomatizing”, putting into “black boxes” all the chemico-biological elements underlying the 
basic units of the organic system --in this case, the neuron. The job concerning what takes place 
ad intra these heuristically convenient brackets is left to the scientist underdog --that is, task 1).  
 Once this convention is put in place, the work gets greatly simplified. We assume of 
these “neurons” as being “automatisms, the inner structure of which need not be disclosed, but 
which are assumed to react to certain unambiguously defined stimuli, by certain unambiguously 
defined responses”.483 These basic units admit only of a yes/no type of reaction, allegedly being 
the biological instantiation of a logical gateway, and thus amenable of being mapped upon good 
old logical connectives (not, and, or, if…then). The result is that “any functioning in this sense 
which can be defined at all logically, strictly and unambiguously in a finite number of words can 
also be realized by such formal neural networks”.484 Von Neumann acknowledged that the 
implications of this methodological ‘move’ are as tremendous as they are admirable. In a 
sentence that resembles one of Ross Ashby’s ultra-cybernetic lines of reasoning, he evaluated 
and appreciated it… 
 McCulloch and Pitts' important result is that any functioning in this sense which can be defined 
 at all logically, strictly, and unambiguously in a finite number of words can also be realized by 
 such a formal neural network. It is well to pause at this point and to consider what the 
 implications are. It has often been claimed that the activities and  functions of the human nervous 
 system are so complicated that no ordinary mechanism could possibly perform them. It has also 
 been attempted to name specific functions which by their nature exhibit this limitation. It  has 
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 been attempted to show that such specific functions, logically, completely described, are per se 
 unable of mechanical, neural realization. The McCulloch-Pitts result puts an end to this. It proves 
 that anything that can be exhaustively and unambiguously described, anything that can be 
 completely and unambiguously put into words, is ipso facto realizable by a suitable finite neural 
 network.
485
  
There would finally be a glimpse of an answer to the age old question regarding how both exact 
disciplines and rigorous thinking can emerge from heretofore the anti-thesis of mechanical 
exactitude: the mind. This was not only the question that kept Warren McCulloch out of the 
Protestant Theology Seminary. It also made von Neumann plunge into the cybernetic project, 
later coming out with a full-blown computer. In fact, this insight was probably the one that, 
along with Wiener’s views on teleology, drove scientists of the time into the cybernetic 
movement in the first place.  
 However, that was as far as von Neumann would go in terms of praising the cash value 
and heuristic justification of the neural model. Subsequently, he picked up where he left off 
regarding such a remarkable achievement –namely, making feasible of being run by these 
networks every behavior that can be rigorously and unambiguously described. Von Neumann 
began to explore the downside of this methodological mandate. Specifically, he remarked on two 
basic questions that emerge; 1) “whether that network can be realized within a practical size, 
specifically, whether it will fit into the physical limitations of the organism in question;”486 and 
2) “whether every existing mode of behavior can really be put completely and unambiguously 
into words”.487 
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 Regarding the first one, once again von Neumann left it as the stuff for painstaking hard 
science tinkering –however, he would later make a clear reference to this issue within the 
discussion that followed suit right after his presentation.
488
 Regarding the second question, he 
tackled the issue by means of an example. What would it take to understand how we can know a 
triangle? Prima facie, applying McCulloch and Pitts’ networks we can describe clearly the 
characteristics of a triangle (3 sides, 180 degrees). However, we soon realize that we are also 
able to recognize circular triangles, deformed triangles, upside down triangular figures, and so 
on. Suddenly, we realize that the more accurate our description is, the lengthier our report 
becomes. Nevertheless, even if it gets very long, it is still feasible…  That is, until we clash into 
a second aspect of the issue, whose chances of tractability look as bleak as they look 
discouraging:  
 All of this [the set of descriptions], however, constitutes only a small fragment of the general 
 concept of identification of analogous geometrical entities. This in turn is only a microscopic 
 piece of the general concept of analogy.
489
  
Von Neumann questioned the plausibility, in terms of practicality, of totally and finally 
describing the behavior of an organ as the good route to take –even if it is feasible in principle. 
Here he re-introduced what was advanced to Wiener in his letter two years before: the very un-
cybernetic idea of opening the “black box” and describing the actual “connections of the visual 
brain”.490 In what amounts to a radical change of modeling strategy, von Neumann suggested 
swapping the model for the modeled as the most realistic avenue to pursue, given the explosively 
unhandleable nature of describing all possible behaviors: 
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 It is not at all certain that in this domain a real object might not constitute the simplest description 
 of itself, that is, any attempt to describe it by the usual literary or formal-logical method may 
 lead to something less manageable and more involved.
491
 
After a certain threshold of complexity in the studied organ, it becomes more feasible to directly 
describe the very structure of the object, rather than accounting for all the possible behaviors of 
the said organ. This renders McCulloch and Pitts’ networks good for very simple organisms, but 
utterly inadequate for something whose degree of complexity will entail that a constructed model 
would require the dynamic and cooling forces of the Niagara Falls --as McCulloch sarcastically 
suggested. Von Neumann did not spare any opportunity to clearly mention the “McCulloch-Pitts 
results” as no longer useful when we attempt to describe a more complex organ, especially the 
brain --the most complex of them all. The discussion that ensued expectably had Warren 
McCulloch as the first respondent. What he said within his response was a hard confession that 
points to an acknowledgment of the critique: 
 I taught neuro-anatomy while I was in medical school, but until the last year or two I have not 
 been in a position to ask any neuroanatomist for the precise detail of any  structure. I had no 
 physiological excuse for wanting that kind of information. Now we are beginning to need it.
492
 
After the behavioral neurophysiologist Ralph Gerard (1900-1974) asked for further explanations 
regarding the issue of rigorously describing complex behavior in a model, von Neumann took the 
occasion to relentlessly continue his critique. He accentuated the very practical problem of 
having to be able, when dealing with a complex object, to come up with a description that at least 
“can be read in a lifetime”.493 Furthermore, in connection with the two first questions 
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“dismissed” above,494 and metaphorically vastly surpassing McCulloch’s Niagara Falls’ sarcastic 
reference, von Neumann asserted that using McCulloch and Pitts’ networks to map the human 
nervous system would “turn out to be much larger than the one we actually possess”.495 Much 
larger is here used as a charitable understatement, as he then clarifies that “it is possible that it 
will prove to be too large to fit into the physical universe”.496 Naturally, von Neumann 
consequently asked “What then? Haven’t we lost the true problem in the process?”497 
 As we can see, both “first questions”, initially dismissed as the stuff pertaining to the 
typical tasks of the hard sciences, returned in full force, since the consequence of modeling an 
extremely complex structure upon the possible behavior of such structure incurs into a growth 
explosion in terms of model size. Once the threshold of becoming factually non-manipulable is 
reached, we seem to have betrayed the whole point of the endeavor, namely, attempting to 
understand the organism. This reversal might have been profoundly influential for cybernetics’ 
own fate, instantiated in implications that failed to be recognized in full. A direct outcome, 
however, is below.  
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4. The Illinois Lectures and the kinematic model: Cybernetic materialization of a theory. 
 
Von Neumann reassumed the attack during a series of five lectures he gave at the University of 
Illinois in March 1949.
498
 It is relevant to point out, however, that just as in the Hixon 
Symposium, the criticism of McCulloch and Pitts’ networks was not the point of his 
presentation. Rather, the criticism was introduced as the point of departure upon which his 
“Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata”499 would soon be developed, advancing it as “the way 
to go” precisely because of the unfeasibility of using McCulloch and Pitts’ networks for 
modeling very complex organisms. The second of the five lectures is the one where von 
Neumann addressed McCulloch and Pitts’ networks squarely, in the introductory manner just 
indicated. In this lecture, he gave some more details pointing to the inadequacy of the model in 
what pertains to the modeling the brain. Von Neumann would later on be more specific about 
what is being lost if one is to choose this neural model as the instrument for studying the nervous 
system. The line of criticism was consistent with his previous remarks on the issue.    
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we will see below (Von Foerster, Mead & Teuber 1950, p. 17). 
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 Von Neumann started off discreetly, just letting slip at this point that he is developing a 
slightly dismissive stance regarding the implication of having McCulloch and Pitts’ networks as 
a plausible counterpart for the nervous system’s natural networks. He expressed that their neural 
model “has a meaning which concerns me at this moment a little less…They wanted to discuss 
neurons”.500 The way McCulloch and Pitts proceed to go about this, von Neumann continued, is 
by means of using what is “known in mathematics as the axiomatic method, stating a few simple 
postulates and not being concerned with how nature manages to achieve such a gadget”.501 But 
he to some extent justified this strategy, pointing out the already mentioned remarkable 
achievement of showing how anything amenable to rigorous description can be instantiated by 
the model. Indeed von Neumann cautiously endorsed the heuristic simplification attained after 
the encapsulating power of such idealized neurons, given that “one gets a quick understanding of 
a part of the subject by making this idealization”.502 
 But then von Neumann, in stronger language, started to gradually convey the problems 
being brought up as side effects of such accomplishment. He asserted that the scientific duo 
“believed that the extremely amputated, simplified, idealized object which they axiomatized 
possessed the essential traits of the neuron, and that all else are incidental complications which in 
a first analysis are better forgotten”.503 Von Neumann wondered whether this move --namely, 
leaving aside the details that constitute a real neuron for the sake of the model’s operability-- will 
ever reach wide acceptance. He doubted it.  
 Still in another instance, displaying a half-sympathy for the axiomatic strategy, von 
Neumann went on to describe a neuron as having “two states: It’s excited or not. As to what 
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excitation is, one need not tell”.504 In what seems as approvingly allowing for the bracketing of 
an otherwise important detail, von Neumann faithfully described McCulloch and Pitts’ neuron, 
specifying that “its main characteristic is its operational characteristic and that has a certain 
circularity about it: its main trait is that it can excite other neurons”.505 
 The last nod of approval towards McCulloch and Pitts’ networks is given right before von 
Neumann begins to point out its shortcomings –although from a different angle than what was 
remarked at the Hixon Symposium. Graciously mentioning another time the rigorous descriptive 
parsing accomplished by the model, he followed it with still another benefit, not without 
remarking that these outcomes carry a philosophical twist: 
 May I point out what follows from this from a philosophical point of view, and what does not 
 follow. It certainly follows that anything that you can describe in words can also be done with the 
 neuron method. And it follows that the nerves need not be supernaturally clever or complicated. 
 In fact, they needn’t be quite as clever and complicated as they are in reality, because an object 
 which is a considerably amputated and emasculated neuron, which has many fewer attributes and 
 responds in a much more schematic manner than a neuron, already can do everything you can 
 think up.
506
  
Now the requirement of intellectual honesty had been fulfilled, having given the best possible 
depiction of the model “on trial”. Von Neumann went on to begin listing, in an almost accusative 
tone, the high prices that were paid for the theoretical package purchased, and the great losses 
obtained in return. In his words, next to the great benefits attained by the McCulloch and Pitts’ 
networks, “what is not demonstrated by the McCulloch and Pitts result is equally important”.507 
There are three major issues left unsolved, or even further problematized, after assuming the 
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McCulloch and Pitts’ networks. What von Neumann recounted here summarized the discomfort 
he felt for three years: 1) There is no proof anywhere that McCulloch and Pitts’ networks 
actually occur in nature.
508
 2) There is no assurance that whatever was left aside in the 
axiomatization of the neuron is not of the utmost importance. 3) Most disturbingly… 
 It does not follow that there is a considerable problem left just in saying what you think is 
 to be described. Let me try to put this in another way. If you consider certain activities of  the 
 human nervous system, you find that some of them are such that all parts of them can be 
 described, but one is flabbergasted by the totality of what has to be described.
509
 
Once he justified plenty why McCulloch and Pitts’ networks were not the way to go for a 
cybernetic articulation in general --and of a nervous system in particular --, von Neumann 
advocated for the line of research proposed to Wiener in the 1946 letter. Primitive organic 
systems should be the first ones to be understood, putting special attention on bacteriophages. 
The feature of primitive life that one ought to focus on is self-reproduction. If one is able to 
recreate such an essentially biological feature, von Neumann would consider it the first 
qualitatively distinct step towards a practical understanding of a living system feasibly 
reproducible in a model. Recreating self-reproduction would be a concrete task that could give a 
distinctly profound insight into the nature of life. In faithfully cybernetic manner, he thought of a 
real world, physical model of this primitive system: he specifically called for an automaton 
occupying Euclidean three-dimensional space. The primitive automaton would arbitrarily 
measure some decimeters, and it would be constituted by the following elements: 
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 + Four computing elements (three logical and one processing):  
  - Disjunctive organ (for the function or) 
  - Conjunctive organ (for the function and) 
  - Inhibitory organ (for the function not and) 
  - Sensing element (stimuli producing)  
 + Four mechanical elements   
   - A fusing element; this organ would weld parts together. 
  - A cutting element; this organ would separate parts. 
  - A muscle organ; this organ would provide motion. 
  - A rigid organ; which would just provide structural rigidity.
510
 
The automaton would operate in the following way. The “mother” automaton, in possession of 
the whole set of instructions for a model of itself, is to be left freely floating in a liquid 
substance, surrounded by physical parts of itself, freely floating as well. When the automaton 
would bump into a part, tests would be performed within itself in order to identify what kind of 
part it is (a muscle contracts, a rigid bar does not change, etc.). It was not specified how this 
contact process would precisely operate, but von Neumann suggested that there might be a 
“sensing” device, actuated by the muscle element. The muscle organ would also provide motion 
to the fusing and cutting organs. The automaton would gradually put all the parts welded 
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together, and as the last step, it would transfer the set of instructions of itself,
511
 for the 
“daughter” automaton to continue the reproductive process. In such way, the “miracle” of life 
would be a step closer to be fully artificially recreated in the metal, thus providing the kind of 
cybernetic true knowledge only possible when breaking down the problem into an engineering 
issue. 
 A number of issues can readily be identified in the previous description of artificial self-
reproduction. Firstly, von Neumann conspicuously avoided touching upon the issue of an energy 
source –all the more telling, after advocating for a future logic that should be sensitive to issues 
of thermodynamics (the amount of steps to reach an answer would have practical consequences 
in friction, decay, erosion, heat dissipation, etc.). Probably, he was going to add this feature 
later.
512
 However, it is already signaling the strategy that he is going to be using: axiomatizing 
elements and black-boxing issues that otherwise would throw paralyzing obstacles for the 
experimental research to continue. After all, he did justify the same strategy used by McCulloch 
and Pitts’ networks to some extent. 
 Also, there is no elaboration as to how the grasping of the floating parts would be 
performed. Presumably by means of a movable mechanical “arm”, helped by both the muscle 
organ and the energy source, the part would be grabbed and put in the right spot. The same goes 
for the welding and cutting procedure; there is no mention of the way in which these would 
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work. Or even for the all-important gadget that would function as a “recognizing device”, which 
would presumably provide information for the proper accommodation of the found part. There is 
practically nothing said about this.
513
 
 
5. The Theory of Automata: From embodiment to abstraction. 
 
Despite the cautious justification for obviating these empirical aspects for the sake of the 
advancement of the theory, one can safely assume that this might have been a cold comfort for 
von Neumann. He was not only keenly aware of the cybernetic tradition of demonstrating 
knowledge by means of “recreating” it in the metal, as showed by Grey’s tortoises, Shannon’s 
rat, Ashby’s homeostat and even the early Wiener’s uncanny AA predictor. Von Neumann 
demonstrated a personal leniency, unlike many mathematicians, to implement his ideas in the 
flesh, being the primal example what came to be known as the von Neumann-architecture 
computer.
514
 Leaving aside the truly mechanical aspects of the automaton was likely not 
something he cherished. In fact, it is recalled that he would be seen walking around Princeton 
University with a smiley face and big boxes filled with Meccano pieces of tinker toys.
515
 After 
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all von Neumann did have the cybernetic mandate of knowledge as re-creating as an integral part 
of his epistemology.  
 Conversation with colleagues gradually convinced him to leave aside the “problematic” 
approach to knowledge-gathering having physical substrata as a grounding factor. The Polish 
mathematician Stanislaw Ulam (1909–1984) gradually convinced him to leave aside bodily 
three-dimensionality to re-state the problem in a two-dimensional plane. Being an outstanding 
mathematician himself, von Neumann acknowledged that his three-dimensional “kinematic” 
model lacked the mathematical “elegance” that might be required for future generations to build 
upon it. With the new proposal, void of a balancing physical checkpoint, it was expected that he 
would be able to give attention to the elaboration of a logic of reproduction that he claimed was 
non-existent. 
 What von Neumann developed after the suggestion of his colleague is what came to be 
known as the theory of cellular automata.
516
 It consisted of two-dimensional squares, called 
lattices, which would --under specific instructions based upon the condition of the contiguous 
squares (occupied or not) -- “grow” and “reproduce”. These two-plane automata would show a 
fairly complex behavior stemming from simple rules –which would allegedly fulfill the 
evolutionary evidence of complex structures coming from simpler ones (as it is shown in the 
biological reproduction of entities, commencing in unicellular beings). All this was to occur on a 
flat geometrical plane, completely void of Euclidean mass and thus free from the extra (and 
implementationally and operationally “crippling”) complications of the three-dimensional world.  
 The details of this historic theory are not the concern of this work. What is important to 
remark is the effective outcome of von Neumann’s change of methodology. As indicated above, 
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von Neumann thought of this later work as the most fundamental of his whole career. He used to 
talk about it with solemnity, effectively devoting to it the last decade of his life --to the chagrin 
of government officials and colleagues who wanted him more involved in work with computing 
machines. However, despite the effort of a few disciples,
517
 the theory of cellular automata fell 
into oblivion,
518
 after von Neumann died.
519
 It was attempted to be rescued
520
 but it remains an 
effort whose punchline never arrived.
521
  
 Most importantly perhaps, cybernetics missed a fundamental arm in its own body of 
theoretical tenets: the utmost importance of the physical instantiations of their theoretical 
pursuits. Von Neumann effectively ended up taking the same path that he criticized just a few 
years earlier, provoking a focus in the abstracted model as if it would be the object of study 
itself.  The importance of the structure of the object was shown to be particularly relevant and 
helpful when the mapping of possible behavior became extremely complex and beyond feasible 
management in practical terms. But once one takes a peek into the structure itself, the difficulty 
found is “flabbergasting” –as von Neumann would like to refer to it. And so the nuanced 
epistemic trip taken by von Neumann followed these stages: 1. the study of virus; 2. the attempt 
to recreate “primitive” self-reproduction; 3. the paralyzing effects of the physical details of the 
mechanical model; 4. the retreat into the non-physical realm. And this last one is precisely what 
                                                 
517
 Mainly Arthur Burks. He published about von Neumann’s automata theory in Burks 1959; 1960; 1963; 1963b, 
1966, 1970; 1974; 1975 and of course Von Neumann 1966, where Burks did the heavy editing and completion. 
518
 Boden 2006, pp. 890-892 
519
 Von Neumann reverted to the Catholic faith that he adopted when he married his first wife. He was accompanied 
by a Benedictine priest the last days of his life, at the end of which he received the Last Rites (McRae 1992, pp. 378-
379). 
520
 Probably the most serious attempt was NASA’s commission to study the feasibility of constructing and using 
self-replicating machines for space exploration. This technical report has a section on asteroid mining that has lately 
re-gained some momentum, due to the renewed interest in such potentially pecuniary enterprise (See Freitas & 
Gilbreath 1980). 
521
 The relatively novel field of Artificial Life does not take sides with the kinematic model as opposed to the 
cellular model, but it does acknowledge the former as the first model that fully grasped the essence of ALife –a 
fortiori, a successfully self-reproducing automaton would qualify as living for this discipline (Langton 1989). 
Theorizers of nanotechnology do recognize von Neumann’s kinematic model as conforming the root of their 
envisaged “molecular assembler” (See Drexler 1986, ch. 4). 
206 
 
happened to McCulloch and Pitts, which von Neumann was quick and effective in pointing out –
to the eventual resigned acceptance of McCulloch. Seemingly, von Neumann’s suggestion to 
focus on the structure of very simple and primitive entities was confronted with the reality that 
they were not simple enough for mechanical re-creation. Once physical instantiation is out of the 
equation, cybernetics is left with little that would make it different and unique, let alone 
revolutionary. 
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VII. Cybernetic tensions: Further philosophical considerations. 
 
1. Consequences of the irrelevancy of materiality for the nature of a machine. 
 
Let us recall that the origin of cybernetics is situated in the context of research on anti-aircraft 
defense --the nature of the mechanically operated anti-aircraft gun, the soldier’s almost 
symbiotic relation with the operating machine, both processing in sync the information available 
about the enemy target. The question “what kind of machine have we placed in the middle?”522 
was attacked by Wiener by means of a behavioral understanding of both the machines and the 
human in between them, under one and the same theoretical framework. This was made possible 
thanks to a more extended view of what a machine stands for, taking cues from Turing’s 
suggestions regarding the mechanical essence of an algorithm –or the algorithmic essence of a 
machine.
523
 Shannon’s work on information theory anchored both realms even closer, both 
seamlessly crossed-through by information flow. Considering these black boxes as displaying 
active “aims” was the feature that distinguished cybernetic talk from the already entrenched 
behavioral psychology of the time. 
 The approach seemed promising, and to some extent, it flourished. Understanding 
adaptive --even intelligent-- behavior from an exclusively external point of view (leaving 
inquiries into the nature of the working structures aside) produced striking results. There were 
the mice and the tortoises of Shannon and Walter, which attracted attention beyond cybernetic 
circles, occupying pages in mainstream magazines and booths in science festivals. There was 
McCulloch and Pitts’ networks, which mathematized certain purported behaviors of the brain 
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and the nervous system, serving as the platform for von Neumann’s construction of the first 
stored-program computer. They seemed to have hit the sweet epistemological spot regarding the 
behavior of entities in nature, which would otherwise be riddled with vitalist assumptions. 
Rigorous behavioral descriptions could be unambiguously measured. It seemed to be the right 
path chosen for understanding man, faithful to (and consistent with) the mechanistic tradition. 
After all, for the cyberneticians such tradition still effectively was the strongest one (if not the 
only one) in modern science, if we are to maintain that “to understand” a thing means “to provide 
the mechanism” for such thing.  
The homeostat’s creation was a necessary outcome of such a position --it was just a 
matter of time. Cybernetic tenets pointed in that direction right from the start. But cyberneticians 
might not have gone that extra mile. When Ashby entered the picture, it probably rang the death 
knell of a project whose radically materialistic ontology might not have shown itself with all its 
colors to the cyberneticists themselves. Mechanical mice and electric tortoises, wandering 
autonomously, avoiding obstacles and “figuring out” their way out of a maze, were creatures that 
immediately were predicated of as being essentially the same as the ones that nature boasts –just 
simpler, but with possibilities of growth in complexity. The homeostat was another story. With 
this machine, the learning process of a kitten (who is first attracted to a flame, but after being 
burnt, begins to avoid it) does not qualitatively stand out from the situation of a plastic ball 
finding its way out of a moving box with a hole.
524
 Under the hood, both situations where 
underpinned by random processes that would lock and capitalize on those outcomes that benefit 
the system –to the dismay of Julian Bigelow, who saw no virtue in that.525  
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Let us recall the damming examples of the young philosopher Richard Taylor when 
attacking Bigelow, Wiener and Rosenblueth’s 1943 article.526 The behavior of a missile with a 
rope attached to its nose, being pulled by a submarine, would also count as behavior with an aim 
(along with that of a self-guided missile, the example given in the criticized article). 
Trivialization seemed to have been a looming outcome always present. In the case of the 
homeostat at Macy, trivialization, although it showed its face, seemed to have worked its way to 
those very foundations –at least in what pertains to the reasons for an important part of its 
success and its intentions-- which lured brilliant minds into cybernetics. The cybernetic project 
was partly appealing because of the promise of being able to construct artifacts that would not 
only emulate, but eventually replace those constructed by nature –thanks to the discovered 
knowledge of a machine-basis common to both, the natural and the artificial. That promise 
proved to be exciting and extremely attractive (probably more so in the context of a Cold War 
threatening the existence of natural life as we knew it). But then came a cyberneticist who 
faithful to cybernetic tenets in extremis, proclaimed that the very features that we understand as 
the ultimate pointers for life, namely self-organization and adaptation, are in no way particular to 
living entities –in fact, they are a necessary condition of existence for material objects coping, 
such as crystals.
527
 And randomly so at that. And he had a machine to show it. Ashby, however, 
was not without a tradition of thought that heavily relied on experimentation and physical 
recreation.  
It has been indicated that scientists in the United Kingdom were very interested in 
cybernetics right from the beginning, influencing their own careers and even forming a small, 
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invitation only, regular discussion gathering.
528
 Ross Ashby, producing his own insights squarely 
within cybernetic thinking at the start of the 1940s
529
 –almost a decade before Wiener’s 
catalyzing book
530—seemingly performed a tune-up of the enterprise’s theoretical core. Some 
years later, he recounted in his own book
531
 the intellectual adventure into the solidification of 
cybernetic science, providing valuable insight into his life’s work --which was to some extent, as 
previously shown, seemingly more concerned with cybernetic dicta than that of the original 
cyberneticians themselves. 
 A crucial point that Ashby found as fundamental to the whole enterprise was the notion 
of control. We have seen that Norbert Wiener was well aware of its importance, identifying 
James C. Maxwell’s 19th century mathematical treatment of governors532 as the theoretical 
foundational document for cybernetics.
533
 Wiener’s famous book carried the noun “control” in 
its subtitle. However, Ashby identified that a previous, more fundamental notion, was the one 
that made possible control in the first place; this more primal notion was that of a machine. The 
strategic move that extended the notion of machine into realms heretofore untouched by it is 
located here. This extension is ingeniously articulated by means of choosing geometry as a 
cybernetically suitable theoretical counterpart. Ashby described how this mathematical branch 
went from being ruled (and constrained) by physical instantiations, to actually containing them 
later on. This extension gained for geometry unprecedented control…  
 There was a time when “geometry” meant such relationships as could be  demonstrated on three-
 dimensional objects or in two-dimensional diagrams… In those days a form which was suggested 
 by geometry but which could not be demonstrated in ordinary space was suspect or inacceptable. 
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 Ordinary space dominated geometry. Today the position is quite  different…Today it is geometry 
 that contains the terrestrial forms, and not vice versa, for the terrestrial forms are merely special 
 cases in an all-embracing geometry. The gain achieved by geometry’s development hardly needs 
 to be pointed out. Geometry now acts as a framework on which all terrestrial forms can find their 
 natural place, with the relations between the various forms readily appreciable. With this 
 increased understanding goes a correspondingly increased power of control.
534
 
Cybernetics follows this path: it has the same relation to an actual machine that geometry has to 
an actual, ‘terrestrial’ object. Hence, cybernetics “takes as its subject-matter the domain of ‘all 
possible machines,’ and is only secondarily interested if informed that some of them have not yet 
been made, either by Man or by Nature”.535 In such way, Ashby managed to identify the crucial 
elements that make a machine what it is --in plain philosophy, its ‘essence’-- thus furnishing its 
particular capacities. And the mechanization of entities entails the exertion of controlling power 
over them. For Ashby, such articulation was isomorphic with scientific explanation, in so far as 
one understands “explanation” in this context as isomorphic to providing an “explanatory 
mechanism”. A mechanism entails a machine –and we managed to find it in nature. Modern 
science is on the right path. 
 Aware that this accomplishment is something remarkable in terms of extending powers of 
tractability to realms previously beyond mechanistic reach, Ashby claimed that it is “one of the 
substantial advances of the last decade [1950s] that we have at last identified the essentials of the 
‘machine in general’”.536 Here Ashby is in fact referring to himself, as he was correctly aware 
that “[m]any a book has borne the title ‘Theory of Machines’, but it usually contains information 
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about mechanical things, about levers and cogs”.537 It is he who comes up first with a rigorous 
definition of what a machine is:  
 [A] machine is that [whose] internal state, and the state of its surroundings, defines 
 uniquely the next state it will go to.
538
  
This over-encompassing definition, the embodiment of a merge between a theory of machine 
behavior and negative entropy, gained unprecedented “control” for cybernetics by means of 
extending the reach of what can be understood as a full-blown machine. Ashby confided that in 
order to see clearly a machine for what it is, a behavior-based premise had to gain precedence, so 
as to dispel probable metaphysical or epistemological misunderstandings of what essentially 
constitutes a machine. And so he expressed that 
 Before the essentials could be seen, we had to realize that two factors had to be excluded as 
 irrelevant. The first is “materiality” –the idea that a machine must be made of actual matter, or the 
 hundred or so existing elements. This is wrong, for examples can readily be given… showing that 
 what is essential is whether the system, of angels and ectoplasm if you please, behaves in a law-
 abiding and machine-like way.
539
  
By musing about machines made up of “angels and ectoplasm”, Ashby wanted to push the point 
across unambiguously: the materiality of a machine is entirely circumstantial. Not only has this 
observation closed the case regarding whether something purporting to be a mechanism is a 
machine --the answer being obviously in the positive. It also displaces the importance we have 
traditionally (both scientifically and philosophically) attributed to physicality --in the sense of 
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materiality. In this sense the physical sciences themselves might see their strong theoretical 
attachments to materiality seriously affected. The definition of the physically real would no 
longer entail material measurability. This seems to be a historic instance where an 
epistemological backhand move was surreptitiously passed. And it could have resulted in deep 
tensions within the cybernetic ontology --committed since the start to a physical grounding in a 
radically Viconian manner.
540
  
 Furthermore, it could have also signified the coming of an epistemic turn --still in the 
making
541
 –inimical to a classical cybernetic epistemology: life as necessary order coming out of 
chaos, or negative entropy as the natural course of things coping in the world; both against what 
Wiener would defend.
542
 Let us recall Ross Ashby’s heated exchange at the 1942 Macy 
conference.
543
 There, some in the audience were taken aback by Ashby’s assertion that his 
homeostat displayed exactly the same learning and survival that a cat displays when it learns and 
survives. Ashby reminded them that “to learn”, in cybernetic lingo, necessarily entailed, 
“objectively” speaking --without retorting to psychologisms or introspections-- a consequent 
change of behavior. An “animal” can be observed to “learn” in order to “survive”: In strictly 
physicalist terms, that translates to a system adapting in order to reach and maintain equilibrium. 
To lose the capacity to adapt means to die. Seemingly, some cyberneticians (e.g., Julian 
Bigelow) were not too comfortable with the kind of conclusions that Ashby showed they were 
compelled to reach, if they were to still hold on to the basic tenets of cybernetics. To recall, 
Ashby indeed bridged the artificial inanimate with the organic living in no vague terms.
544
  
                                                 
540
 Chapter IV, section 4. 
541
 Chapter IV, section 2 
542
 Chapter IV, section 2 
543
 Chapter V, section 5 
544
 Recalling the relevant quote by Ashby: 
The moment we see that “adaptiveness” implies a circuit and that a circuit implies an equilibrium, we can 
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 Ashby was relentlessly taking a machine-ontology based upon observable behaviors to its 
ultimate consequences, confident of its epistemological strength and methodological 
maneuverability. He showed this unmovable confidence throughout the years in his own 
theoretical development –if anything, the certainty grew stronger. Hence, at the Macy 
conference, he convincingly showed to the cyberneticians that if behavior, tout court, is what 
tells us what a thing is, then they have to concede that his presented machine is alive –or, at the 
very least, that living entities live and survive in the same way that this machine does. If one 
considers that a cat behaving differently after training can be said to have learned, one is 
compelled to accept that the machine has learned, given that it behaved differently after 
training.
545
 This was in fact a crucial aspect of cybernetics. 
 Ashby was however somewhat encouraged by the criticism he received regarding the 
relative simplicity of the exposed entity (his machine), of which it could be said, through a 
behavior-only lens, that it was indeed alive and learning –but not precisely “alive and kicking”. 
More was needed. Mindful of the feedback received at the conference, Ashby allowed for higher 
layers of complexity in the structure of the machine to be an issue to be dealt with –so that it 
could be more justifiably comparable with the behavior of biological entities. In fact, he already 
had embarked upon the construction of DAMS. And as we saw,
546
 this more complex automaton 
did not show any pattern of self-organizing behavior whatsoever, to Ashby’s disappointment. For 
a moment, while the homeostat showed its glory, one could witness the argument for a state of 
                                                                                                                                                             
is precisely the main feature of adaptive behavior that it enables the animal to continue to exist… I must 
say unambiguously what I mean by ‘alive’. I assume that if the organism is to stay alive, a comparatively 
small number of essential variables must be kept between physiologic limits. Each of these variables can be 
represented by a pointer in a dial… This, of course, is in no way peculiar to living organisms (Ashby 1953, 
p. 73) 
545
 The “post hoc ergo propter hoc” fallacy was seemingly not flagged, possibly due to the context of the necessity 
of an exclusively mechanical explanation –which severely reduces the possibility of entertaining alternative 
explanations.  
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nature that coping mechanisms inevitably reach, through trial and error towards self-
organization, bringing order out of chaos --and eventually, life. This, most likely, would not have 
been to Wiener’s liking. 
     
2. Consequences of a machine’s isomorphism with highly complex entities. 
  
An exclusively behavioral-based understanding of a coping system was explanatorily adequate 
when the entity did not exceed a certain threshold of complexity. Once that threshold was 
crossed, then explanatory models would explode towards the practically unfeasible. During the 
Hixon Symposium,
547
 McCulloch considered the possibility of having his networks utilized for 
mapping thought processes, accepting that the adequate implementation might now be in its 
infancy, but mostly due to an issue of availability of materials --and not to the theory itself. Thus, 
we saw how McCulloch referred somewhat compassionately to von Neumann’s physical 
instantiations of his networks --namely, the first stored-program computing machines.548 
Von Neumann would more than concur with McCulloch’s hyperbole. In fact, building the 
computing machines using McCulloch’s (and Pitts’) model helped him notice precisely such 
inadequacy, and in productive ways. Von Neumann saw in the very nature of the model --
namely, one that maps network behaviors rather than structures-- an inherent incapacity for 
capturing a very complex entity. It was a model surely amenable to be instantiated in a 
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Neurons are cheap and plentiful. If it cost a million dollars to beget a man, one neuron would not cost a 
mill. They operate with comparatively little energy. The heat generated  raises the blood in passage about 
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computing machine –as he efficiently showed-- but thoroughly inadequate to map a brain. Being 
the latter an object of very high complexity, encompassing all the possible behaviors of such 
system would render the outcome of the model realistically intractable --even if in principle 
feasible. Von Neumann thus gave an image-rich (negative) verdict of McCulloch and Pitts’ 
networks in regards to being a model suitable for understanding the nervous system.549 
John von Neumann also expressed this dissatisfaction in the aforementioned infamous 
letter to Norbert Wiener
550
 at two main levels. First, McCulloch and Pitts’ networks seemed to be 
a model unfit for studying a highly complex object --knowledge likely acquired and/or 
reinforced with his own experience while building a computer based upon it (and which already 
occupied a physical space of considerable dimensions). Second, leaving the model aside, 
studying the nervous system at all seemed too far-fetched and even hubristic, given its 
extraordinary --probably the most extreme-- complexity.  
 Putting the two criticisms together, von Neumann fleshed out a proposal: Going “back to 
the basics” --also at two main levels. First, choosing the simplest living system, and start from 
that; he suggested a virus. Second, to forego McCulloch and Pitts’ networks of behavioral 
mapping-- they have proven their efficacy for other realms, such as automated computing 
processes, relieving humans from such tedious task-- and to focus instead on the very structure at 
hand. To recall, for von Neumann, after a certain threshold of complexity, it is more feasible to 
describe the structure of the object than its behavior --hence effectively reversing the modeling 
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roles. Attaining a full description of the elements constituting the studied entity would still be 
indeed difficult, but now it remains within the realm of feasibility –and that is a huge gain. 
However, there he introduces a very un-cybernetic idea for a “true” understanding of a complex 
object. It is worth taking another look at what he said… 
 I would, however, put on “true” understanding the most stringent interpretation possible:  
 That is, understanding the organism in the exacting sense in which one may want to  
 understand a detailed drawing of a machine, i.e. finding out where every individual nut  
 and bolt is located, etc. It seems to me that this is not at all hopeless… I suppose (without 
 having done it) that if one counted rigorously the number of “elements” in a locomotive, one 
 might also wind up in the high ten thousands. Consequently this is a degree of complexity 
 which is not necessarily beyond human endurance.
551
 
The analogy here with a machine is not casual, and more so coming from an unapologetic 
cybernetician –which he certainly was, despite his vocal disagreements. The immediate 
usefulness of the machine imagery here is the entailed amenability of being taken apart piece by 
piece --literally, one by one-- as one could do, despite the daunting task, with an airplane or a 
ship. Cybernetics certainly aimed to understand living organisms as machines; however, the 
extension of the notion of machine upon them was clearly based on the behavior of the former, 
and not upon the structure of the latter. As an outcome, for von Neumann, the still gigantic 
difficulty of the job would be now quantitative and not qualitative in nature --and that is where 
the ‘huge gain’ is located. The complex entity would now be at least tractable --which is not the 
case with the unworkable amount of variables resulting from the exact description of the 
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behavior of a very complex object (like the brain). Such is the gain of turning into an “exacting 
sense”552 of rigorously understanding something qua machina.  
 In order to have a clear and mechanical model that could be neatly disassembled (at least 
theoretically), the object itself has to be sufficiently away from that threshold of complexity that 
stunned von Neumann in the first place. And because cybernetics aimed at understanding living 
beings in a full-blown mechanical way, von Neumann elected a virus as the entity to start with. 
However, we know that right in the very letter of complaint against McCulloch and Pitts’ 
networks (as a model for a brain), he also expressed his shocked amazement at the complexity of 
even the simplest entities of the biological world.553 
Once we shift attention from a complex entity’s behavior to its structure, the employed 
model risks entering into a one to one mapping with the objects’ features, potentially bringing an 
unsurmountable intractability. Realizing the staggering complexity of even the simplest living 
entities, von Neumann not only settled for the study of viruses, but within that realm, he 
advocated focusing on its capacity for reproduction. It would seem that it is more reasonable to 
identify a feature of an organism that at least looks amenable to being recreated. All the more so 
if such feature paradigmatically characterizes an entity as living: self-replication --certainly 
present in a virus. That should provide us with a still audacious, but more realistic, task to 
accomplish. 
 True to his cybernetic spirit –the same spirit that used the McCulloch and Pitts’ networks 
for building the first computing machines-- von Neumann embarked upon the task of recreating 
it mechanically. His “kinematic model” came to fruition, where an eventually constructed entity 
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should be able to navigate through a host of floating resources, and use them to make a copy of 
itself. However, this task was proven to be exceedingly more difficult than expected –arguably, 
until today. Issues of solderability, separation and energy sources crippled the problem right 
from the start. This pushed von Neumann to consider an alleged equivalent of this self-
reproducing entity, but now entirely living in logical space. He was finally persuaded to switch 
to a disembodied model, in the form of a logic of lattices –a two dimensional model that by its 
very nature avoids the problems entailed by the actual physicality of a self-reproducing 
automaton. Although von Neumann died before completing what for him was the most important 
undertaking of his life, the project was somewhat briefly followed up by a few disciples, only to 
end up in relative obscurity ever since. 
 
3. An ontological slippery slope: From complexity to disembodiment. 
 
As previously pointed out, cybernetics’ perch for model building was not radically new. 
Although it became right from the start a sort of defining feature for the scientific enterprise, the 
material recreation of a studied object has deep roots in the Western tradition of philosophy. The 
manner in which cybernetics assumed this feature (model buildability), was based upon the 
behavior of the object –readily pointed out by Wiener on the American side and by Ashby on the 
British side. The strategy proposed by von Neumann, however, pushed for a preceding “return” 
to the structure of the object per se. The basis for this, to repeat, was that after a certain threshold 
of complexity is reached, it is more attainable to map the object’s structure directly, rather than 
comprising the gigantic plethora of all its possible behaviors. Still within a cybernetic spirit, von 
Neumann nevertheless pushed ahead with the necessary buildability of the obtained modeled 
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object, however now based upon its structure, and not its behavior. Put back by the seemingly 
intractable complexity of micro-biology, not even a virus seemed amenable to be structurally 
cracked for epistemological purposes via a one-to-one descriptive mapping and subsequent 
recreation. Von Neumann tried to focus at least on reproduction alone, but he ended up in the 
logical space of two-dimensional lattices. That must have signified a rift in the cybernetic 
embodied epistemology.  
 Although von Neumann and Ashby differed in regards to their approach to a behavior-
based understanding of a surviving entity, both did accept it as a legitimate and appraisable 
cybernetic methodological tool, as presented and depicted by Wiener, Rosenblueth and 
Bigelow’s 1943 founding article –where they distinguished it from mere behaviorism tout 
court.
554
 When referring to the accomplishment of McCulloch and Pitts’ networks in 
demonstrating that behavior can be totally and rigorously described, Von Neumann had positive 
thoughts about it –so much so that he went off to build a computing machine, the first of its kind, 
based upon this approach.  
 However, von Neumann applied theoretical “breaks” when confronted with the attempt at 
applying these behavioristic lenses to something extraordinarily more complex than a computer 
machine --namely, the nervous system and the brain. Once there, McCulloch’s somewhat 
mocking suggestion (that one would need the Niagara Falls to provide the electric current and 
the Niagara River to dissipate the heat) was actually topped by von Neumann. He suggested 
instead --surpassing McCulloch’s picturesque rhetoric-- that a description using McCulloch and 
Pitts’ model may take more time than that of a human’s lifetime and its material dimensions 
exceed those of the physical universe. In face of this, a look into the actual structure of the 
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system, whose description might be less complex than its behavior, seemed like a way out –
eventually to no avail, as we now know. 
 Hence, albeit with different technical motivations but with the same cybernetic 
intentions, both thinkers suffered the backlash of tinkering with actual structures –as opposed to 
manipulating models of their behavior. It is important to signalize that at this point both had 
already crossed the methodological line in the sand, entering into non-cybernetic territory. The 
investigation of the nitty-gritty stuff operating under the hood in the ‘teleologically behaving’ 
mechanical systems is the task of the traditional science ‘underdog,’ not of the new science of 
cybernetics, equipped which such an impressive novel theoretical edifice. Even if cybernetics did 
not have as an aim to transcend or replace physics, it did want to extend it –in its own eyes, to 
actually ‘defend’ it.555 The price to pay for this trespassing came from cybernetics itself.  
 It has been several times pointed out that reliance on physical instantiations of its own 
theoretical proposals was part and parcel of the cybernetic impetus. This was untenable after an 
anti-cybernetic ‘heresy’ was committed. Once the ‘harm’ was done, it became evident for both 
cases that the cybernetic mandate for physically grounding the theory, complicated things to the 
point of no solution. Where Ashby had to concede even on his own terms an augmentation of 
complexity within the structure behind the homeostat’s behavior (to be able to account for a 
more life-like comparison, thus giving birth to the doomed project of DAMS, where no order 
was to be attained), von Neumann had to plunge into the structure of complex entities (by-
passing McCulloch and Pitts’ networks, engaging into the construction of automata according to 
cybernetic dictum, only to then retreat into the non-physical due to the very complexity that 
made him turn away from the artificial neural networks in the first place).  
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 When the cybernetic mandate for behaviorally articulating the studied object fell short, 
then entering the realm of structure to better understand the operating entity seemed to be the 
next, scientifically motivated, viable step. But this move clashed with the cybernetic mandate of 
instantiating theories in concreto. More precisely, the mandate for buildability cancelled the 
possible import of going out of the cybernetic way into structural insights, given that this very 
need for physicality rendered the recreated structures as caricatures of the modeled object.  
After von Neumann’s kinematic model failed he had to retreat into logical research. After 
Ashby’s DAMS failed he ended up studying systems. Unexpectedly, the last cybernetic move 
was to find refuge in the realm of the disembodied, betraying a main column (arguably its 
strongest differentiator) of this “new science”.556 
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Concluding remarks: The nature of a machine and the collapse of cybernetics.  
       
The main aim of the preceding chapters has been to establish the strong correlation between the 
evolving role of the notion of a machine, its role in scientific explanation and the subsequent 
outcome in the scientific pursuits it fostered, with particular emphasis on cybernetics –a 
scientific endeavor whose very core pivoted around the ontology of a machine. 
 In an attempt to nest the theoretical pillars of cybernetics within the evolution of ideas, 
the context that preceded the movement was laid out, starting with identifying an impetus for 
addressing certain fundamental mathematical problems presented at the beginning of the 
previous century by David Hilbert. Several European thinkers, ranging from Gottlob Frege to 
Kurt Gödel, engaged into an attempt of founding mathematics upon logical and/or formalistic 
grounds, triggering the foundational question for the rigorous definition of the notion of an 
algorithm. Alan Turing picked up the task, devising an abstract machine whose behavior would 
exactly define what an algorithm is supposed to do --and hence, what it is supposed to be. This 
definition of an entity based upon its behavior, carried some far-reaching consequences, as it was 
indicated later. Turing’s puzzling reversal regarding the possibility of intelligent machinery 
allows to show a possible link between cybernetics and the evolution of Turing’s thought. 
 The chapters pertaining to cybernetics proper (the core of this work) were intended to be, 
beyond a mere scholarly updated description of what the movement stood for, rather an 
articulated account of its theoretical pillars, based upon its different takes on the notion of a 
machine –namely, the latter being possibly teleological, possibly non-material and ultimately the 
instantiation (accordingly, materially or not) of a theory. This reading of cybernetics’ structure 
and goals allowed me to show the subsequent internal tensions that arguably led to its demise. 
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Coupled with the implosion of the Macy conferences and the Ratio club, two reported 
experiences occurring during the mid-1940s and lasting for less than a decade, those of William 
Ross Ashby and John von Neumann, can serve as historical markers pointing to the time when 
classical cybernetics was effectively over --around the mid 1950’s.  
 However, beyond historical clarifications, a theoretical issue of philosophical import 
seems to emerge from the scrutiny of both experiences. Both scientists, after struggling with 
physical instantiations of their advocated proposals, ended up retreating from the material 
anchoring of these proposals into a disembodied realm –the very realm inhabited by those 
positions they were set to dispel in the first place, be it psychologisms or metaphysical truisms. 
These ad intra conflicting cybernetic developments are exposed and treated in the two chapters 
that followed, one pertaining to von Neumann’s contributions and the other to Ross Ashby’s –
two cyberneticists whose influence on the enterprise has been so far relatively relegated to a 
secondary role, probably due in part to the widespread non-philosophical accounts of 
cybernetics’ atrophy.  
 William Ross Ashby’s role in the cybernetic enterprise was characterized by a brilliant 
mind that combined a philosophical underlayer of psychology with the utilization of serious 
engineering skills, and whose British empiricist heritage led him to be faithful to the materialistic 
tenets of cybernetics until the end. Ashby’s role might have given him the image of the 
underlaborer of cybernetics, also caring more about cybernetic principles than what the founding 
cyberneticists themselves did. In that spirit, Ashby’s inroads into cybernetics commenced with 
his preoccupation with the underdeveloped notion of a machine –notion that necessarily had to 
grow in sophistication if it was destined to encompass living entities, as cybernetics clearly 
intended. For this, he embarked in what could stand as the only exclusive treatment of what a 
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machine stands for, including arriving at a definition of it. Ashby did this by substantially 
relating on the one hand the notions of equilibrium in physical systems, and on the other the 
adaptation by self-organization in living entities. He then equated this relationship with survival 
itself. Having bridged the organic and the inorganic by means of a fundamental feature of life 
present in both –namely, adaptability--, he then built a peculiar machine to show how it can do 
what was hitherto believed as being contrary to its own machinal nature: adapting to its changing 
environment. A machine which literally survived. Ashby’s homeostat, acting as an embodied 
heuristic device, uncomfortably cut through the not entirely metaphysics-free cybernetic minds, 
showing them how far the cybernetic mechanistic commitment goes, testing whether they were 
willing to pay the epistemological and ontological price.  
 Although Ashby was reasonably satisfied with the outcome of the exposition of his ideas 
by means of his device, he accepted criticisms, granting that the machine was embedded with too 
little a number of variables as it is, in its attempt to resemble a living entity. In fact he already 
had built another, more complicated one –DAMS. However, this last one never managed to 
attain the kind of self-organizing adaptive behavior of the simpler homeostat. Instead its chaotic 
behavior never seemed to reach, let alone settle in, a coping pattern --despite 2 years of careful 
observation. Ashby, discouraged, abandoned the project and focused on the theoretical 
exploration of the notion of “cybernetics of cybernetics” (or second order cybernetics), where the 
“observer becomes part of the system”, engaging in projects without physical grounding and 
effectively going under the radar (both scientifically and publicly) until the end of his life. 
 John von Neumann’s part in the cybernetic movement was in turn characterized by a 
genius put in check by Continental skepticism. Despite his praise of a bold and exciting proposal 
about the nature of life and mind –cybernetics--, he reminded us of the majesty of the “objects” 
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of study at hand. The networks constructed by McCulloch and Pitts, a model that, as we saw, 
was to become a major theoretical column for cybernetics, begun to be heavily criticized by von 
Neumann on a number of grounds. Despite his acknowledgment of the heuristic utility of the 
model, he pointed out to its excessive removal from the reality it was supposed to model – by 
means of necessary simplification. Being able to have a “working” model of what occurs inside 
the brain was certainly a plausible achievement, but the quantity of essential details left aside (for 
the model to work) was a source of concern for him. It might be the case that the very details that 
would otherwise give a richer and more revealing account, were being left aside. Von Neumann 
in fact advanced the idea that likely the most important aspects of our neural grid were indeed 
being left aside. Bringing this criticism to its logical outcome, he observed that if we are to take 
into consideration such a model for mapping real cognitive processes, the model would turn out 
to be of a degree of complexity that would absolutely escape our handling capabilities. In 
realistic terms, von Neumann would ask, what would the use for it be, if modeling a cognitive 
process would take someone’s entire life time, or if the scheme rendered would occupy the entire 
physical universe? 
 After the stark criticism against the verifiability of results given by McCulloch and Pitts’ 
networks –one of the main pillars of cybernetics-- von Neumann proposed an epistemological 
turn. He encouraged shifting away from the observations of the behavior of the object in order to 
focus instead on its structure, given that after a certain point of complexity, the latter could be 
more amenable of tractability than the former. Since the ultimate structure of a complex entity is 
complex itself (the model approaching a one to one mapping upon the object), von Neumann 
recommended retargeting the cybernetic attention towards simpler organisms. In fact, the 
simplest: a virus. Despite the limbo area that it occupies in terms of fully counting as a living 
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entity, a virus does display a feature essential to living things: reproductive capacities. Precisely 
this capability for self-replication is what von Neumann recognized and extrapolated as worthy 
to focus on and --in true cybernetic fashion—literally build. His resulting kinematic model, 
however, was fraught with issues pertaining to details inherent to material embodiment –to the 
way in which three-dimensional entities inhabit the world. He subsequently found asylum in 
logical representations of lattices --sidestepping the problems of physical embodiment altogether.  
After jumping out of the physical grounding into the abstract realm (calling for the developing of 
a “new logic” more suitable for automata reproduction), the project failed to garner attention. 
Shortly after, von Neumann died. 
 Both epic missions seemingly eventuated in negative outcomes. As advanced in this 
thesis, the tension between the mandate for model construction and the seemingly perennial 
temptation for abandoning all grips with physical reality might have proven to be devastating for 
the cybernetic endeavor. And more so if what ultimately characterized cybernetics was its 
impetus for control, in order to enhance and eventually complete its overarching articulating 
power. In the case of von Neumann, his kinematic model proved to be fraught with a plethora of 
practical issues, such as weight, density, friction, heat, material fatigue, etc. Being physical is 
hard, someone would say. In a move to avoid the problematic entailments of the physical 
construction of a fairly complex entity, he resorted to leaving physical grounding aside, 
concentrating instead on the possible future logic that would allow such entities, his automata, to 
exist. In the case of Ashby, the acknowledgement of the need of augmentation of variables, for 
an entity to more convincingly qualify as alive and learning, was realized in the construction of 
DAMS. However, one could witness via the dramatic entries in his diary how Ashby grows 
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increasingly discouraged in the span of two years, observing a machine that only renders chaotic 
behavior.  
 If one approaches the experience of classical cybernetics from the theoretical framework 
of an inquiry into the nature of a machine, one might be able to shed more light into what went 
down with such peculiar enterprise –one that manages to carry allure until these days. The 
cybernetic articulation of a machine might have been ahead of its time, particularly in what 
regards the role of entropy in the physical world, and the relevance of materiality for a physical 
entity to exist –such as a machine. Martin Heidegger might have been somewhat prescient in his 
usually unattended preoccupation of cybernetics. He was aware that the technological mandate 
of purposeful manipulation, paradigmatically present in cybernetics, was purportedly pursued for 
the sake of the improvement of the human condition –as Wiener would proclaim in later years. 
However, as we saw, Heidegger recognized in cybernetics an epistemology that was going to 
wrap up, for him, the very history of metaphysics. Cybernetics was not only going to transcend 
modern science as it was practiced, bringing us one step closer to a Leibnitzian dream of a 
universally subsumed reality under the power of calculus. Cybernetics was also destined to 
replace philosophy itself, by means of the ultimate mechanization of anything understandable --
precisely because it is understandable.  
 With cybernetics, an enriched understanding of what a machine is, was brought to the 
fore, reaching its zenith with Ross Ashby. Ashby brought to fruition Turing’s hint at a definition 
of a machine not fundamentally relying on its materiality, but rather, on its behavior. That much 
would be in sync with Norbert Wiener’s enriched understanding of a machine. However, 
seemingly an ontological displacement was taking place at the same time. While Wiener was 
talking about “teleological machines”, Ashby was interested in the machine’s capacity for self-
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organization –after all, if living entities truly were machines, they should show this capability. 
While Wiener would recognize negative-feedback-fed machines with a purpose in both the 
organic and inorganic realms, Ashby would see an inherent capacity of self-organization towards 
equilibrium. Both could prima facie be seen as compatible. With one difference: Wiener saw 
chaos as the fundamental inclination of physical reality. Ashby saw order as the forming 
undercurrent of this reality. The consequences of this subterranean displacement would come 
later. When Ashby, true to the cybernetic spirit, attempted to show a physical model of the 
machine –which should consequently blur the difference between the organic living and the 
artificial, inert contraption—he ran into problems. The instantiation of a self-organizing machine 
would work only with very simple and few variables (e.g., the homeostat). Once more 
complexity was introduced–which is required if one is to ever mimic, let alone re-create, life—
the physical instantiation of the model would no longer work. Ashby put his machines aside and 
dedicated himself to the disembodied study of systems, until the end of his career. 
In the case of John von Neumann, the aspect of this new and richer understanding of a 
machine that he wanted to put emphasis on was self-replication. This approach emerged out of a 
frustration taking place after attempting to model a nervous system or a brain upon artificial 
neural networks. Von Neumann showed that they would certainly work for far less complex 
machines –such as the first program-stored computer that he built. But it would be hopeless for 
mapping anything substantially more complex –such as the brain. In such case, the gain of being 
able to rigorously describe a behavior simply disappears, since the complexity is so tremendous 
that the rigorous behavior description would be translated into a model of such dimensions that it 
would inherently escape any possibility of human tractability. In such case, it would be “simpler” 
to in effect turn our attention into the structure of the entity –a very uncybernetic move, just as 
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much as Ashby’s stance regarding a necessary order coming out of chaos. Von Neumann’s 
approach, still riding the cybernetic spirit, had to be instantiated in the flesh, and such attempt is 
remembered as the kinematic model. “Real world” problems precluded this model from attaining 
success, and in a manner that ultimately is not dissimilar from Ashby’s late reaction, he dropped 
the physical instantiation of the model and opted for a theoretical project towards a new and 
enriched logic –leaving physical instantiations aside.  
 Once cybernetics lost its unique methodological and ontological stance –namely, 
knowing by means of constructing and letting this construction lead to more knowledge—not 
much was left that was unique to cybernetics. Considering the renewed and sophisticated 
understanding of what a machine is --which constituted a cybernetic cornerstone at a time-- it 
might come as somewhat expectable. After all, a machine does not have to be materially 
instantiated to be a machine, and so a physical embodiment of a machine is only tangentially 
important for the machine to be itself. But physical instantiations were fundamental for the 
cybernetic enterprise from its inception. It would seem that a profound insight eventually led to 
its own demise. Under this perspective, one could see as the positive outcome of the cybernetic 
implosion a richer and deeper understanding of the nature of a machine. 
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